MEMORY, TRAUMA,
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SELF

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MEMORY, TRAUMA,

AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SELF

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PREFACE

The volume *Memory, Trauma, and the Construction of the Self* represents the third part of the book series *Cultures, Contexts, Identities* edited by the Intercultural Studies Research Institute of the Debrecen Reformed Theological University. The invariable aim of the Research Institute is to present the new results of the research in the field of literature and culture and, in this context, to provide an opportunity for both experienced researchers with a mature research program and young researchers at the beginning of their professional career—with the undenied intention to foster the cross-border professional relations and the deepening of the existing ones between the Debrecen Reformed Theological University and Partium Christian University.

The revised and expanded material of the presentations held at the *2nd Networks Conference* jointly organized by the Department of English Language and Literatures of the Partium Christian University and our Research Institute in Oradea on 4 December 2020 form the backbone of this volume. The papers in the volume investigate the various aspects of cultural memory related to the themes of individual and collective memory, national identity, transcultural memory, and the themes of forgetting, erasure, and nostalgia in the context of different linguistic narratives. As for the structure of the volume, each chapter comprises essays connecting to different nodes of the problem fields.

In the section "Black Culture and Trauma," Yesmina Khedir provides a theoretical overview of the relationship between trauma, cultural memory, and the African American cultural identity. Bianka Szendrei analyses Janelle Monáe's film *Dirty Computer* bearing the same title as her third music album as a production that allows for the multiple intersections of several branches of art to convey powerful messages. At the heart of the work, there are questions of the loss and recovery of the collective memory as they are articulated within the framework of the American black culture today. Alexandra Erdős analyses the short story "On the Road" by Langston Hughes, a major writer of the Harlem Renaissance, exploring the layer of meaning of

the text informed by African American religiosity. Her method essentially identifies the religious images in the text as they recycle biblical symbols to provide a narrative that both criticizes white American religiosity/society and re-enlivens African American religio-cultural consciousness. Anxhela Filaj investigates the memoir *Hunger* by Roxane Gay, an American author of Haitian descent, in terms of the narrativity of severe trauma experienced earlier in life and the life chances resulting from the change in the image of one's own body. She approaches the text of the author with multiple social disadvantages from the perspective of the conceptual framework offered by intersectionality.

The first essay by András Tarnóc in the section "Remembering, Forgetting, Dreaming, and the Construction of the Self" investigates the role and significance of memory in the process of subject construction in the different types of captivity literature. Employing Gérard Genette's narratological concepts, Alíz Farkas analyses her dreams that can be categorized as grief dreams. She aims to describe the narrative properties of the dream web. Rightly so, since self-examination as a scientific achievement can be looked upon as the application of Socrates's application of philosophy to scientific practice. Dorel-Aurel Mureşan stresses the significance of forgetting in the novel *Autumn* by Ali Smith. Forgetting then does not mean ignoring the past but building such a relationship with the past that lets the past go, thereby making room for future changes leading to development. Szilárd Kmeczkó analyzes in the autobiographical novel *Memoirs of an Anti-Semite* by Gregor von Rezzori, how inherited family narratives play a role in the construction of the subject, and how a change in the relationship to narratives entails sometimes poignant transformations of the subject. Alice Eged examines the behavior of certain court actors in the German judiciary during the Hitler period and the reassessment of the same behaviors in the course of the denazification process understood in a broader sense following World War II, pointing out the relationship between the practice of re-evaluation and the denazification process.

The section "Variations on Identity" begins with the essay by Andrea Horváth, who reviews the reflections of the Austrian writer Robert Menasse on the process of European unification. Menasse, who has turned from a critic to an enthusiastic supporter of integration, has published them in the form of a book and journal articles. Xiaorui Du examines the constitutive traits of the 19th century American patriarch in Washington Irving's writings, mainly based on the bulky volume *A History of New York from the Beginning of the World to the End of the Dutch Monarchy*. A part of the study is a comparison of the European and American patriarchs and seeing

the American patriarch with a critical European eye. Cristina Chevereşan examines Philip Roth's attempt to understand existence as a Jew—a peculiar form of cultural identity—in his novel *Operation Shylock*. The question of what it means to belong to a particular community—the Jewry—shows a connection with the individual existence and the question of humanity in general in today's globalized world. Meng Liu investigates the identity constructions of the Chinese diaspora in Hungary and, within this theme, the dynamic relationship between individual and community identity; furthermore, the importance of memory functioning in the process of identity building. Bianca Gabriela Palade reviews the attempts to thematize identity in Cuban American fiction. The particular identity patterns observed are determinant among those belonging to different waves of Cuban emigration. Cristina García's novel *Dreaming in Cuban*, where the author traces his own lost Cuban identity, serves as a basis for her conclusions.

The last section of the volume "Metaphors of Disgust, Abreaction, and the Joy of the Gaze" consists of three essays. Andrea Csillag examines the metaphoric and metonymic examples of the English expression of disgust and the meaning-making role of the associated attributive structures in corpus-based analyses. Edit Gálla deals with Leigh Whannell's film that is the reworking of H. G. Wells's novel *The Invisible Man*. She also thematizes the threat to modern life posed by modern technology along with vulnerability, the problem of exposure to surveillance by digital technologies. Reviewing the historical genesis of the genre, Titus Pop interprets musicals—as stage productions—as a special *Gesamtkunstwerk*. Based on this, he examines the preconditions for the success of popular musicals offered by the examples of Lloyd Webber's high-impact creations.

The third volume of our series of books—just like the two previous volumes entitled *Cultural Encounters: New Perspectives in English and American Studies* (2019), and *Intercultural Occurences: Diversity and Alterity* (2020)—reveals a wide range of investigations to the reader. The analyses cover a rich and diverse range of phenomena, whose interpretations present the basic concepts of the scholarly fields in operation, thereby relating to the research dimensions provided by intercultural studies. We hope that this volume will contribute to broadening the exchange of scholarly views and offer exciting and useful readings for all those who—as open-minded readers—seek an understanding of the phenomena at the meeting point of different cultures.

The Editors

1.

BLACK CULTURE AND TRAUMA

Yesmina Khedhir

Cultural Memory
Trauma and African American Cultural Identity

Cultural memory provides a relevant conceptual framework for examining the black experience from the early Afro-European encounter until the present time. While historical knowledge of the African journey to the Americas and what came afterward exists in the archive, the history of "the Black Atlantic culture" (Gilroy 2007, xi) and the "interior life" (Morrison 1995, 92) of people of African descent remain "so little known" (Gilroy 2007, xi) and insufficiently represented. This knowledge gap is due first to mainstream historical discourses which "only recorded dominant voices or documents stressing the character of African subjects as objects" (Wilker 2017, 46), and second to the very "scarcity of African narratives of captivity and enslavement" (Hartman 2006, 3). For instance, first-hand narratives of the Middle Passage or "those early centuries of the 'execrable trade'" (Sharpe 2016, 69) are rare, for the exception of Olaudah Equiano's *The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa, The African, Written by Himself* (1769), which offered almost the only "historical" account that provides an "authentic" narrative of the transatlantic slave trade from the point of view of the enslaved. Other slave narratives, likewise, remain insufficient for though "they provided the foundation of African-American literary and political history" (Blight 1994, 59), they "were silent about many things, and they 'forgot' many things. There was a careful selection of the instances that they would record and careful rendering of those they chose to describe" (Morrison 1995, 91). In other words, slave accounts, as they were constrained by the dominant political, social, and cultural structures of their time, prove only partially adequate in uncovering and recovering the lived experience of enslaved people. That is why African American writer Toni Morrison indicates that her writing relies heavily on her own memories

or recollections, on the memories of others,[1] but mostly on imagination as for her "the act of imagination is bound up with memory" (1995, 98) and together, memory and imagination, allow to make sense of "the interior life that was not written" and lead to "the revelation of a kind of truth" (1995, 93) that remains quasi-absent in American hegemonic discourses of history.

While history and memory are conceived as oppositional by several theorists and historians (such as Maurice Halbwachs and Pierre Nora),[2] I believe that "the polarized view of history and memory" (O'Melly and Fabre 1994, 8) should be abandoned for a more inclusive approach that considers history and memory as "two modes of remembering in culture," as argued by Astrid Erll, who considers history "but yet another mode of cultural memory" (2008, 6–7). Indeed, as cultural memories and traumas are primarily based on "fateful events of the past" (Assmann 1995, 129), "the question whether history can emerge entirely without the deliberation of what we can call social or cultural memory—that what is often too easily dismissed as fictional account, emotional disposition or political motivation—must therefore be denied, since there cannot be any exact delineation between the two" (Wilker 2017, 49). History and memory emerge in this sense as two interrelated yet distinct means for knowing and reconstructing the past. However, in the African American context, due to the "scarcity" and partiality of "authentic" historical material about the Black experience, especially that of the transatlantic slave trade and chattel slavery, "memory rather than history becomes a fruitful strategy for the recovery of the past"

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1   Morrison's explanation of her writing process is very similar to Maurice Halbwachs's definition of individual remembering process and his insistence on the inherent intersections between individuals' memories. He states*: "a man must often appeal to others' remembrances to evoke his own past. He goes back to reference points determined by society*, hence outside himself" (1980, 51).

2   In his article "Between History and Memory: Les Lieux de Mémoire," Pierre Nora states that "Memory and history, far from being synonymous, appear now to be in fundamental opposition. Memory is life, borne by living societies founded in its name. It remains in permanent evolution, open to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting, unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to manipulation and appropriation, susceptible to being long dormant and periodically revived. History, on the other hand, is the reconstruction, always problematic and incomplete, of what is no longer" (1994, 285). Maurice Halbwachs, likewise, interprets history and memory as two different concepts and distinguishes between two types of history: learned history and lived history. For him, lived history is a form of collective memory, while learned history is related more to historical academic scholarship. In this, he claims: "Our memory rests truly not on learned history but on lived history. By the term 'history' we must understand, then, not a chronological sequence of events or dates, but whatever distinguishes one period from all others, something of which books and narratives generally give us only a schematic and incomplete picture" (1980, 57).

(Dixon 1994, 22) and for the generation of a certain kind of "referential truth" (Whitehead 2004, 13) aimed at diversifying representations of the Black historico-cultural experience.

Trauma, both in its psychological and cultural dimensions, represents also a generative concept to explore Black culture. As the African American past "is one undeniably littered with traumatic acts, laws, and legitimized behaviors: racially biased laws that relegated Blacks to the status of disposable bodies denied by White culture; the regulated, segregated spaces of Jim Crow; and brutal, repetitive acts of violence that include lynching, incest, rape, and murder" (Hinrichsen 2013, 605), the expressive representation of Black lives inherently requires the placement of Black historical traumas at the center of the memory work. While psychological trauma is substantially understood as a destructive force that precludes representation or integration (Caruth 1996, 4), more recent theorization of cultural trauma (the 1990s) perceives it rather as a productive experience that "can yield powerful effects of group cohesion" (Wilker 2017, 16).[3] In particular, through its shared nature and cultural relevance for group self-definition, cultural trauma, "establish[ing] a frame of reference and action [i.e.,] a culturally informed horizon of expectations" (Gaál-Szabó 2014, 120), may foster unity among members of collectivities as they remember and try to make sense of their collective painful experiences. As such, the revisiting of African American traumatic events will not only allow to "rip that veil drawn over 'proceedings too terrible to relate'" (1995, 91), to use Morrison's expression, but may also induce a process of working through and possibly working over traumas as "[t]he proper mourning of the past can [. . .] serve in its recovery and possible containment" (Wilker 2017, 31). The literary narrativization of the past emerges in this regard as a therapeutic means that is capable of healing communities by enabling them to come to terms with violent histories.

While memory, as explained above, may be considered as "a form of counterhistory that challenges the false generalizations in exclusionary 'History'" (qtd. in O'Melly and Fabre 1994, 7), Black lived experience, and hence cultural identity, as represented through the lenses of memory and trauma, should not be understood solely through its oppositionality to mainstream discourses of history and memory (i.e., as a counter-memory or counter-history), but rather as it exists within and beyond, inside and

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3   To read more about the interrelation and intersection between cultural trauma and cultural identity, read *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity* by Jeffery C. Alexander, Ron Eyerman, Bernhard Giesen, Neil J. Smesler, and Piotr Sztompka (2004).

outside American master narratives. Memory, through its proximity to and distance from history, occupies a "space in-between," a "Thirdspace" with "a constantly shifting and changing milieu of ideas, events, appearances, and meanings" (Soja 1989, 2) which challenges any monolithic or essentialist view of Black cultural identity and reflects "the rhizomorphic, fractal structure of the transcultural, international formation" of what Paul Gilroy calls the "black Atlantic" (2007, 4). As a "third space" that places Blacks, at the same time, at a centripetal and centrifugal position in relation to American history, memory enables to de-colonize knowledge about the past and to de-racialize the Black self by anchoring the Black subject in diverse and continuously changing spatiotemporal frames of reference. Memory presents itself in this sense as a tool for resistance and self-authentication, i.e., it "challenges [. . .] the white American version of history as official, canonized discourse as well as the historical consciousness of white America" (Gaál-Szabó 2019, 124).

Addressing African American cultural memory entails studying the intersection of African American culture, on the one hand, and memory, on the other, i.e., understanding the different cultural practices and forms through which African American cultural history and memory are preserved, re(produced), and transmitted throughout generations. In other words, to examine African American cultural memory, it is useful to raise and seek answers to the series of questions that Paul Gilroy poses:

> How do black expressive cultures practice remembrance? How is their remembering socially organized? [. . .] what part the memory of the terrors and bondage that have been left behind plays in securing the unity of the communities of sentiment and interpretation which black culture help to reproduce. How do changes in the ways that these terrors are summoned up illuminate the shifting, restless character of black political culture? (2007, 212)

To answer Gilroy's question, it is important first to highlight the centrality of the notions of community and collective memory in the Black remembering process. Although the remembering act itself is often carried out by individuals and may concern personal memories, the connection to the collective is always already present given the shared nature of the past (Halbwachs 1980, 25).[4] Cultural memory strengthens communities for

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4   In his conceptualization of individual memory and collective memory, Maurice Halbwachs, a major leading figure in memory studies, sees individual memory as inherently collective or social as for him "our memories remain collective and are recalled to us through

"communities emerge from the repetition of cultural practices, including dreams, desires, fantasies, and fictions, and from affects and identifications that become naturalized as the signifiers of membership" (Hinrichsen 2015, 5). Due to its role in preserving cultures, memory helps to (re)create a network of meanings to which community members adhere and continue to exist as a cultural unity. Accordingly, the early constitution of an African American community, and by consequence of a shared identity and culture, represented not only a means for liberation from bondage, but also a set of references for subsequent generations, a "seedbed" of cultural definitions that emerge out of pain, but with a validating potential for both individuals and collectivities.

In his book *The Black Atlantic*, Gilroy stresses also the role of remembering in forging a Black collective consciousness and maintaining historical continuity through the very narratives of rupture:

> the narratives of loss, exile, and journeying [. . .] serve a mnemonic function: directing the consciousness of the group back to significant, nodal points in its common history and its social memory. The telling and retelling of these stories play a special role, organising the consciousness of the "racial" group socially and striking the important balance between inside and outside activity—the different practices, cognitive, habitual, and performative, that are required to invent, maintain, and renew identity. (2007, 198)

The "significant, nodal points" concern events or memories, primarily traumatic in nature, which provided the very foundation for the racial formation of African Americans, yet marked a point of departure for the (re)construction of their cultural identity and their potential emergence as a distinctive—not in the sense of homogeneous—communal entity. The continuous revisiting of Black "founding traumas" (LaCapra 2014, xii)[5] does not only reflect an enduring sense of ontological dislocation but also reveals a conscious "will to remember" (Nora 1994, 295) as a discursive means

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others" (1980, 23). He further explains this interconnection between individual remembering and collective remembering when he states that "while the collective memory endures and draws strength from its base in a coherent body of people, it is individuals as group members who remember" (1980, 25).

5 Dominick LaCapra defines "founding trauma" as "the trauma that is transformed or transvalued into a legitimizing myth of origin. A crisis or catastrophe that disorients and harms the collectivity or the individual may miraculously become the origin or renewed origin of the myth and serve an ideological function in authorizing acts or policies that appeal to it for justification" (2014, xii).

to resist constraining frames of definition. Indeed, two major recurrent historical "nodal points" or "founding traumas" that keep feeding the mnemonic representation of the Black lived experience, even today, are the Middle Passage and enslavement.

As "the prime originator of racial slavery and terror for African captives in the Atlantic" (Mozes 2019), the Middle Passage emerged as a "defining metaphor" (Walker 2017, 12) and "a pervasive topic and motif in late twentieth-and early twenty-first century black diasporic literature" (Terry 2013, 474). As the people aboard the ships "were represented [. . .] not as subjects in social history but as objects and quantities" (Smallwood 2007, 2), Black cultural expression focuses on giving voice to those who were forgotten and excluded from historical narratives. As Morrison contends:

> It's like the history of the middle passage. All those people who threw themselves into the sea had been violently ignored; no one praised them, nobody knows their name, nobody can remember them, not in the United States nor in Africa. Millions of people disappeared without a trace, and there is not one monument anywhere to pay homage to them, because they never arrived safely on shore. So it is like the whole nation that is under the Sea. (qtd. in Ying 2006, 66)

Besides pointing to the inadequacy of history alone for knowing the past, Morrison emphasizes the duty of Black people to remember and honor their African cultural history. This is reiterated in her article "The Site of Memory" where she considers the writing about Black life as the inherent "exercise [. . .] of any person who is black" (1995, 91). Thus, as an enigmatic, haunting experience, the Middle Passage as represented in Black expressive works conveys various meanings of "dislocation, starting point, loss unspeakable or repressed memory, abyss, contact zone, gateway, transformation, common ground, and a site of potential mythic or historical recuperation" (Terry 2007, 477–78), which, for instance, often involves the use of the slave ship image as a site of memory/trauma and an ambivalent "cultural icon" that symbolizes both racial terror and a "distinct mode of cultural production" (Gilroy 2007, 16–17). As such, the transatlantic slave trade remains a consensual founding moment in Black historical, cultural, and racial experience which continues to (re)define their cultural identities.

As "a cultural marker, a primal scene and a site of memory in the formation of African American identity" (Eyerman 2004, 163), slavery also continues to inform Black cultural practices even today. As explained by Saidiya Hartman:

> If slavery persists as an issue in the political life of black America, it is not because of an antiquarian obsession with bygone days or the burden of a too-long memory, but because black lives are still imperiled and devalued by a racial calculus and a political arithmetic that were entrenched centuries ago. This is the afterlife of slavery—skewed life chances, limited access to health and education, premature death, incarceration, and impoverishment. I, too, am the afterlife of slavery. (2006, 6)

While Hartman defines slavery as an "unresolved unfolding" (Sharpe 2016, 18) experience which continues to affect Black life today, one cannot deny the traumatic feeling which also persists in the afterlife of slavery as manifest especially in Black mnemonic writing. In his definition of "forced servitude" as a cultural trauma, Eyerman confirms that "slavery, not as an institution or even experience, but as collective memory [. . .] a pervasive remembrance that grounded a people's sense of itself endures until today by way of its consistent mediation and 'representation through speech and works of art'" (2001,1–2). According to Eyerman, despite its traumatic nature, slavery was the experience that "collectivized people with diverse languages and cultures into the population we refer to as African Americans" (Davis 2016, 13) and its memory continues to strengthen their present communal identity.

The emphasis on the traumatic memory of slavery is equally prompted by a will to reimagine the real life of enslaved people that is highly obscured by a dominant narrative that mostly emphasized their subjugation and failed to acknowledge the different ways in which "the object" (the enslaved) may engage in acts of resistance (Moten 2003, 5):

> Again and again scholars of slavery face absences in the archives as we attempt to find "the agents buried beneath" (Spillers 2003b) the accumulated erasures, projections, fabulations, and misnamings. There are, I think, specific ways that Black scholars of slavery get wedged in the partial truths of the archives while trying to make sense of their silences, absences, and modes of dis/appearance. (Sharpe 2016, 17)

To envision narratives of a past in which Blackness inhabits meanings other than objectification, commodification, and dehumanization and prioritize other notions of humanity, resistance, and survival, Black scholars resort to art and "critical memory" (Baker 2001) to "rewrite the chronicle of a death foretold and anticipated, as a collective biography of dead subjects, as a counter-history of the human, as the practice of freedom" (Hartman 2008, 3). Remembering, in this regard, proves liberating as it allows to continuously refashion individual and collective self-image and to cope with past traumas and injustices.

To treat the transatlantic slave trade and enslavement as two traumatic experiences is evident due to the extreme brutality and terror that characterized both of them. However, limiting the reading to their traumatic nature would be reductive. The early encounter between Africans and Euro-Americans was far more meaningful than a "natal alienation" (Orlando 1982, 5) process which initiated centuries of racial oppression and violence engendered by white supremacy. Rather, seen from a different angle, the enforced displacement of Africans marked the "surfacing of an incipient African American culture from the holds of the slave ships" (Diedrich et al. 1999, 7). Indeed, "an alternative mode of thinking to U.S. binary oppositions and the cultural exclusivity between black and white" (Diedrich et al. 1999, 9), a mode which interprets W. E. Du Bois's "double-consciousness" not only as a manifestation of identity conflict but as a cross-cultural, hybrid experience, brings more insight into Black existence. In this rendering, the Middle Passage and ensuing racialization emerge "not as a clean break between past and present but as a spatial continuum between Africa and the Americas" (Diedrich et al. 1999, 8). For instance, early in the 20th-century American anthropologist Melville J. Herskovits argued for the cultural continuum across the Atlantic and confirmed the survival of African philosophies and traditions in the Americas—though to different extents and in non-identical ways across the continent.[6] Thus, the cultural memory of Africa constitutes an essence in multiple Black diasporic cultural works, African American literature in particular. The African presence in Black

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6   The hypothesis of "African cultural retention" in the New World has represented a controversial issue among American sociologists, anthropologists, and cultural theorists. The most known controversy is that between Melville J. Herskovits and E. Franklin Frazier. To read more about the African cultural continuity in the "New World," see Melville J. Herskovits's *The Myth of the Negro Past* (1941), Albert J. Raboteau's *Slave Religion: "The Invisible Institution" in the Antebellum South (updated edition 2004)*, and Henry Louis Gates Jr.'s *The Signifying Monkey* (1988), to name a few.

life features also in everyday cultural practices including "familiar forms of African American speech and music" and religious or spiritual beliefs, such as Vodoun, Candomblé, Santeria, etc. (Kamali 2016, 6–8). The cultural memory of Africa that is continuously explored in Black cultural production remains thus an ever-present source for Black cultural reclamation and authentication.

The diversity of African American cultural memory reflects the diversity of Black cultural identity. While most African American cultural memories carry with them traumatic effects due to Black violent history, cultural memory, "as the shared knowledge of a community's past" (Rico 2019, 3), continues to be a defining aspect of African American identity formation. While I tried in this paper to address some of the major elements (or "nodal points," to use Gilroy's terms) in African American cultural memories and explain their significance for African American cultural authentication and identity (re)construction, especially in Black literary production, the great variety and unlimited expand of Black cultural memories make it unviable to envisage a comprehensive study that covers all aspects of African American cultural memory without the focus on a specific cultural text (be it literary, performative, visual, or musical.). Hence, I directed my focus towards a more theoretical exploration of the usefulness of cultural memory and trauma as conceptual frameworks in representing African American cultural history.

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Bianka Szendrei

Memory Reclamation through Emotional Connections in Janelle Monáe's *Dirty Computer* (2018)

The emergence of memory studies in the 20th century introduced a shift from historical knowledge to remembering as a cultural practice. French philosopher Maurice Halbwachs popularized memory studies in academic fields showing that personal and collective memories are fundamental components of humanity's history. Halbwachs describes an individual memory as "inward" and "autobiographical" while a collective memory encompasses the "external" and "historical" aspects of memory studies (1980, 52). Collective memories determine cultures as they allow individuals to cherish and reevaluate the past. Halbwachs also notes that people acquire, localize, recall, and recognize memories in society (1992, 38). Halbwachs's argument suggests that individuals' bodies and minds function and survive on a collective scale and thus, individual, and communal memories are inscribed between bodies. Black communities draw strength from collective memory to create art out of pain, loss, strength, and success while also solidifying their bond with each other through their shared history and heritage. With the advent of Afrofuturism, however, memory was reinterpreted as it is not necessarily tied to the past but rather promotes a forward-thinking approach to Black temporality.

Before analyzing Afrofuturist (counter-)memory in popular culture and Janelle Monáe's *Dirty Computer* (2018), it is crucial to understand the meaning of Afrofuturism, which allows Black individuals to rediscover their Blackness in a utopia. Although the idea of a future of limitless possibilities for Black people had been a prevalent theme in many Black artists', authors', and musicians' works,[1] American scholar Mark Dery's question marked the

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1   See W. E. B. DuBois's "The Comet" (1920), Octavia Butler's *Kindred* (1979), or Sun Ra's career.

beginning of the conceptualization of Afrofuturism in culture. Dery asks, "Can a community whose past has been deliberately rubbed out, and whose energies have subsequently been consumed by the search for legible traces of its history, imagine possible futures?" (1994, 180). Dery's contemplation calls for a cultural movement that aims to challenge racial politics, correcting the white-dominated past while also demonstrating Black resilience manifested in imagining the impossible. Black Afrofuturist scholar, Alondra Nelson adds that Afrofuturism "opens up inquiry into the many overlaps between technoculture and black diasporic histories" (2000, 35). Afrofuturism is not strictly about the nature of technology but how technology is used by Black communities to vocalize their fears, challenge dominant narratives and to mobilize social movements, and therefore, gain a level of agency over their own narrative and identity. British-Ghanaian writer and theorist Kodwo Eshun adds that Afrofuturism aims to "recognize that Africa increasingly exists as the object of futurist projection" (2003, 291). One part of Afrofuturism is acknowledging trauma and giving space for Black communities to process pain and heal. Another component of Afrofuturism is recognizing the potentials of the African diaspora and their capacity to not only imagine but also to create an inclusive future for the coming generations. Afrofuturist scholar Ytasha Womack reinforces the aforesaid points as she claims that Afrofuturism is "an intersection of imagination, technology, the future, and liberation" (2013, 9). Afrofuturist artists, dreaming about a utopia, use their platform, on the one hand, to share their visions about the future they imagine and, on the other hand, educate their audience about how they can achieve the imagined utopia.

Black memory can also be categorized as a "counter-memory" which gives a complex understanding and function of memories in oppressed people's life. Michel Foucault argues that a counter-memory serves the purpose of those, who are misrepresented by the dominant culture, as he notes in *Language, Counter-memory, Practice*, "other voices which have remained silent for so long" (1977, 18). Afrofuturist counter-memory recognizes the brilliance of Black history and through respecting their legacy deconstructs the master narrative's negative images created around the African diaspora. Eshun notes that Afrofuturism "does not seek to deny the tradition of countermemory. Rather, it aims to extend that tradition by reorienting the intercultural vectors of Black Atlantic temporality towards the proleptic as much as the retrospective" (2003, 289). Reasserting power over their narratives and memories allows Black people, as Patricia Hill Collins puts it, to name their own realities (1990, 300) and place their experiences into

existence and public consciousness. Afrofuturism further denounces the idea of Black invisibility in the future and envisions a future free from colonial influence through the Black lens.

Afrofuturism is a prevalent concept in contemporary popular culture. Janelle Monáe, Flying Lotus, Missy Elliot, and Erykah Badu are amongst the most influential Afrofuturist musicians who share their personal stories about different sides of the Black experience. Monáe's primary focus is on the limitless possibilities and pure beauty of gender, race, sexuality under an oppressive regime. Janelle Monáe always employs technological elements for the sake of discussing social injustice and mobilizing people to question and change the system. Her latest studio album, *Dirty Computer* (2018) was originally meant to be an angry album responding to Donald Trump's 2016 presidential victory. Instead, Monáe chose to incorporate into the album all her fears, emotions, and her experiences as a pansexual non-binary Black individual coming from a working-class family. *Dirty Computer* is an intimate experience both for Monáe and her listeners, a journey from anger to finding liberation through love and vulnerability. Later she developed the album into an "emotion picture," combining her compelling music with visuals to tell a story about a Black queer woman's vision about a possible utopia in a dystopian setting.

Dirty Computer revolves around the three protagonists', Jane's (Janelle Monáe), Zen's (Tessa Thompson), and Ché's (Jayson Aaron) openly polygamous relationship[2] and their resistance against oppression in a dystopic setting. The world is ruled by a totalitarian system, The House of the New Dawn which aims to hunt down "dirty computers" to clean them. Jane explains the status of dirty computers at the beginning of the film: "You were dirty if you looked different. You were dirty if you refused to live the way they dictated. You were dirty if you showed any form of opposition at all. And if you were dirty it was just a matter of time" (Monáe 2018, 00:00:12-00:00:28). The regime views individuals who resist social norms that are shaped by the interlocking oppressive systems such as white supremacy, heteropatriarchy, capitalism, imperialism, as "dirty computers." To the New Dawn, dirty computers are potential threats to the system due to their capability of dismantling social and political hierarchies. In this dystopia, "dirty computer" is a slur used to dehumanize individuals who, according to the mindset of the regime, are "different" from the norm or "others." Limiting

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2   However, the emotion picture dedicates more time to Jane's and Zen's queer love.

the existence of nonconformists to computers suggests that hunting and torturing them are justified since they are not even recognized as human—although Monáe reinterprets the meaning of a computer throughout the film in a positive sense.

The audiovisual film *Dirty Computer* is categorized as an "emotion picture" by Monáe, making her the first artist to use this term as a genre. According to Monáe's (2018) definition in the YouTube description of *Dirty Computer*, an emotion picture is a "narrative film and accompanying musical album" I believe that the term "emotion picture" carries a deeper meaning than Monáe's definition. The film displays many emotions in 48 minutes, acknowledges the complexity of one's feelings, and, most significantly, proves that emotions may serve as tools of resistance towards social injustice. *Dirty Computer* also teaches the audience to endeavor to be vulnerable for the sake of one's healing and personal growth. Moreover, the film recognizes and empowers emotions (especially anger) that are often disregarded by society and treated as negative feelings. Monáe challenges the negative connotations and redefines the meaning of anger as a tool that lets individuals share their emotional distress about their situation to provoke social change.

To ensure the safety of the system, soldiers bring dirty computers to a facility where their memories are erased by a white, toxic gas called "Nevermind." Two white scientist men launch the gas [Figure 1] which the victim is forced to inhale eventually leading to the victim falling asleep and forgetting their pre-cleaned, liberated self [Figure 2]. Jane is trapped in the facility and the story follows through her struggle against forgetting while also trying to save her lover's, Zen's already erased memories. As Jane describes the cleaning, "when you thought you could remember something, just when you thought you could see the past clearly, [. . .] the gas would take over and then you were lost [. . .] sleeping [. . .] and you didn't remember anything at all" (Monáe 2018, 00:22:40-00:23:02). Being under the control of "Nevermind" means constant uncertainty and pressure for the victim throughout the cleaning process. Fear is a significant component of "Nevermind," allowing the regime to assert its dominance over the psyches of dirty computers. One source of that fear is losing consciousness and, as a result, control over the body. Forcing them to fall asleep and to forget the past are also manifestations of psychological torture, however, later, the reader will see that pushing memories into the subconscious does not necessarily mean that the victim forgets.

Figure 1: Launching "Nevermind." Photo: Janelle Monáe (2018)

Figure 2: Jane (Janelle Monáe) inhaling "Nevermind." Photo: Janelle Monáe (2018)

"Nevermind" embodies various aspects of the dominant culture's treatment of oppressed people including colonization, dehumanization, violence, and exploitation. I believe Monáe intentionally used "Nevermind," a white gas to demonstrate the cleaning process as it resembles colonization and white supremacy's violent invasion of Black bodies and minds. Additionally, approaching the meaning of cleaning from the point of view of the queer experience, which is heavily represented in the emotion picture, "Nevermind" can be treated as an allegory of conversion therapies. Nonetheless, Monáe

demonstrates that even a technological invention like "Nevermind," which fabricates alternative memories and histories for individuals, can be deconstructed and transgressed. The paper aims to offer a deeper analysis of Monáe's unique approach to the interconnection of emotions and memories which are inscribed between dirty computers' bodies and minds. While the totalitarian system devalues individual lives and emotions, Monáe demonstrates in "PYNK" and "Don't Judge Me" that memories allow the person to protect their identity even in a dystopia, therefore, introducing a new, complex form of resistance.

The emotion picture is centered around Jane's struggle against the colonization of her mind since, on the one hand, she would lose her memories about the pure love shared between her, Zen, and Ché. On the other hand, her memory of being a dirty computer is a cherished aspect of her identity. Remembering on an individual and collective scale is essential for dirty computers as memories create an everlasting bond between them. Dirty computers are interconnected through two points: the care for each other and the willingness to resist and change. On the one hand, dirty computers recognize that they are oppressed and discriminated for not complying with the expectations of white supremacy, heteropatriarchy, imperialism, and capitalism. Being in a marginalized community, the oppressed experience is recognized and used to form a bond between those, who are treated as inferior. Dirty computers are bound together because of their agape love for each other, for the memory of survival, and turning dirt into gold as a community. On the other hand, even in a dystopia, dirty computers are unapologetically honest about their experiences and refuse to be silenced. Challenging, questioning, resisting the dominant culture are the main constituents of their identity which, as I prove later, cannot be erased.

"PYNK" introduces one understanding of collective and individual remembering through the prism of the memory of the ineradicable self. Dirty computers denounce the idea of being erased from history, the present public consciousness, and the possible future. A manifestation of their resistance is the capability of claiming and filling spaces with love and magic. In the emotion picture, Monáe consciously chooses to include scenes that are usually abandoned or lonely. For example, "PYNK" is set in a desert [Figure 3], "Screwed" plays out in an empty house, while "Django Jane" takes place at an abandoned warehouse. Dirty computers, the oppressed, demonstrate their resistance by filling spaces that are originally dominated by the presence of white supremacy, heteropatriarchy, capitalism, imperialism. Dirty computers allow themselves to exist in spaces they are usually excluded from and thus,

demand visibility in society. In "PYNK," dirty computers dominate the space by painting the whole screen pink [Figure 4]. As pointed out before, the New Dawn views dirty computers as threats due to their power of resisting and dismantling an oppressive system. Jane's presence at the facility also imposes a threat to the regime despite Jane being the one who is trapped and tortured. The focus always shifts to Jane's visions, commemorated in her memories both in visual and vocal representation, about love, unity, and vulnerability that let dirty computers rethink the future and contemplate a utopia in a dystopia. She always dominates the space by existing as an independent being who questions and deconstructs the system.

Figure 3: Desert painted pink. Photo: Janelle Monáe (2018)

Figure 4: Black women celebrating and painting the screen pink. Photo: Janelle Monáe (2018)

In the emotion picture, memories are not restricted to the role of a connector between individuals, but also assist people in reassembling their selves under an oppressive regime. Jane embraces other dirty computers and guides them through, as Porshé Garner would put it, their piece-gathering process. Garner talks in "What We Know and How We Know It?" about the interconnection between reaching deeper in one's identity to discover the self and remembering on an individual and collective scale. Garner writes, "(Re)membering then becomes an act of piece-gathering, of collecting and assembling fragments of a larger whole, of creating and innovating identity for African people that includes African Americans seeing ourselves in the gaze of another and not looking away, but instead looking deeper" (2019, 111). Piece-gathering is a key component in the reclamation process as each dirty computer associates a certain person, an object, a place, an event with emotions differently. In Jane's case, she connects many memories to the personal and emotional development between her and her lover Zen. Hence, having very intimate, emotional memories both about the self and a community is rooted deeply in the self, a dark, yet beautiful place. Remembering is about recognizing and acknowledging the past, nurturing heritage, and assembling the self individually and collectively. The recollection of fragments deconstructs the master narrative about the oppressed to reintroduce themselves in a way they wish to be known. In Monáe's case, she challenges marginalized communities to continue to look deeper and find a missing fragment in the future, in a different world. At the same time, Monáe also encourages her audience to perceive themselves as essential fragments who are the components of creating a whole in the future by reimagining the world and challenging the oppressor. Looking deeper means to discover and care for the deeply rooted power of knowledge to dismantle social and political hierarchies.

In *Sister Outsider*, Audre Lorde establishes a relationship between Black women's creative power and strong spirit, both of which allow them to continuously create magic in society while also strengthening their bonds in their community. Lorde further argues that Black women's strong spirit is ancient, deeply rooted, generational, and interconnected by sisterhood therefore, forgetting such legacy is merely impossible. She argues,

> For each of us as women, there is a dark place within, where hidden and growing our true spirit rises [. . .] These places of possibility within ourselves are dark because they are ancient and hidden; they have survived and grown strong through that darkness. [. . .] [E]ach one of us holds an incredible reserve of creativity and power, of unexamined and unrecorded emotion and feeling. (2007, 32)

Lorde's point is closely connected to the erotic of love which refers to the notion of the embodiment of knowledge and love. Lorde argues that discovering true fulfillment can be achieved through nurturing the deeply rooted creative power and love for the self (2007, 44). Garner adds, "Thinking of our [Black women's] knowledge beyond the secular then allows it to be spiritual, which can then be seen as body praxis, and an example of embodied knowledge" (2019, 111). Drawing a parallel between Lorde's argument and Garner's writing, Black women are the embodiment of knowledge and true love achieved through the appreciation of the nourished creative power and sisterhood. In *Dirty Computer*, the deeply rooted power and strength is not necessarily restricted to Black queer women's magic but rather encompasses a universal love for the oppressed. To Monáe, individuals' knowledge, power, and creativity are inscribed between their bodies and shared among each other through the lived experience. Bodies are representatives and carriers of the culture of survival, beauty, and resistance of marginalized communities. By giving agency to dirty computers and ownership over their bodies, the emotion picture challenges the idea of erasing oppressed bodies and cultures by colonization and forced assimilation.

"PYNK" elaborated on the unique symbolic representation of the interconnection between memories and emotions, concluding that dirty computers possess a deeply rooted creative power. Jane's other visual memory "Don't Judge Me," shows the symbolic representation of one's memories and the capacity to regain memories through associations. In the following conversation preceding the video file of "Don't Judge Me," Jane is examined by Zen. Jane, suffering by the aftereffects of "Nevermind" says, "They are taking everything away from me. I don't even remember how we met anymore. [. . .] I'm not sure if any of this actually happened" (Monáe 2018, 00:33:03-00:33:17). Jane's words demonstrate that the cleaning process proves to be successful since she starts doubting her emotions and memories and she is incapable of connecting Zen to any specific point in her life. Yet, even though Jane is subjected to a series of tortures, Zen's presence prevents her from completely forgetting everything. Puzzled and worried by Jane's words, Zen tries to comfort her claiming, "Thinking will only make it harder. It's best if you just enjoy the process. Accept it. People used to work so hard to be free. We're lucky here. All we have to do is forget" (Monáe 2018, 00:33:28-00:33:48). Zen, a cleaned person, believes that Jane only adds to her pain by resisting the cleaning process. Zen's new idea about freedom also shows signs of manipulation as to her, the only liberation is supposedly forgetting and obeying The House of the New Dawn. Freedom under the regime means

giving up one's identity as well as, the cause they fight for, abandoning the past for believing in the illusion of total liberation. Finding freedom is only achievable if Jane undergoes the biopower and allows the authority to control her body through ideologies. Jane replies, "But I don't want to forget you" (Monáe 2018, 00:33:51-00:33:54). Jane is no longer worried about herself, rather, she is afraid of losing someone who influenced her the most, Zen. Nonetheless, I believe that Jane's fear of forgetting Zen is not necessarily addressed exclusively to Zen. To Jane, forgetting Zen would mean losing the memories of Jane's personal and intimate journey of finding liberation as a queer Black woman with the help of Zen. Losing memories about Zen also results in forgetting the magic they created with dirty computers as a community.

However, forgetting is not as simple as Jane, Zen or the totalitarian system imagines. After the conversation between Zen and Jane, the clip for "Don't Judge Me" starts playing. The visual memory introduces the audience to the reclamation process through emotional connections and symbolic representations of love. The viewer witnesses Jane, Zen, and Ché's intimate relationship at a beach. At the beginning of the whole emotion picture, the camera shows Jane's forearm depicting a feminized version of the crucified Jesus Christ. In "Don't Judge Me," the viewer learns about the origin of the tattoo which was designed by Zen for Jane. The tattoo perfectly encompasses Jane's role in the world of *Dirty Computer*, a savior who loves the oppressed unconditionally and contributes to their spiritual liberation. While sketching, Zen incorporates herself into the artwork, and thus, she becomes art [Figure 5]. Next, Zen tattoos Jane and through this process, she literally engraves herself into Jane's body [Figure 6]. Hence, Jane's and Zen's memories are inscribed on Jane's body. Zen includes her emotions, her love, and her memories connected to Jane in the drawing. Returning to the idea of symbolic representation of memories and emotions, the audience sees how Zen leaves one of her pieces in the artwork which can be reassembled later.

Figure 5: Zen sketching a feminized image of Jesus

Figure 6: Zen tattooing on Jane's arm. Photo: Janelle Monáe (2018)

After "Don't Judge Me," the white scientists want to delete the memory but one of them notes, "I thought we deleted this beach stuff already" (Monáe 2018, 00:40:26-00:40:29). This sentence demonstrates that Jane's memory about the tattooing has already been deleted before, but the beach scene reappeared in her mind. Jane displays the ability of dirty computers, namely reaching deep inside of her and rewinding memories about the past

through associations. Jane's associations derive from the daily meetings with Zen where they physically interact, more precisely, gently touch each other. Zen also shows her capability of reaching her precleaned identity and rewinding memories. At the facility, Zen touches Jane's tattoo [Figure 7] and immediately starts remembering her precleaned self [Figure 8]. Jane's tattoo is a physical manifestation of Zen herself and Zen's care both for Jane and for dirty computers. Touching allows Zen to reach deep inside herself to gather her fragments and reconstruct her identity as a whole.

Figure 7: Zen touching Jane's tattoo. Photo: Janelle Monáe (2018)

Figure 8: Zen emotional expression after touching Jane's tattoo and remembering her pre-cleaned self. Photo: Janelle Monáe (2018)

Zen's memory reclamation process suggests to me that she never truly forgot her identity and her relationship with Jane. Rather, Zen was manipulated and forced into repressing her memories by being subjected to torture. Therefore, I believe that Zen's memory can be understood as what Toni Morrison refers

to as a "rememory." Morrison's term was introduced in *Beloved* to describe the effects of traumatic experiences on the main character's, Sethe's mind: "Some things you forget. Other things you never do. [. . .] Places are still there. If a house burns down, it's gone, but the place—the picture of it—stays, and not just in my rememory [. . .] What I remember is a picture floating around out there outside my head" (1994, 35–36). Sethe captures a unique way of remembering in African American culture. Morrison's rememory refers to traumatic experiences and memories being forgotten and repressed in the subconscious in a Freudian sense. On the contrary, Zen forces herself to repress her recollection of uplifting memories due to the traumatic cleaning. Since Zen was continuously tortured and manipulated, her mind alienated her memories from her identity, however, her memories were still stored in her subconscious. Jane's description about the facility has pointed out before that the victim "falls asleep" after inhaling "Nevermind." Considering Morrison's definition and Zen's rememory, sleeping gains a new meaning, representing the repression of memories into the subconscious. The image floating around in Morrison's description is Jane's presence and her tattoo in *Dirty Computer*. The tattoo is a site of memory that triggers associations with Zen's precleaned identity and makes her regather her missing pieces to become a whole.

After Zen's memory and hence her identity are restored, Jane must still go through the final cleaning process, the "Final walk." The last torture means that the victim must enter a room where "Nevermind" surrounds them, completely blurring their mind [Figure 8]. The overdose of the white gas results in an intense trauma in the victim's body and mind, erasing their identity. In my understanding, going through the "Final walk" entails the individual's final journey in their precleaned life before entering a new "chapter." The old identity is forcefully erased and instead, a new, colonized identity takes over.

Figure 9: The "Final Walk." Photo: Janelle Monáe (2018)

The viewer witnessed Jane's journey at the facility, saw her in agony and almost giving up. Yet, she never stops imagining a utopia, a space without colonial influence, where dirty computers can find power and liberation. Cuban American academic Jose Esteban Muñoz writes, "concrete utopias can also be a daydream-like but they are the hopes of a collective, an emergent group, or even the solitary oddball who is the one who dreams for many" (2009, 3). Jane is the figure who dares to dream about a utopia and lay the foundations of a brighter future by challenging, criticizing, and dismantling the interlocking oppressive systems. Despite the New Dawn's battle against dirty computers, the regime cannot permanently colonize Jane's and Zen's minds. Although the New Dawn's technological invention, "Nevermind" can seemingly delete the victim's memories, emotions cannot be violently erased as they are intangible parts of human life. Memories are more than just "contents" (Monáe 2018, 00:21:58-00:21:59), which can be "trashed and bagged" (Monáe 2018, 00:14:40-00:14:42). Memories of the self and the community are deeply rooted, inscribed between bodies. Past remains embedded in one's present and future.

At the end of the story, Jane, Zen and Ché turn one of the regime's weapons, technology, against itself. They can resist the violent colonization of their minds because of their deeply rooted creative power. The power to reclaim spaces where dirty computers are usually excluded from, to love unconditionally, and to both imagine and work on alternative futures without limitations. Monáe uses technology not only to tell a compelling story about liberation, (queer) love, Black sisterhood but also introduces a new understanding of human existence, the posthuman. Traditional humanness is a "praxis" (Wynter and McKittrick 2015, 23) and posthuman studies introduce a non-essentialist understanding of Blackness. Individuals, whose existence is disregarded by the regime and are dehumanized, break from the traditional meaning of human. Instead, posthumans embrace a new, fluid extraterrestrial being and view the posthuman future as a site of development of identity and power.

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Alexandra Erdős

Religiosity and Religious Images
in "On the Road" by Langston Hughes

Langston Hughes, one of the leading figures of the Harlem Renaissance, became "the outsetting bard" (Whitman qtd. in Rampersad 2002a, 40) for African-Americans by clinging to a dream of racial equality and faith in his people. He presents the ugliness of the prejudiced and racist American society and the beauty of African American life. The ambivalence is also expressed in his modernist views concerning religion: he urges fellow African American writers to expose the "sick-sweet smile of organized religion—which lies about what it doesn't know, and about what it *does* know" (Hughes 2002b, 132). The paper explores Hughes's use of the Biblical symbols recycled in the short story, "On the Road" (1935, 1952), which authentically represents the African American experience in their social and spiritual struggle, while it also channels African American cultural energies in his black modernist aesthetics.

Through the biblical themes of the Exodus, Jesus's figure, and his redemptive work, Hughes aims to "re-member" aspects of the African American old-time religion and to strengthen the heritage of African American spirituality by often employing "theological terms, discourses, and frameworks such as salvation, sin, prayer, communion, covenant, eternity, and the cross to express his ideas" (Best 2017,12). Moreover, Hughes's tactics mark a counter-memory maneuver by "mediat[ing] memory but also project[ing] a new cultural consciousness [to] counter[] official versions of history" (Gaál-Szabó 2017, 77) as he offers a social and religious critique of the white church, and in general, the contemporary American society by highlighting the contradiction between the contemporary values of the white church and the traditional Christian values such as the acceptance of the poor, especially of African American descent. As slaves interpreted religion

to fit their condition and present-day needs, similarly, Hughes re-interprets the most prominent Biblical stories to re-create a new meaning and purpose for black Americans, and himself, to face the still existing struggles in his time.

Josef Sorett argues in *Spirit in the Dark* that religiosity remained a significant driving force in the first half of the 20th century for African American self-expression and that African American "allegedly secular artists and intellectuals [. . .] have had much to say about religion" (2016, 7) and sought to "fundamentally rethink the spiritual terms of black existence" (2016, 175), in later decades to evolve to "reflect[] [a] new, revolutionary understanding of the black self" (Gaál-Szabó 2020, 106). Despite the fact that Hughes was not an official member of any Black congregation, his use of Biblical images and elements of African American Christianity makes it clear that religion and religious thinking play a significant role in Hughes's works. Wallace Best in *Langston's Salvation: American Religion and the Bard of Harlem* argues that "Hughes maintained and cultivated a religious sensibility and sensitivity to religious systems" (2017, 11) and "harbored a deep affection for many aspects of the church of his youth, mainly its worship" (2017, 11). In his first autobiography *The Big Sea*, Hughes recalls the most salient religious experience he had in his childhood, which, according to Wallace D. Best, functions as "an event he considered to be one of the three most important moments in life" (2017, 2). The experience of fake salvation in a Methodist revival meeting left him deprived and disappointed: "now I didn't believe there was a Jesus any more, since he didn't come to help me" (Hughes 2002c, 43). Hughes felt as if Jesus Christ "had abandoned him in a spiritual or metaphysical sense" (Best 2017, 3), instilling in him, as Arnold Rampersad calls it, an "extreme fear of abandonment" (Rampersad 2002a, 377).

The same "fear of abandonment" haunts Sargeant throughout the story. The Reverend Mr. Dorset refuses to shelter the homeless black on the road, despite his religion's instruction to help the poor in need. He appears as the metaphor of Hughes's contemporary society, whose racism and religious hypocrisy make him shut the door in front of the hungry and cold African American. Dorset immediately sees the snow "when he switched on his porch light" (Hughes 2002a, 272) and notices the contrast between Sargeant and his surroundings, who appears "a human piece of night with snow on his face" (Hughes 2002a, 272), emphasizing that he is an outsider of that place. According to Jeanette S. White and Clement A. White, Sargeant embodied a "fearsome image" (1996, 97) for Dorset, "looming gigantically amidst the snowy grandeur" and "a large ominous presence that casts a blighting

shadow over the sacred ground" (1996, 97), so he shuts the door believing his "color is enough to set him apart from the Christian community" (1996, 98). The rejection by the reverend, on the one hand, stands for the social discrimination of African Americans; on the other hand, it reveals the religious hypocrisy and double standard of "religious" Americans. The door shut into Sargeant's face, after Mr. Dorset remarks he is "obviously unemployed" (Hughes 2002a, 272), symbolizes the discrimination and exclusion African Americans experience in/from society, which is further enhanced by the two doors of the church indicating the Jim Crow standard for the protagonist. The door marks a threshold, i.e., the color line, that Sargeant cannot cross and is "relegated to remaining outside, always on the fringes of society" (White and White 1996, 99). The door forces African Americans to stay outside white spaces. In that sense, the short story creates an outside-inside dichotomy via the built environment, which constrains blacks to the outside space, i.e., to the road.

The road before the encounter with Christ signifies African American displacement highlighted by the stark contrast between the inside/outside, black/white, and the difference in size between the black giant and the tiny snowflakes. Through the unsurmountable barriers, being on the road for Sargeant marks historical timelessness, where he is denied subjectivity by the only point of reference that ties him to the social structures. The road, in this sense, becomes a site of Sargeant's abandonment and loneliness. The homeless protagonist wanders the town aimlessly as "a black vagabond [. . .] trying to go somewhere, but [is] too tired and hungry to make it" (qtd. in Emanuel 1967, 94). James A. Emanuel argues that Sargeant's journey is "prolonged by discrimination" (1967, 95) of society, demonstrated by the shut door of the Reverend, and the "hundreds of relief shelters during the depression" that "drew the color line anyhow" (Hughes 2002a, 272). Through the image of the road, Hughes highlights African Americans' uprootedness in the United States, reflecting on the common black sentiment, as in Claude McKay's poem from 1922: " [. . .] my race that has no home on earth" (1922, 22) that is "Enslaved and lynched, denied a / human place / In the great life line of the Christian West" (1922, 22).

Hughes's social criticism runs deeper with the metaphor of the snow. The falling snowflakes appear in contrast to Sargeant's physical appearance. In a way, it remarks the sharp contrast between the whiteness of the snow and Sargeant's skin color, him being a "big black man" (Hughes 2002a, 272), and further enhances his unawareness "that the whiteness of the snow [also] magnifies his outsider status" (White and White 1996, 98). Not only does

the phrase show the difference in his relation to the place, but Sargeant's magnitude is contrasted with the tininess of the snowflakes. The fact that "he wouldn't have known it was snowing" (Hughes 2002a, 272) and "he was not interested in the snow" (Hughes 2002a, 272) despite the snow "seeping down his neck, cold, wet, sopping in his shoes" (Hughes 2002a, 272) refers to both resignation and resilience. The snow, in the short story, signifies white supremacy, white oppression, and represents the white American society that has conditioned and socialized African Americans to ignore the "snow"—a criticism, which Hughes already formulated (and later developed) in his manifesto published in 1926, "The Negro Artist and the Racial Mountain," that African Americans are "taught rather not to see [the beauty of his people]" (Hughes 2002b, 32). Hughes's criticism, however, is also supported by Carolyn P. Walker's point that "when one feels helpless against an oppressor, sometimes one cannot afford to 'see' the oppressor [. . .] but a part of trying to survive is not being aware" (1991, 745). Sargeant's weariness further enhanced by "too hungry, too sleepy, too tired" (Hughes 2002a, 272) undergirds his disinterest in the snow, which, according to Walker, "inhabits a central place" (1991, 745) "under the bright lights of the main street" (Hughes 2002a, 272).

Although it may be adequate to thematize Sargeant's movement on the main street in the spotlight of the streetlights illuminating his lonely road of suffering of biblical magnitude, he is "like Samson in the Book of Judges, a man who has lost everything" (Walker 1991, 749). His size and strength in the midst of the snowflakes as Samson's among the Philistines and the fact that he tears down the church as Samson demolishes the Philistine temple elevate Sargeant to the ranks of Old Testament judges empowered by the calling of God. Emanuel points out the ambivalence of Sargent's act of disrupting the church as "unlike blind Samson of the Bible, who invokes the aid of the Lord to pull down the two pillars for his own vengeance, Sargeant clings to church pillars to preserve himself before the people" (Emanuel 1967, 94). The demolition of the church through Sargeant being pulled from it, seemingly not the agent in the process, yet signifies Samsonite activity. What Emanuel observes as an invocation in the biblical story reenters in Hughes's narrative as looking upon the stone Christ on the facade of the church[1] (Hughes 2002a, 272). The eye-opening encounter empowers him to erupt from blindness and achieve the awakening of consciousness.

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1   Seeing Christ is similar to the Biblical passage in Num. *21:4-9*, where Moses erected the bronze snake so that the people who looked up at it would be saved from danger. In a

On the one hand, it is the whites who demolish the church by pulling Sergeant away in the surrealistic scene evoking folk tales. The image of "the people of the street" (Hughes 2002a, 273) who are motivated by the fear of the "idea" (Hughes 2002a, 273) underlines Hughes's attitude towards the hypocrisy of "the white man's religion"—the same religion that explained the "legitimacy of human bondage" (White and White 1996, 100), reducing Jesus Christ to "the Christ of the white supremacy" (Culp 1987, 242) and "divid[ing] the active Christian conscience from the act of enslaving and dehumanizing" African Americans (Emanuel qtd. in White and White 1996, 100). Hypocrisy unveiled blatantly through their self-ironic action brings actually their church down.

On the other, it is after Sargeant's sight is restored by looking up at Christ that "for the first time that night he *saw* the snow" (emphasis in the original). Seeing is understanding as in making sense of his situation, motivating him to undertake performative action: "He shook his head. He shook the snow from his coat sleeves, felt hungry, felt lost, felt not lost, felt cold" (Hughes 2002a, 273). His "conversion" derives from finding a point of reference outside the racial binary, which has kept him in an ahistorical place. His act of "grab[bing] for one of the stone pillars" (Hughes 2002a, 273) shows his new identity stemming from outside the binary and derives from the cultural memory of resistance through faith.

Beyond "survival uppermost in his mind" (White and White 1996, 99), Sergeant demonstrates his resistance to control with re-ignited hope to counter his displacement. James Emanuel also strengthens the idea that "Sargeant's purpose—survival—is blindly personal" (1967, 94) to reconstruct Samson's vengeance to enliven his character as a judge, creating an analogy between the two men. Breaking down the pillars is, thus, an act of confirmation of belonging through the act of faith, not simply an "act of violence" (White and White 1996, 100).

However, Emanuel explains that "the tie between religion and violence [in the US] is ancient" (1967, 89) and the "trail of racial violence and bloodshed under specious Biblical sanction criss-crosses the path of every American and grits the memory of every Negro author, regardless of occasional appearances to the contrary" (1967, 89). As the "two club-swinging policemen have begun to pull and beat him [and] the crowd help[ed] the officers pull on him" (Emanuel 1967, 93) a scene of mob

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similar way, Christ on the crucifix, figuratively, opens Sargeant's eye to reality, i.e., the racial hypocrisy in the American society.

violence becomes visible for the reader. Even though the number of violent attacks against African Americans declined in the 1930s, the need to exert power over blacks remained. As W. Jason Miller writes in *Langston Hughes and American Lynching Culture*, visible locations/sites of mob attacks and lynching proved important in that they "intimidated African Americans and reinforced white superiority" (2011, 29).

With Sargeant's change of attitude, the road and "being on the road" take on a new meaning. Through the encounter, Sargeant overrides African American uprootedness and "becomes aware for the first time" (Walker 1991, 748). This time Sargeant is not alone; for he has Christ as a companion, who is "leavin' here" (Hughes 2002a, 274). Christ "as the archetype of suffering blacks" (Culp 1987, 243) proves homeless, just like Seargent, the African American person. "Ha[ving] no place to lay his head" (Mt. 8:20, NIV), Jesus is identified by Hughes as "the Saviour of men [who] had nowhere to go except to push on" (Hughes qtd. in Emanuel 1967, 94). Hughes does similarly in "On the Road" as he does in his famous poem "Ma Lord," and draws a "comparison between the fate of Jesus and the revilement of black people" (Culp 1987, 243), with Christ symbolizing an "ever-present and intimate friend" (Raboteau 1978, 259). Through the newfound companionship, Sargeant transforms from a resigned and victimized African American into a "laughing and talking" cultural subject. The regained companionship enables for the physical meeting as "Christ [is] walking along beside him," (Hughes 2002a, 274), alluding to Luke 24, where Christ appears to the disciples on the road to Emmaus. However, while in Luke "their [disciples] eyes were kept from recognizing him" (Lk. 24, NIV), Sargeant seeing the "anthropomorphic Christ" (Culp 1987, 243) is a testimony of faith, i.e., a performative sign of his immersion into and attachment to African American cultural memory through his experience on the road as a wilderness experience, enabling him to transcend his condition and to appear together with Jesus Christ. The "Two on the Road" as Hughes previously entitled his work, exhibits and contributes "to the idea of daily brotherhood" (Emanuel 1967, 95) when Christ is depicted "as humble in spirit and as deprived as a Negro vagabond" (Emanuel 1967, 95) and counts him as "one of the dispossessed" (Emanuel 1967, 95).

Nonetheless, Sargeant's road is only figurative. His encounter with Christ was only a surreal dream experience. At the end of the story, Sargeant is in jail, behind closed bars. Until this point in the story, doors were used to keep Sargeant outside, in an act of inversion, the jail keeps him inside, indicating that his previous condition of the road is but a place of incarceration, too.

According to Walker, "the oppressor is back in full force" (1991, 752), however, Sargeant's change of consciousness marks a directionality pointing beyond the societal prison and thus threatening to "break down this door, too" (Hughes 2002a, 274), echoing Christ's previous statement that "God knows [. . .] but I'm leavin' here" (Hughes 2002a, 273). Wandering about "where Christ's gone? I wonder if he's gone to Kansas City?" (Hughes 2002a, 276) reiterates thus that "hope is back, permanently" (Walker 1991, 752), only "in a dream born of pain" (Emanuel 1967, 95).

Besides Kansas City "being a half-way point across the country" (Hughes qtd. in Emanuel 1967, 94), it serves as a historical and meditative place. The history of the Langston family motivated and inspired Hughes to "nurse[] a sense that he was obliged within his lifetime, in some way, to watch their deeds" (Rampersad 2002a, 18), and as an artist "Hughes assign[ed] memory to a place rather than a people" (Miller 2011, 22). The juxtaposition between past and present creates the history of the place, an interconnectedness between people, place(s), and history. As in many of Hughes's poems ("The Negro Speaks of Rivers," "The Negro," "Mississippi," etc.) in the present short story Hughes addresses the history and "draws attention to a familiar and ever-present need" (Miller 2011, 22) simultaneously. The past actions of his family, and that of many unnamed African Americans' who reached Kansas City (the Canaan after bondage), recalls and "re-members" the significance of the place: Langston Hughes calls "for the spirit of the men to return, suggesting that their work is still not done" (Miller 2011, 22).

Langston Hughes reminds us in "On the Road" of the importance of religious and religio-cultural values in African American culture, which also played an important role in the writer's life and works. The symbols recycled from the collective memory of African Americans are used to strengthen an African American identity and validate the writer's black self. By remembering, Hughes, just like his protagonist, goes through the process of black self-realization and self-creation, thus able to transcend the timeless black condition imposed on African Americans by white society. The reminiscence of familiar places, such as Kansas City as Hughes re-members it, discloses a piece of cultural memory and the black experience to remember and invoke DuBois's statement that "the peculiar spiritual quality which the Negro has injected into American life and civilization" (qtd. in Sorret 2016, 42).

Invoking "old-time" values and highlighting the communal relationship between Christ and African Americans, Hughes encourages his fellow African Americans to persist in the "door" of racial prejudice and discrimination,

and use their blackness to authenticate the African American experience and self. The short story is one example of Hughes's religious writing. Making use of the theme of the Exodus, the persona of Jesus Christ, and appropriated Biblical notions in African American Christianity, Hughes criticizes prejudiced (religious) Americans and urges African Americans to "discover [themselves] and the people" (Hughes 2002b, 32).

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Anxhela Filaj

Liberating the Oppressed Body in Roxane Gay's *Hunger*

Roxane Gay's *Hunger* (2017) is a non-fiction memoir that takes the reader through her life in a way that nobody would expect, through a heartfelt and vulnerable confession. Gay[1] is a famous American writer, editor, and critic of Haitian origin. Throughout the book, the author recounts her experience with weight gain, body image, and building a positive relationship with herself, following her childhood experience as a victim of sexual violence. When she was twelve years old, Roxane was gang-raped by a boy she thought she loved and his friends. After the sexual abuse, she punished her body in her quest for self-discovery by finding comfort in food as the only way to fill the void, take up space and become undesirable. *Hunger* is the story of a black woman who despite being a target of sexual violence, does not direct that rage or hostility toward anyone, not even her abusers, but herself. This paper explores the intimate narration of Gay using intersectionality as the most predominant way of conceptualizing her experience and powerlessness as a black Haitian woman in an "unruly," fat, and sexually abused body.

Adopting #MeToo movement, as an important asset of the historical overview regarding the "legitimacy" of survivors' discourses (since it encouraged several victims of sexual abuse to speak publicly about their abuse), this paper focuses on Roxane's path toward loving her body by using close readings of her memoir and recognizing all the traumatic stages she went through. By perpetuating her disempowerment, Gay takes the reader in the long journey of coming to terms with her body from the initial stage where she denied the recognition of herself, to her becoming the master of

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1   Her most distinguished works include: *Bad Feminist* (2014), *Difficult Women* (2017), and *Not That Bad: Dispatches from Rape Culture* (2018).

her own fate, as the ultimate destination: "There is the before and the after. Before I gained weight. After I gained weight. Before I was raped. After I was raped" (Gay 2017, 17). I argue that she uses dehumanizing language in *Hunger* to express the uneasiness, apprehension, and repulse she felt toward herself, her body, and her identity. This is a conscious choice of the author to exploit in a realistic manner the difficulties of her psychological journey for three decades from degrading/devaluing her body to loving/nurturing it.

In feminist theory, intersectionality has become the most prevalent way of conceptualizing the relation between several systems of oppression which construct multiple identities in hierarchies of power and privilege. The concept of intersectionality as a theoretical and methodological tool was explicitly introduced into feminist theorizing by Kimberlé Crenshaw, a black feminist scholar. In her article for *Stanford Law Review*, Crenshaw addresses identity politics in the context of violence against African American women, and the problematic framework of mainstream liberal discourse which often "treats race, gender and other identity categories as vestiges of bias or domination" (1991, 3). In this paper, intersectionality will serve as the most ruling structure when analyzing the interacting effects of inequalities to better understand all the matrices of oppression that affected Roxane Gay's life as a black, lesbian, obese woman, without falling into the trap of introducing a hierarchical relationship of the different systems of oppression she encountered because that would risk excluding[2] some of them. Thus, it is important not to homogenize intersectionality as an approach, since it is an umbrella term for many social identities, and homogenizing it would mean that people's identities "will instead be seen as converging effects of different kinds of subordination" (Lykke 2010, 75).

Hunger documents Gay's experience of sexual and bodily trauma and related challenges with body image. The memoir begins with Roxane's rape and her memories of the abuse revealing how its consequences affected her body perception, and relation to the self. In *Memory Distortions*, the author explains that a traumatic bodily experience has the capacity to manifest/renew itself in memory without emotional or psychological distancing (Schudson 1995, 351), and imbued with moral purpose, instrumentalizes the past as a reminder of the survivor's deficiency. Paula K. Lundberg-Love, an American therapist in women's psychology, argues that sexual trauma not

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2   My overall focus is not limited to the concept of "intersectionality" as such, but rather the idea that the power of the gender/sex concept (deriving from intersectionality) intersects with other sociocultural categorizations such as ethnicity, race, and sexuality.

only sensitizes the body but also increases concern regarding body issues in general since several neurotransmitter systems[3] in the brain are impacted by the abuse, which in turn underlies eating disturbances (2006, 79).

Remembering and publicly talking about terrible events are prerequisites both for the restoration of the social order and for the healing of individual victims, states Judith Herman, since the conflict between the will to deny horrible events and the will to proclaim them aloud is the central dialectic of psychological trauma (1992,1). Linda Alcoff and Laura Gray argue in their article that speaking out not only educates the society at large about the dimensions of sexual violence and repositions the problem from the individual psyche to the social sphere where it rightfully belongs, but also empowers victims to make the transition from passive victim to active survivor (1993, 262).

In *Assaults on the Small Screen,* the author criticizes the categorization of sexually abused survivors as "victims" as the main difficulty of overcoming trauma and shame, not the actual assault (Magestro 2015, 83). In addition, Alison Phipps explains that the discourse around the term victim/survivor articulates victim's psychology since the gradual pathologization of the "victim" is analogous to having "a long-term illness," whereas "survivor" focuses on "the personal journey of empowerment" (2014, 42–43). Thus, this articulation of the term transforms the ways victims/survivors of sexual abuse identify their subjectivities since "the self is fragile and vulnerable" (Mansfield 2000, 88). Contradictorily, in *Hunger*, the author does not consider the victim-survivor dichotomy as problematic. In fact, she states that "I prefer 'victim' to 'survivor' now. I do not want to diminish the gravity of what happened. I do not want to pretend I am on some triumphant, uplifting journey. I do not want to pretend that everything is okay" (Gay 2017, 20). Despite identifying as a "victim" in order not to devalue the strength of her trauma, Gay acknowledges none of the terms as responsible for the reflection of her autonomous subjectivity.

The power of words and body are both political (liberal) powers and human rights, whose access should by default be permitted/guaranteed to everyone. Influenced by the enterprise system of capitalist societies, we are now reduced to economic assertiveness where everything is redefined to facilitate the prosperity of the private sphere. In a sense, neoliberalism as a system of domination which shapes how we regard the self is equivalent to "the male gaze," trying to regulate Gay's social identity as a black woman.

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3   Serotonin, norepinephrine, dopamine, and the endorphins.

Au contraire, Nick Mansfield in his theory of individual subjectivity clarifies that no individual is naturally autonomous, and that identity is "a trap, something to be frustrated and deconstructed" (2000, 172), rather than a liberating or expressive force of our selfhood.

In her response to the black female subjectivity in her book chapter "Revolutionary Black Women," bell hooks accepts the difficulties black women face within white supremacist capitalist patriarchies to construct radical subjectivity, and assumes that "the production of honest confessional narratives by black women who are struggling to be self-actualized and to become radical subjects are needed as guides, as texts" (2015, 59) to provide the readers with the understanding of the complexities of black female experience:

> Willingness to share openly one's personal experience ensures that one will not be made into a deified icon. When black females learn about my life, they also learn about the mistakes I make, the contradictions. They come to know my limitations as well as my strengths. They cannot dehumanize me by placing me on a pedestal. (hooks 2015, 56)

Likewise, Gay's memoir avoids constructing a homogeneous black female subjectivity defined by the same experience. By focusing attention primarily on her journey, she does not try to generalize the "pursuit" for an identity, nor does she idealize or romanticize her quest.

Roxane Gay does not talk about the invisibility of intimate partner violence against women of color, instead, she talks about her body, as a black woman, and the space it possesses, "Fat, much like skin color, is something you cannot hide, no matter how dark the clothing you wear, or how diligently you avoid horizontal stripes" (2017, 80). In the past, slavery defined the slave "not as an autonomous individual, but as part of a specific economy" (2000, 130), argues Mansfield, and ever since skin color has been identified as a quintessential "visible marker" of powerlessness and racial inferiority, i.e., "You did not sound like a colored girl on the phone" (Gay 2017, 71). Writing about the racial and sexual significance of colored women's bodies matters because in doing so the racist hegemony is disrupted, yet the black woman needs to "purge oneself of feelings of inferiority" (Ingram 2008, 71):

> As I was a black student from a reasonably well-off family, and I was from Nebraska, of all places, the white students did not quite know what to do with me. I was an *anomaly*, and I did not fit their assumed narrative about blackness. They assumed

that all black students came from impoverished backgrounds and lived in the inner city. (Gay 2017, 45)

Being black put an obsessive emphasis on skin "as the determining attribute of subjectivity" (Mansfield 2000, 118), and separated Roxane from herself and others. Races are real, but they are artifacts of social classification, "not just a matter of how people look" (Smith 2011, 173–74).

In *Hunger*, Gay comments on the social "compulsion" toward weight loss as a system that relies on women's deprivation and dissatisfaction by encouraging the readers to think in more complex ways about the actual experience of obese individuals. The obese body is not only the expression of "excess, decadence, weakness, and a site of massive infection" (Gay 2017, 81), but also a matter of public discourse. The author categorizes herself as "the other," i.e., "sweet words were not for girls like me" (153), since her body could not conform to the beauty social standards and justify her femininity: "I had no right to feel pretty, to feel good about myself, to acknowledge myself as a woman when I am clearly not following the rules for being a woman – to be small, to take up less space" (95).

Similarly, Caitlin Moran in *How to Be a Woman* documents her early teenage years. In the chapter "I Am Fat" she confesses her experience as a bullied adolescent girl for not fulfilling the ideologies of perfectionism and ridicules herself for the way she looked, i.e., "an albatross," "an outsized white bird," "a sea anchor" (2011, 93). Moran delimits the word "fat" as "a swearword, a weapon, a sociological sub-species, an accusation, dismissal, rejection," the "filth" (94), and like Gay accepts the power of its social domination.

David Smith, who authored the book *Less than Human*, refers to the term dehumanization as obliterating one's humanity, as "the act of conceiving of people as subhuman creatures rather than as human beings" (2011, 31), and as "an actual transformation from a human to a subhuman caused by sinful behaviour" (51). So, Smith explains that when women are objectified, their humanity is disregarded, and they start being treated as "instruments of sexual pleasure rather than as human subjects" (32), i.e., "I was too damaged" (Gay 2017, 64).

"Dehumanisation is the most significant driver of insurrection and it always starts with language," states Brené Brown in her podcast *Unlocking Us*. In her talk, she explains that when we reduce people to animals or less than fully human, we gradually diminish our humanity. Dehumanization is a long psychological process, a way of thinking, which starts with creating

an enemy image. Gay created the enemy image and projected it on her body, "I was not a girl. I was less than human" (2017, 35). Once she began seeing that "enemy" as morally inferior, it was difficult practicing any empathy toward "it." In the memoir, Gay uses a language toward herself that reflects a deeply internalized pain and self-rejection in the aftermath of the abuse. After realizing that she no longer echoed individual freedom toward her body, she "punished" herself by objectifying, vilifying, shaming, and "demonizing" the body for its powerlessness in the past, i.e., "My body was nothing," "[. . .] a thing to be used," "[. . .] repulsive" (153), "a cage" (20).

Gay is not afraid of being vulnerable. In recounting the perception of her own body, she describes the shame she felt because of her "weakness" (body size), and the abuse she encountered, "I have no idea where the bottom of my shame resides" (2017, 170), referring to shame as "the intensely painful feeling or experience of believing we are flawed and therefore unworthy of acceptance and belonging" (qtd. in Burks 2006, 19). In her book, *I Thought It Was Just Me*, Brown states that from the field of social psychology after recognizing and understanding our shame triggers, we can more easily acknowledge vulnerability as "an act of courage," since being vulnerable "is not a weakness but a strength" (2007, 73–75). Furthermore, "vulnerability is enhanced by assembling," asserts Judith Butler in her book chapter "Rethinking Vulnerability and Resistance" (2016, 12), since, without shelter, we are vulnerably exposed to the social conditions around us:

> When women talk about the shame of being sexually abused or raped, they associate most of the shame with the pain of being defined by their trauma. The events are, of course, horrific and can have a lasting effect. But the social-community reaction to their experience —and the attendant loss of identity and the right to "be normal"— is just as painful, and often produces the more enduring shame. (Brown 2007, 178)

When it comes to sexual assaults, shame is certainly misplaced since survivors are entitled to reciprocate certain responses from the community surrounding them and in turn delineate themselves as the epitome of disgust and guilt. In *The Signifying Body*, Penelope Ingram describes the body as "more than a mere vessel or natural shell which houses our psychic, culturally inflected selves" and further states that "one's sense of one's own physical body occurs through identificatory relations with others as well as through a narcissistic relation with the self" (2008, 79). After the assault, Roxane internalized the stigma and body-hate stemming from others. Her biggest determination was "getting bigger," making her body what she needed it to

be "a safe harbor," "a hulking, impermeable mass" (Gay 2017, 126), rather than "a small, weak vessel" that "betrayed" her (46).

Struggling with the fear of being stereotyped, labeled, and trying to escape her unwanted identity, Roxane unfolds her position as someone being constantly reminded by her memories of the assault, "I buried the girl I had been because she ran into all kinds of trouble. I tried to erase every memory of her, but she is still there, somewhere. She is still small and scared and ashamed" (Gay 2017, 21). Brown explains this association of the present with the traumatic past as reexperiencing the original trauma. So, "rather than remembering the wound, we *become* the wound" (2007, 80): "I ate mindlessly, just to fill the gaping wound of me" (Gay 2017, 69).

After working for more than a decade with trauma survivors, Janina Fisher in her book *Healing the Fragmented Selves of Trauma Survivors*, observed that all her clients had something in common, "each was superficially an integrated whole person but also manifested clear-cut signs of being internally fragmented" (2017, 4). Many trauma survivors yearn to be invisible because their bodies "still remember the experience of 'no control'" (7). Towards the end, Gay admits what happened to her body, yet still faces troubles coming to terms with past flashbacks that were triggered by the most unexpected things. She reveals that she will never forget: "I will never forgive the boys who raped me, and I am a thousand percent comfortable with that because forgiving them will not free me from anything. I do not know if I am happy, but I can see and feel that happiness is well within my reach" (2017, 194).

The body is an important site for symbolizing autonomy, self-representation, empowerment, control, and identity. Gay uses her writing to present her reality and protest the old, traditional standards dictated on women and strengthened by political ideologies which deny women the right of viewing their bodies as their own entities, separated from the commercial enterprise system: "It bothers me to have my gender erased, to be unseen in plain sight. I am a woman. I am large, but I am a woman. I deserve to be seen as such" (Gay 2017, 164). This is Gay's attempt to construct a discourse in which she can articulate, acknowledge her differences, accept her femininity, open space for new cultural formations, and subvert societal expectations regarding women's bodies and their cultural objectification.

The ending is not triumphant. Roxane does not "invent" herself in this memoir, but instead offers a new vision of selfhood by accepting herself as a complex subject: "I am overweight. I hope to not always be, but for now, this is my body. I am coming to terms with that. I am trying to feel less shame about that" (Gay 2017, 119). Once completing her self-discovery journey,

Gay seeks to define her body positively and attempts to reclaim her denied identity as a woman: "I understand 'fat' as a reality of my body. When I use the word, I am not insulting myself. I am describing myself" (129).

By intently embracing all the cultural "contradictions" surrounding her identity, she learns how to accept herself, live a healthy and nutritious life, and stem self-dehumanization: "Part of healing is taking care of your body and learning how to have a humane relationship with your body" (Gay 2017, 182). Tattooing her body empowered and healed her because by doing so she abandoned her old "deviant" self and the dictates of beauty culture. Beverly Yuen Thompson describes the process of becoming heavily tattooed as letting go of social expectations of normalcy in appearance and representing "a certain authenticity to the self" (2015, 62). Through "self-modifying" her new body, Gay gained the control back and claimed it as her own: "When I mark myself with ink, or when I have that done to me, I am taking some part of my skin back. It is a long, slow process. This is my fortress" (120).

Roxane Gay utilizes her individual story of sexual abuse as a public discourse, a form of feminist protest, and a powerful weapon in making public the blunt strength of gender oppression and sexual violence. In a lot of ways, by being openly vulnerable (even self-negating at times), Gay's public acceptance of her rape and obesity creates an assembly, congregation, gathering, a single body with all the readers facing social criticism regarding the way their bodies look:

> Writing this book is the most difficult thing I have ever done. In writing this memoir of my body, in telling you these truths about my body, I am sharing my truth and mine alone. Here I am, finally freeing myself to be vulnerable and terribly human. Here I am, reveling in that freedom. Here. See what I hunger for and what my truth has allowed me to create. (2017, 195)

The title *Hunger* transcends the physical hunger and moves towards the hunger of the mind and the soul. Through her honest confession, she wants the readers to know the reality of the world she lives in, not them feeling sorry for her. This book is not a place from which Gay leaves with a sense of estrangement after speaking out. She alternatively turns it into a safe space where she can easily name her experience, speak openly and honestly about it, and not carry remembered pain: "I learned that being raped was not my fault" (51). In her pursuit of self and identity, Gay explores her sexuality and openly annihilates gender expectations, "I was and am attracted to women. I find them rather intriguing" (150).

Voicing her narrative of resistance through the cathartic expression of her pain, she presents her story of sexual abuse as an "authentic" female reality. Gay refrains her identity as a black woman from being framed synonymously with victimization and does not try to evoke the negative experience of black womanhood as "commonly" shared. As a radical feminist, she speaks against sexism before speaking about her race and adopts all her identities as heterogeneous entities, which in turn makes her journey toward selfhood easier to chart.

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2.

REMEMBERING, FORGETTING, DREAMING, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SELF

ANDRÁS TARNÓC

"An order is given to remember, but the responsibility is mine and it is I who must remember"
The Role of Memory in Subject Construction

I.

The purpose of my paper is to explore and assess the role of memory in subject construction. To realize this research objective, I will rely on a theoretical apparatus primarily consisting of the works of Michel Foucault, Pierre Nora, Kathleen Brogan, and Robert Doyle. Following Foucault I view subject construction as a dual process, implying subjection and subjectivation taking place in the context of the given power. Inspired by Pierre Nora's famous quote I consider all three subgenres of the confinement narrative as the manifestation of *lieux de memoire*, or places of memory. Kathleen Brogan distinguished between two types of memory, the traumatic and the narrative. Last but not least, while Robert Doyle originally developed his model of the presentation of the self for the prisoner of war narrative, I extend its applicability to the texts at hand.

I selected representative texts from three subgenres of captivity literature. The accounts of Robert Eastburn and Rachel Plummer are examples of the Indian captivity narrative, the reports of Olaudah Equiano and Frederick Douglass represent the slave narrative, while the recollections of Prescott Tracy and Sam Johnson exemplify the prisoner of war narrative.

My analysis rests on the following pillars. (1) At first I identify the factors launching the memory construction process, in other words, I look at the source of the "duty to remember." (2) I elucidate the context of the subject construction effort, namely the existence of the passive or active subject and the very power the captive confronts along with categorizing the given memory according to Brogan's taxonomy and (3) I categorize the presented image of the self in light of Doyle's model.

II.

Foucault's *assujettisement* concept holds that the subject is created in the context of or in relation to contemporary power. Consequently, there are two ways of becoming a subject, either by being submitted to power, implying subjection, or by forming a new self, while defying the given power, in other words, subjectivation. Thus subjection entails passivity or the presence of the passive subject, while subjectivation leads to the emergence of the active subject. I am also aware of the distinction between the concepts of the subject and identity as the former expresses fluidity and continuous inscription into the symbolic order, while the latter is a rigid, pre-determined entity.

The remembering process can be described on a continuum ranging from individual history to national or collective memory and implies the conflation of private, personal, and communal recollections. At the time of the capture the settler, the would-be slave, or the soldier is in Louis Althusser's term, hailed by history. The respective trauma and the need to cope with it "trigger, represent, as well as feed" (Gaál-Szabó 2017, 79) the recordings of memory. Confinement narratives function as the embodiment of Nora's *lieux de memoire* further divided into, material, functional, and symbolic memory.

The material aspects include the tangible remnants of the captivity experience. Suffice to refer to the statues of two famous captives of Indians, Mary Jemison and Hannah Dustan, the graves of former slaves decorated by broken chains, and the Wall, that is, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial erected in honor of American soldiers fallen in the Vietnam War. The functional side of memories refers to the respective roles attributed to the given recollections. Accordingly, the Indian captivity narrative served anti-French or anti-Indian propaganda purposes and called for the defense of the tenets of Puritanism against Catholicism. The slave narrative promoted the goals of the abolition movement, while the prisoner of war narrative provided proof of the American soldier's personal and moral resilience while being exposed to the enemy during long-term captivity. The symbolic aspects of memory are manifestations of the "living heart of memory" in "places of refuge, sanctuaries of devotion and silent pilgrimage" (Nora 1989, 23) in other words, social and cultural myths.

Kathleen Brogan utilizing Pierre Janet's research identified two types of memory. The traumatic memory preserves the specific ordeal in one's mind in the original form, it is rigid, repetitive, and inflexible. Narrative memory, on the other hand, implies the processing of the given incident and amounts to a social act reshaping and giving meaning to the past (Brogan 1995, 155).

Doyle established four types of self-image projected by authors of the prisoner of war narrative. The *beleaguered self* primarily resulting from the trauma of undergoing a military defeat and suffering physical abuse and culture shock usually appears at the beginning of the experience, at or soon after the time of capture. The *fortunate self* represents an overall positive appreciation of the captivity experience similar to that of Mary Rowlandson declaring "It is good for me that I have been afflicted" (Rowlandson 1994, 90). The *distanced self* implies a figurative removal from the given incident, as the protagonist attempts to stay aloft of the suffering. The *soldierly self* displays behavior meeting the requirements of the Code of Conduct, a model established by the military to follow even in captivity (Doyle 1994, 10). While the behavior of white settlers captured by Native Americans was not expressly regulated by the WASP society I consider staunch protection of Protestantism and along with that of personal integrity a soldierly act. Furthermore, the slave's commitment to freedom and his willingness to engage in a physical struggle with the overseer or the slaveholder can be viewed in the same light.

Remembering and Subject Construction in the Indian Captivity Narrative

As a correlation can be observed between the stages of Indian captivity and the remembering process I will not delve into the content of the given narratives as I only examine how these narratives fulfill the abovementioned three criteria of my inquiry. In this section, I will also rely on Richard VanDerBeets's cyclical model including the "Separation," "Transformation," "Return" representing the plot of such confinement narratives (VanDerBeets 1972, 554). In most, if not all cases, the power against which the subject is constructed is the captor Native American tribe. The ambush forces the victims into an inherently submissive position. The "duty to remember" (Nora 1989, 15) is partly brought on by the representatives of the WASP cultural elite or by the internal need of healing the injured self. The traumatic memories are related to the Separation stage, while during the Transformation phase the captive starts to adapt to the circumstances of captivity. Following the Return, the former captive is able to reflect on the given experiences and produces the respective account.

Robert Eastburn served as a blacksmith and deacon in the First Presbyterian Church of Philadelphia when he was captured by French soldiers and Indians in 1756 during the French and Indian War. In the course of a year-long ordeal, he suffered both physical and psychological abuse, was subjected to the gauntlet, and experienced starvation. After he was forcibly

taken to Canada he fought valiantly to preserve his faith and ironically he gained his freedom at the behest of a French general. His recollections were published in 1758 under the title *Faithful Narrative*.[1]

Eastburn confesses on his own that "On [his] Return from [his] Captivity, [he] had not Thoughts of publishing any Observations [. . .] to the World," and asserting that "my Memory being broken, and Capacity small" (Eastburn 1994, 153) he indicates his inability to remember or form memories during his ordeal. Since the writing of the memoir came about as "A Number of [his] Friends were pressing in their Perswasions" (Eastburn 1994, 153) the duty to remember is imposed externally. The power he is confronted with is naturally the Indian tribe and their French allies. The compulsion for recalling the events of captivity primarily comes from his peers, but Reverend Tennent's comment: "But, seeing the following Sheets, are like to spread into many Places, where he is not known" (Eastburn 1994, 153) implies urging on the part of religious elders. The circumstances of his capture, similarly to that of being surrounded by hostile forces on the battlefield, anticipate the prisoner of war narratives: "the Enemy [. . .] obliged me to surrender, to prevent a cruel death. (They stood ready to drive their Darts into my Body, in case I refused to deliver up my Arms)" (Eastburn 1994, 154).

At the beginning of his captivity experience, Eastburn is subjected to the power of the Indians and his own God as well. His objectification is indicated by being deprived of mobility as he recalls the treatment he received after capture: "[The Indians] put a Rope on my Neck, bound my Arms fast behind me, put a long Band round my Body [. . .] struck me on the Head (a severe Blow)" (Eastburn 1994, 155), while he refers to his captor as "my Indian master." Such additional terms of his narrative as "was sent to Cohnewago," and "was hauled" (Eastburn 1994, 162), or "was ordered to work," or "I was then sent over the River to be employed in hard Labour" (Eastburn 1994, 164) imply objectification as well. Furthermore, being "taken hold by a stout Indian and hauled into the Water" (Eastburn 1994, 162) also highlights Eastburn's status as the passive subject.

Submission in a religious context is suggested by Althusser who asserts that Christian means "*a subject through the Subject and subjected to the Subject*" (2001, 179). Eastburn views himself as a sinner: "My Afflictions

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1   Since Indian captivity narratives tend to have rather long titles such as Eastburn's: *A Faithful Narrative of the many Dangers and Sufferings, as well as wonderful Deliverances of Robert Eastburn, during his late Captivity among the Indians* [. . .], I use the shortened versions in the essay.

are certainly far less than my Sins deserve" (Eastburn 1994, 158). At the beginning of his captivity, he reinforces his passive subject status in relation to God: "I endeavoured with all my remaining Strength, to lift up my Eyes to God, from whom alone I could with Reason expect Relief!" (Eastburn 1994, 155).

As the captivity progresses Eastburn advances toward subject status as well. He acts as a representative of the Puritan church and WASP society. One such indication is his refusal to act upon the Indians' command, that is, to sing the Prisoners' Song. Remembering in his case fulfils anti-French propaganda purposes as shown by his references to the "French Governor's Conduct" as "giving the Indians great Encouragement to Murder and Captivate the poor Inhabitants of our Frontiers" (Eastburn 1994, 173), or maintaining slavery among the Indians, "which is a Scandal to any civilized Nation, and what many Pagans would abhor!" (Eastburn 1994, 173). At the same time, he considers his captivity as a patriotic mission: "I was suffered to fall into the Hands of the Enemy, to promote the Good of my Countrymen" (Eastburn 1994,155). His defense of Protestantism is manifested in his anti-Catholic statements condemning the French for instilling "Popish Principles" (Eastburn1994, 169) among the Indians. One of the most potent examples of his religious resolve is his steadfast refusal to participate in a Catholic mass and proudly succumbing to the ensuing punishment of forced labor. Considering Catholicism "a bloody and absurd Religion" (Eastburn 1994, 163), he exclaims: "O! may not the Zeal of the Papists, in propagating Superstition and Idolatry, make Protestants ashamed of their Lukewarmness, in promoting the Religion of the Bible!" (Eastburn 1994, 163).

Distancing from the Other advances the progress towards subjectivation: "I May, with Justice and Truth observe, That our Enemies leave no Stone unturned to compass our ruin; they pray, work, and travel to bring it about" (Eastburn 1994, 158). The term "our Enemies" conveys a strong sense of self-definition and the exclusion of the Other from one's horizon. His refusal to sing the Prisoners' Song triggers a physical confrontation with one of his captors, in which Eastburn holds his own as the Indian is unable to push him into a fire. His ability to obtain gainful employment is a further sign of subjectivation as he participates in creating earthworks or earns money by working as a blacksmith.

By recalling the abuses he was exposed to, Eastburn projects the beleaguered self at the beginning of his captivity: "It is not easy to conceive, how distressing such a Condition is!" (Eastburn 1994, 155). The soldierly self applies in an extended way following Samuel Nowell's idea expressed in his famous inflammatory sermon "Abraham in Arms." His defense against the

continuous Catholic propaganda and protecting the tenets of Protestantism against the French efforts at conversion and presenting himself as a believer among the heathen make Eastburn a soldier of Christ. The fortunate self is reflected by the good treatment he received from several Indian women: "The Squaws were kind to us, gave us boiled Corn and Beans to eat, and Fire to warm us, which was a great Mercy" (Eastburn 1994, 161), or by describing how 'Indian Women being more merciful" (Eastburn 1994, 162) protected him against physical abuse. Standing up to the Indian captor is also reminiscent of the soldierly self. Also, making strategic observations throughout his forced journey to Canada, taking advantage of the "Opportunity of seeing the great Part of the Forces of Canada," or getting "Intelligence, how our People were preparing for Defence" (Eastburn 1994, 168), represent the soldierly self too. At the same time, he recognizes that a "House divided against itself" (Eastburn 1994, 176) cannot hope for success against the united French and Indian forces.

As Edward Casey argues the body preserves the physical impact of a traumatic event in the form of embodied memory. Eastburn's body became both the corporeal and metaphysical receptacle of the ordeal he suffered. The shocking events forming the foundation of his traumatic memory have eased into narrative memory, as he not only protests the brutality of the French and the Indians but calls his countrymen to task for lack of unity or religious commitment. Such impulses imply that he had time and opportunity to process the given memories.

Kidnapped by Comanche Indians along with her eighteen-month-old daughter after the attack on Parker's Fort in Texas in 1836, Rachel Plummer[2] spent 21 months in captivity. At the beginning of her captivity, she was fully exposed to physical brutality, and her reports on being tied bear relevance to Casey's embodied memory concept: "They now tied a plaited thong around my arms, and drew my hands behind me. They tied them so tight that the scars can be easily seen to this day" (Plummer 1994, 338). Another episode recalls the death of her child: "One cold morning, five or six large Indians came where I was suckling my infant. As soon as they came in I felt my heart sick. [. . .] One of them caught hold of the child by the throat; and with his

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2   The title of her narrative: *A Narrative of the Capture and Subsequent Sufferings of Mrs. Rachel Plummer, Written by Herself.*

whole strength, and like an enraged lion [. . .] held on like the hungry vulture, until my child was to all appearances entirely dead" (Plummer 1994, 341).

The motivation for remembering is partly internal as Plummer "indulges in a retrospect of the past" (Plummer 1994, 364) on her own. She writes her narrative partly to find a reason for her suffering and share her ordeals with others. Yet she is forced to relive the brutal murder of her child. Reliving the given ordeal is also indicated by the following line: "while I record this painful part of my narrative, I can almost feel the same heart-rending pains of body and mind, that I then endured, my very soul becomes sick at the dreadful thought" (Plummer 1994, 338).

Throughout her captivity Plummer faced the Comanche as the contemporary power and her subjectivation process was a result of primarily physical confrontations with her captors. After a fight with her young mistress, the Indian captors themselves acknowledge her subject status as the Chief addresses her: "You are brave to fight—good to a fallen enemy—You are directed by the Great Spirit" (Plummer 1994, 353).

Despite feeling "rejoiced to think that all is well with it" (Plummer 1994, 364) she is unable to come to terms with her trauma. The statement: "When I reflect back and live over again, as it were, my past life—when I see my dear children torn from me by the barbarous hands of the savage—one of whom was inhumanly killed before my eyes and its lifeless and mangled corpse thrown, with derision, into my arms" indicates the rigidity and the inflexible, repetitive nature of the given episode as it is imprinted in her mind. While the terms, "rejoice," and "all is well" refer to the easing of the pain, the traumatic memory is further represented by her inability to forgo her hostile ethnocentric attitude expressed throughout her narrative. Furthermore, since her Narrative appeared as part of her father's memoirs titled Narrative of the Perilous Adventures, Miraculous Escapes, and Sufferings of Rev. James W. Parker (Morning Courier Office, Louisville, Kentucky, 1844), it indirectly served to advance Parker's anti-Indian agenda. An additional indication of her inability to process the trauma is her early death as she passed away a year after her release.

Plummer advances from the beleaguered self through the detached self to eventually following the pattern of the soldierly self. The physical abuse leads to psychological intimidation at the beginning of her captivity: "I now ask you, my christian (sic!) reader, to pause [. . .] Such dreadful, savage yelling! enough to terrify the bravest hearts. Bleeding and weltering in my blood; and far worse, to think of my little darling Pratt!" (Plummer 1994, 338). Exhausted physically and emotionally, she hits rock bottom and

sees imminent death as a way to remove herself from her suffering, thereby recalling the detached self: "Having lived as long, and indeed longer than life was desirable, I determined to aggravate them to kill me" (Plummer 1994, 353). In the same manner, as Eastburn, Plummer uses her captivity to gain strategic information about the intentions of the enemy thereby invoking the soldierly self. She reports that having learned the language of her captors she listened to their council and found out about their plans to attack Texas and later the United States.

Remembering and Subject Construction in the Slave Narrative

As far as this subgenre is concerned, the duty to remember originates either from external encouragement or from internal compulsion. External pressure applies to the institutional aspects of slavery. Authors of narratives dated from the second half of the eighteenth century spoke up against the slave trade instead of arguing for the abolition of slavery as shown by the introductory lines of Olaudah Equiano.[3] The narrative was published in 1794, several decades after his slavery experience. The order to remember is partly expressed by an internal commitment to commemorate the sufferings and "showing the enormous cruelties practiced on (his) sable brethren [. . .] and put a speedy end to a traffic both cruel and unjust" (Equiano 2004,185). In the first half of the nineteenth century, the main goal becomes the abolition of the institution of slavery and the narratives tend to advance this objective.

The institution of slavery relegates the slave into secondary or object status in itself. The contemporary power against which the subject is formed is naturally the representatives of the slaveholding society including the plantation owner in the American South or the master of the sugar field in the Caribbean region. The slave undergoes the process of subjection and subjectivation, that is, he or she can be viewed either as the passive or as the active subject. Since slavery in itself is a system reinforcing objectification the slave is inherently victimized and subordinated. Southern society considers him as a chattel and the lack of his freedom is sanctified by local laws.

The progress from object to subject, in other words, from subjection to subjectivation can be retraced in Olaudah Equiano's *Narrative*. His saga lasts from capture in Africa and treated as an object both during the Middle Passage and in America to being manumitted and eventually participating in the slave trade, himself. His objectification is indicated by the line: "When

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3   The narrative is titled: *The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano* [. . .].

I was carried on board I was immediately handled, and tossed up, to see if I were sound." (Equiano 2004, 203). His emancipation is marked by the recognition that "[Robert King] signed the manumission that day; so that, before night, I who had been a slave in the morning, trembling at the will of another, now became my own master, and compleatly free" (Equiano 2004, 241).

Equiano also presents an image of the self that can be explored according to Doyle's taxonomy. The beleaguered self appears at the beginning of his captivity, on being hauled onto the slave ship as he is intimidated by the given scene:

> [The ship] then riding at anchor, and waiting for its cargo. These filled me with astonishment, which was soon converted into terror, which I am yet at a loss to describe [. . .] I was now persuaded that I had gotten into a world of bad spirits, and that they were going to kill me [. . .] I saw a large furnace of copper boiling, and a multitude of black people of every description chained together, every one of their countenances expressing dejection and sorrow [. . .] I was quite overpowered with horror and anguish [. . .] The shrieks of the women, and the groans of the dying, rendered the whole a scene of horror almost inconceivable. (203–5)

His description of the conditions on the slave ship places him in the category of the beleaguered self. Yet the respective details evoke the landscape aspect of the prisoner of war narrative during which the captive provides a detailed report on his surroundings. The gothic images of "bad spirits, horror, shrieks" are markers of psychological anguish.

The detached self appears in slave narratives in the form of symbolic death. Just like in the case of Rachel Plummer who resigned herself to her fate and wished to be killed by the Indians, Equiano also reaches this point of ultimate despair: "I now wished for the last friend, Death, to relieve me" (Equiano 2004, 203). Similarly to the Indian captive finding a reason behind her ordeal, Equiano recognizes the divine intention behind his suffering, thereby suggesting the pattern of the fortunate self: "I considered the trials and disappointments are sometimes for our good, and I thought God might perhaps have permitted this in order to teach me wisdom and resignation" (Equiano 2004, 216). The soldierly self becomes applicable when although already freed, Equiano has to defend himself against slave catchers in Savannah, Georgia intending to take him back to slavery: "while I was a little way out of the town of Savannah, I was beset by two white men, who meant to play their usual tricks with me in the way of kidnapping [. . .] they were about to handle me; but I told them to be still and keep off" (Equiano 2004, 249).

Frederick Douglass's Narrative[4] also provides an apt demonstration of subject construction and the role of memory in that effort. Being a second-generation slave narrative it can be divided into three stages, the decision, the escape, and integrating into a free society. The decision to launch the subjectivation process, however, is preceded by a long line of abuses and traumatic events. Ironically the narrative testifies to a partial lack of memory as the author does not know his own age and cannot position himself chronologically. Furthermore, unlike other texts, such as the narratives of Harriet Jacobs and Francisco Manzano in which the authors being unaware of their actual social standing describe a somewhat blissful childhood, Douglass is continuously aware of his status as a slave.

The reason he writes this narrative in the noted anti-slavery activist Wendell Phillip's words is "to give a fair specimen of the whole truth" (Douglass 1990, 1646). Naturally, the contemporary power is the slave-holding society and especially the given legal framework prohibiting the teaching of the slave, thereby forcing Douglass into "mental darkness" (Douglass 1990, 1663). Yet the desire for him to learn is present from an early age. Although Mrs. Auld, the wife of one of his masters, starts to teach him to read and write, at the urging of her husband she stops and becomes more hostile toward him than Mr. Auld. This also testifies to the fact that contemporary power was far from homogeneous and along with the gaps or fissures his subjectivation process could begin.

Douglass's description of Aunt Hester's whipping: "I remember the first time I ever witnessed this horrible exhibition, I was quite a child, but I well remember it. I never shall forget it whilst I remember anything" (Douglass 1990, 1649) provides a shocking example of the integration of gothic elements into the slave narrative. In the present case, the traumatic memory implies self-accusation as Douglass was only a passive witness of the incident and was not able to help his suffering fellow slave or alleviate her suffering.

Douglass's subjection is also reinforced by religion as he asserts that "for of all slaveholders [. . .] religious slave holders are the worst [. . .] the meanest and basest, the most cruel and cowardly" (Douglass 1990, 1682). Furthermore, being whipped by Mr. Covey as he "cut him so savagely as to leave the marks visible for a long time after" (Douglass 1990, 1674) not only suggests objectification but facilitates the application of Casey's idea of embodied memory. His scarred body functions as a reminder or *lieux de memoire* of the physical and psychological ordeal of slavery.

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4   *The Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, An American Slave* (1845)

One of the best-known parts of the narrative, his lament in the harbor when looking at ships in the distance reinforces his own object status. He refers to the ships as "freedom's swiftwinged angels" while he describes himself being robbed from mobility and motility: "I am confined in bands of iron" (Douglass 1990, 1676). It is the struggle with Mr. Covey that marks the completion of subjectivation: "This battle with Mr. Covey was the turning point in my career as a slave. It rekindled the few expiring embers of freedom, and revived within me a sense of my own manhood" (Douglass 1990, 1679). The terms "freedom, manhood" all represent the active subject. These expressions also suggest that the traumatic memories can be adapted or converted into narrative ones. The following quote implies self-initiated manumission and a passage from object status to that of the subject: "My long-crushed spirit rose, cowardice departed, bold defiance took its place; and I now resolved that, however long I might remain a slave in form, the day had passed forever when I could be a slave in fact" (Douglass 1990, 1679–80). "Long-crushed, cowardice" refers to objectification, while "bold defiance and resolve" celebrates the birth of the subject.

The working of memory is slowed down when motivated by the concern for the safety of his helpers and fellow slaves, Douglass does not disclose all details of his escape. The Narrative can be explored according to Doyle's taxonomy of the self as well. The helpless and intimidated boy witnessing the whipping of Aunt Hester represents the beleaguered self. The detached self, craving death is suggested by the following quote: "I often found myself regretting my own existence, and wishing myself dead" (Douglass 1990, 1665). The desire to die expresses a figurative removal from the scene of suffering. The way he evaluates his departure from Colonel Lloyd's plantation after being sold to a family in Baltimore anticipates the fortunate self: "Going to live at Baltimore laid the foundation, and opened the gateway to all my subsequent prosperity. I have ever regarded it as the first plain manifestation of that kind providence, which has ever since attended me, and marked my life with so many favors" (Douglass 1990, 1660–1).

The famous chiasmic statement: "You have seen how a man was made a slave; you shall see how a slave was made a man" (Douglass 1990, 1676) implies that despite all suffering slavery contributed to his personal development, anticipating Dubois' recognition "Had it not been for the race problem early thrust upon me and enveloping me, I should have probably been an unquestioning worshiper at the shrine of the social order and economic development into which I was born" (Warren 2011, 19). The soldierly self is

suggested by his brave stance in defending himself against the brutal attack by Mr. Covey. Also, his commitment to freedom is prevalent and he even invokes the heroes of the War of Independence: "We did more than Patrick Henry, when he resolved upon liberty or death [. . .] For my part, I should prefer death to hopeless bondage" (Douglass 1990, 1685). The soldierly self is also indicated by his strategic thinking as considering the potential retribution against his fellow slaves he does not reveal further details of his escape as he wants "to guard the door, whereby some dear brother bondman might escape his galling chains" (Douglass 1990, 1692).

Remembering and Subject Construction in the Prisoner of War Narrative

The duty to remember motivates the writing of the prisoner of war narrative as well. The historical background of such texts ranges from the American Revolution and War of Independence (1775-1783) through the Vietnam War (1955-1975) until the latest deployment of American troops in the Persian Gulf (1991-2003). According to Doyle the recollections of soldiers captured by enemy forces can be divided into seven cyclical units, including the Pre-Capture, Capture, Removal to the holding facility, Resistance, Survival, Release, and Lament phases. The outlines of the captive soldier's expected behavior have been determined since 1955 according to the Code of Conduct of the Armed Services of the United States. The Code divided into 6 segments provided an action pattern for the American soldier and reaffirmed their loyalty and commitment to the military.

Prescott Tracy's narrative[5] commemorates his ordeal at one of the most infamous prison compounds of the Confederacy during the Civil War. His time as a POW was relatively brief lasting from June 22, 1864, until August 16, 1864, when he was released as part of an exchange with Southern captives. In Tracy's case Nora's concept of the "duty to remember" must be taken literally as he is called upon by the military establishment to share his recollections for the purposes of a court-martial inquiry. Thus, on the one hand, he wants to commemorate his comrades' and his ordeal, but he also responds to an official call, issued by the Army Commission investigating the crimes of Captain Wirtz, the Confederate officer in charge of the Camp. His report provides data for the official inquiry carried out by the United States Sanitary Commission and is considered a deposition for the compilation of an official

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5   The narrative is titled *Account of Sufferings of Union Prisoners of War of Camp Sumter, Andersonville, Georgia, Private Prescott Tracy on August 16, 1864.*

narrative titled *Narrative of Privations and Sufferings of United States Officers and Soldiers while Prisoners of War in the Hands of Rebel Authorities by the United States Sanitary Commission* (1864).

The power against which the subject is formed is naturally the captor army and its representatives. The contemporary power Tracy faces is primarily represented by the commanding official of the compound, Captain Wirtz. Tracy describes Captain Wirtz with surprising objectivity as "harsh, though not without kindly feelings" (Tracy 1864, 266). The Narrative records the captive's progress from object status to subjectivation. The description of the post-capture events and the repeated use of the passive voice suggests the applicability of the passive subject to Tracy's experience:

> We were kept at Petersburg two days, at Richmond, Belle Isle, three days, then conveyed by rail to Lynchburg. Marched seventy-five miles to Danville, thence by rail to Andersonville, Georgia. At Petersburg we were treated fairly, being under the guard of old soldiers of an Alabama regiment; at Richmond we came under the authority of the notorious and inhuman Major Turner, and the equally notorious Home Guard [. . .] Another batch of prisoners joining us, we left Richmond sixteen hundred strong. (Tracy 1864, 259)

Yet Tracy's self-identification providing only his name and rank not only appears to be an early version of the NRSD[6] requirement of the Code but indicates his insistence on subject status. "I am a private in the 82nd New York Regiment of Volunteers, Company G. Was captured with about eight hundred Federal troops, in front of Petersburg, on the 22nd of June, 1864" (Tracy 1864, 259). Tracy's description of the Landscape of the POW compound, however, indicates the presence of an independent observer. "this prison is an open space, sloping on both sides, originally seventeen acres, now twenty-five acres, in the shape of a parallelogram, without trees or shelter of any kind. The soil is sand over a bottom of clay. The fence is made of upright trunks of trees, about twenty feet high, near the top of which are small platforms, where the guards are stationed" (Tracy 1864, 260).

The Narrative reflects the simultaneous operation of the traumatic and narrative memory via the alteration of the narrator's chronological and personal distance from the given episode. Tracy's almost emotionless, matter-of-fact description of the ordeal in the form of a deposition, on the one hand, conveys a sense of distancing from the event. At the same time, it

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6   name, rank, serial number, date of birth

also suggests that he had mentally processed the specific incidents, and set up a logical order required for the preparation of the report. It is noteworthy that the use of first-person plural not only expresses identification with the fellow sufferers but points to the importance of the shared trauma. Yet, his report on the forced march to Danville as a "weary and painful one of five days, under a torrid sun; many of us falling helpless by the way" or references to substandard living conditions "our only shelter from sun and rain was stretching over us our coats of scraps of blankets" (Tracy 1864, 259) suggest that such memories have not been transferred from the traumatic memory to the narrative memory. On the other hand, the description of the psychological state of the captives in a third person singular refers to distancing and thus the processing of the given experience:

> The mental condition of a large portion of the men was melancholy, beginning in despondency and tending to a kind of stolid and idiotic indifference. Many spent much time in arousing and encouraging their fellows, but hundreds were lying about motionless, or stalking vacantly to and fro, quite beyond any help which could be given them within their prison walls. These cases were frequent among those who had been imprisoned but a short time. (Tracy 1864, 265)

It is reasonable to argue that the beleaguered self is not applicable as he reports on being captured in a rather emotionless way and emphasizes the "fair treatment" during the transfer to Andersonville. The text reveals the manifestations of the detached and soldierly selves. The detached self is indicated by Tracy's description of the criminal activity within the camp and it suggests a distancing effort as well. He is hard-pressed to admit the "melancholy and mortifying fact, that some of our trials came from our own men. At Belle Isle and Andersonville there were among us a gang of desperate men, ready to prey on their fellows. Not only thefts and robberies but even murders were committed" (Tracy 1864, 266). Resorting to the passive voice along with such terms as "melancholy, mortifying fact" suggests Tracy's intention to maintain a distance from his ordeal regardless of the first person plural narration. Tracy's self-identification and his reference to fellow POWs' patriotic loyalty to the Union, represented by a refusal to swear an oath to the Confederacy, and to maintain a steadfast commitment to the United States, "I carry this message from one of my companions to his mother: 'My treatment here is killing me, mother, but I die cheerfully for my country'" (Tracy 1864, 269) function as reminders of the soldierly self. The escape attempts of fellow prisoners by digging tunnels also suggest this action pattern.

The relegation of the prisoner of war into object status at the beginning of his experience is best illustrated by the narratives produced during and after the Vietnam War. Most narratives from this era are written by officers of the Air Force and their ordeal begins when their fighter plane is shot down. Sam Johnson's recollections invoke the passive subject during the first stage of his captivity. His ordeal starts with "shuddering as a set of iron gates clanked shut behind him as though dirt was being sprinkled on [his] coffin" (Johnson 1992, 69). The reference to burial alludes to symbolic death which as the lowest point of the psychological aspect of the POW experience precedes the subjectivation process. He recalls being "pulled from the truck by rough hands," or how he was "pushed down onto a small four-legged stool" (Johnson 1992, 84) by the guards.

The means of subject construction include the meeting of the requirements of the Code, the demonization of the enemy, in other words, the presentation of the soldierly self. The writing process on the part of the POW removes him from the experience. The shifting of the war on the personal level allows him to start the subject construction process. "All that I had endured during that long and painful journey since shoot-down nearly twenty-one days earlier was nothing compared to what I was about to experience. If I had thought I was at war before, I was about to learn that, until now, I had fought only minor skirmishes. The real war was about to begin" (Johnson 1992, 71). He demonizes his opponent while relying on his wit and a stubborn will to survive. He responds to being objectified by his captor with objectification on his own, as he compares him to a rat.

What does the placement of the war on a personal level mean? The very act or decision suggests the reinforcement of subject status. The POW reaffirms himself despite the efforts of the captor at objectification. This coincides with the conversion of the war from the macro to the micro-level. The personalized war distances the captive from the captor. The reporting of the transfer or shifting of the war experience to the personal level takes place in the writing process. Accordingly, in Nora's words, the POW becomes his own private historian.

The formation of the subject can be retraced grammatically as Johnson points to being dragged or paraded earlier and later as the captivity progresses, the very act of narration shows the traces of subjectivation. The private war or the war on the personal level is not fought with actual weapons as the soldier, as Johnson wrote, must rely on his intellectual armory. The main purpose of this war is survival, or preventing the enemy from receiving crucial strategic information. The enemy is primarily interested in military information and

the captive does his best to thwart the effort of the former. Perpetuating his ordeal and the respective way of coping helps future generations. Once again we see how the traumatic memory of the captive is converted into narrative memory as the details of the given tribulation become educational material on their own.

The beleaguered self is represented by the shock Johnson experiences upon being taken to the Hoa Lo prison and being tortured. The detached self is indicated by referring to himself in the third person singular while responding to torture: "I could not believe a body could endure such excruciating pain and remain conscious" (Johnson 1992, 72). The soldierly self is shown by his determination to foil his captors by not revealing any crucial military information thereby following the stipulations of the Code of Conduct: "I knew I was about to begin fighting as I had never fought before, but without the benefit of the conventional weapons of war. It was psychological warfare. The only offense I had was my stubborn will to resist, my only defense, my wits. Yet I believed I was better equipped to win than were my opponents" (Johnson 1992, 71).

Thus the beleaguered self testifies to the traumatic memory and the soldierly self is born in the narrative memory. Following Doyle's taxonomy, the self or persona presented by the captive soldier can be matched with the progress from traumatic memory to narrative memory. The beleaguered individual repeatedly expresses fear and shock. One example is Sam Johnson reporting on how the gate of the prison compound closed behind him, or if we accept Doyle's "forest war" thesis regarding the captives of Indian prisoners of war, the narratives of Rowlandson, Jemison, or Plummer can provide examples as well.

The detached self removing, or placing the individual outside of the context of suffering alludes to the rigid, repetitive nature of memory as distancing oneself from the actual scene of the ordeal precludes the possibility of learning from one's experiences. Thus in both cases, the given traumatic experiences are not processed. Accordingly, the captive is incapable of coming to terms with his feelings. The fortunate self, however, is a result of a thought process, and the captive can reflect on the given ordeal and find meaning behind the specific tribulation. The soldierly self enabling the captive to demonstrate his adherence to the Code bears the signs of the active subject finding the option of agency within the context of confinement.

III.

As we have seen remembering contributes to subject construction in two ways. The writing process testifies to processing or coming to terms with the given experience, suggesting the workings of the narrative memory. In all cases, the former captive looks back at the ordeal he or she suffered and not simply recalls the events, but uses them as a learning experience or example for others and the means of self-development. Naturally, the texts discussed in this essay belong to the category of life writing, and especially to autobiographical literature. All these cases represent a type of self-creation by writing. As Richard Rorty argues narration in one's terms leads to self-creation, the Indian captivity narrative, the slave narrative, and the POW narrative indicate the applicability of the poststructuralist maxim, namely that the self is born in language. In all three cases, the captive relies on his own terms, the means of expression different from that of the captor. Eastburn being carried to French territory or Plummer captured by the Comanche confronted not only a physical but a cultural and language-based barrier as they were unfamiliar with the language of the captor. The same applied to the captives of the Vietnamese. In these cases, the captives relied on their own intellectual resources to develop their means of communication. Thus the Indian captive and the soldier caught by the Viet Cong could fall back on their use of the English language. The slave, however, had to acquire his terms, i.e., literacy, as Douglass' experience indicates they had to learn to read and write first as the prerequisite for gaining the power of expression.

The "machine of forgetting was blocked" for several reasons as the duty to remember could originate from the WASP cultural and religious establishment, the sympathetic Northern anti-slavery activist, or the military organization itself. Additionally, the internal drive to commemorate what the given captive experienced and witnessed either for the purpose of instructing those left behind or healing their broken self should be mentioned as well.

The memories perpetuated in these documents testified to the fact that the power the captive faced was never homogeneous and the self-creation process was launched along the lines of a variety of fissures. As Eastburn's example shows the brutality of captivity was alleviated by sympathetic treatment of Indian women and Prescott Tracy mentions the relatively humane attitude exhibited by Dr. White in Andersonville. The doctor of the camp often expressed his regret that due to the limited medical supplies better care could not have been given to the captives.

The duty to remember is accompanied by the idea of responsibility. This obligation implies telling the truth and also fulfilling an internal compulsion

to commemorate the bravery of fellow captives. The term "the responsibility is mine" functions as a grammatical reinforcement of subject status. This essay aimed to show how memory and remembering give rise to the remembering subject, an individual, who emerged from the status of the object and achieved agency via a process in which "blocking the machine of forgetting" provided vital assistance. While in Nora's words everyone is the historian of their own lives (Nora 1989,10), a word of caution is due. Although the texts discussed in this essay cannot be expected to meet the rigorous professional standards of historiography, the words of the captive not only represent various ways of coping with the given ordeal but offer a valuable learning opportunity to their readers as well.

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Alíz Farkas

Narrative Properties of Dreams

Introduction

Sigmund Freud and Carl Gustav Jung, two pioneers of depth psychology frequently invoked in literary criticism, regarded dreams as manifestations of the unconscious. Both of them associated the act of dreaming with the psyche's attempt to tell a story, however cryptic or bizarre form this might take.[1]

   Current research in cognitive and evolutionary psychology suggests that special brain modules might be responsible for humans' capacity to construct narratives in general (Nigam 2012), and dream-narratives in particular (Walsh 2010, Pace-Schott 2013). It is postulated that dreaming can recreate past scenarios and generate future ones using material retrieved from the episodic, autobiographical, and semantic memory of the dreamer (Pace-Schott 2013). However, the data traffic between different memory modules and dreams is not unidirectional. Memory fragments are fed into the dream apparatus of the brain, but the reverse is also true: the dreams we recall upon awakening can be incorporated into our autobiographical memory, especially if they are meaningful to us at the time. Such dreams (termed "significant dreams" by Jung, "impactful dreams" by Kuiken) have

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1   Current research in sleep physiology confirms Freud's and Jung's insights about the relevance of dreams. Laboratory studies show that dreams reflect complex memory processes taking place in the brain during sleep, such as meaning extraction, the integration of new information into already existing memory networks, and reorganization of emotional memory (Wamsley and Stickgold [2011], Horton and Malinowski [2015]).

the potential of influencing our waking life in crucial ways (Jung 2002, Kuiken 1995).

One still unsettled question in dream literature is the extent to which high-order cognitive processes (such as evaluating, reasoning, self-reflection, etc.) are arrested during sleep. According to one train of thought, higher-order thinking is severely impaired during the sleep cycle (Hobson 2002), while advocates of the "continuity theory" argue that the same cognitive processes are involved in both dream production and waking life cognition (Cavallero and Foulkes 1993).

The present paper aims to identify the narrative properties of factual written accounts of a set of dreams termed "grief dreams" by psychologists. In my analysis, I draw upon Gérard Genette's narratological concepts, such as *narrative time*, *mood*, and *voice* (1980, 1988).

1. Research Material

I must disclose, at this point, that the dream accounts I have analyzed were written by myself based on my own dreams. I had been carefully considering for a while whether it would be appropriate to expose personal material in a research paper before I decided to do so. The main reason behind this decision is the ready access to both the written material (i.e., the dream narratives) and the background information surrounding it, including autobiographical memory, and the knowledge about the circumstances of dreaming and recording the dreams. The inevitable subjectivity resulting from the situation where the analyst and the analyzed are the very same person is hopefully compensated by the insights the analyst gains from a deeper and more personal involvement in the object of analysis.

The written records of 38 grief dreams have been collected over the course of 4 years following my grandmother's death in 2016. I started recording these dreams without any specific goal in mind. Most probably this was a self-comforting act meant to attenuate my overwhelming sense of loss. The dreams were recalled and written down upon awakening, usually in the morning and all dreams were accurately dated.

The majority of dream-content analyses focus on recurring motifs in an attempt to establish a comprehensive typology of dream themes. I decided to follow a different approach: instead of taking an inventory of the story elements and unraveling the plot, I analyze the structure of the dream narratives. Therefore, I chose to carry out the analysis within the framework of Gerard Genette's narrative discourse theory, which provides a hierarchical

classification of terms to describe a narrative structure, focusing on *how* a narrative is structured in a text instead of *what* is told.

2. Genette's Narrative Discourse Theory

Unsatisfied with the Formalists' distinction between *fabula* (story) and *sjuzhet* (discourse) as essential aspects of a narrative, Genette extended the model into a triad including the *narrative/ discourse* (the text itself), *story* (chronologically organized events recounted in the discourse), and *narrating* (the act of producing a narrative). Since the narrative act produces both the story and the narrative, the actual order of the three can be illustrated in the following way:

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                                  STORY
            NARRATING  <
                                  NARRATIVE
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
From the three aspects, only the narrative exhibits materiality (it has a "body" of its own), while the story and narrating are interpreted from it. Therefore, the object of analysis is the narrative.

The categorization of structural properties of a narrative discourse is constructed based on the relationship among the three main components of the narrative.

In what follows, I will focus on some concepts of Genette's narrative theory. After a concise definition, each concept is immediately applied to fragments taken from the dream narratives under scrutiny.

3. Narrative Time

The concept of narrative time refers to the relationships between the temporal aspects of a discourse and story, that is, whether the narrator recounts the events in the order they occurred, or s/he uses anachronies (chronological deviations). Genette defines two types of anachrony: *analepsis* (subjective retrospection or flashback), and *prolepsis* (anticipation or flash-forward).

Despite the vivid, here-and-now impression left behind by most dreams, a closer look at dream narratives reveals a complex temporal structure incorporating instances of analepsis and prolepsis, and even combinations of these two types of anachrony.

The following excerpt taken from a dream is an example of analeptic narration: "The front of the house is bleak and barren, I think to myself that there used to grow flowers there, asters in the flowerbeds, now there is nothing there, nothing but bare ground, worn-out grass. The lilac bushes are gone, too."

ANALEPSIS

PAST ⟵ PRESENT

asters, lilac bushes "used to" bleak and barren, bare ground, worn-out grass

Instead of a static image featuring the narrative here-and-now, the dream narrative provides a double-time perspective stretching between past and present. The condensed image of the lively flowerbeds turned into barren ground perfectly captures the profound sense of loss experienced in bereavement.

Instances of prolepsis frequently appear in the dream narratives in the form of foreseeing or imagining an approaching event. Such anachronies are usually introduced by phrases like "I know," "I imagine," "I think" (that something is going to happen). Interestingly, whenever proleptic narration involves the anticipation of impending death, the strongest of these cognitive verbs ("know") is used, as in this example: "I can see Grandma sitting on the bed in floral pajamas. I know that she's going to die and we are embracing each other tightly in farewell."

PROLEPSIS

PRESENT ⟶ FUTURE

Grandma sitting on bed "I know" she is going to die

Similarly, the following excerpt also anticipates Grandma's death, but here the narrative indicates more clearly that the knowledge of impending death is shared: "I lay Grandma down on a safe spot, we huddle together in tears, knowing that we have to part."

In the examples presented above, there is a single move in time within the narrative: either from the narrative present towards the past (analepsis), or from the narrative present towards the future (prolepsis). In several cases, however, the time structure of the narrative is more complex than that. In

the following fragment, for instance, a double move involving an instance of analepsis and one of prolepsis can be observed among three different time levels: "Then I remember that she entrusted me with the burial clothing, she wanted to be buried in a dark-blue skirt suit."

ANALEPSIS

PAST ←———————— PRESENT

she entrusted me PROLEPSIS *I remeber*

FUTURE IN THE PAST

she wanted to be buried in a dark-blue skirt suit

In Genette's model of narrative discourse, the temporal determination of the time of narrating (when the story is told) relative to the time of the narrative (when the events recounted in the narrative happened) is linguistically expressed by verb tenses. From this point of view, Genette differentiates four types of narratives: *subsequent* (past-tense narrative), *prior* (predictive, future-tense narrative), *simultaneous* (events are recounted in the present tense), and *interpolated* (where the narrator simultaneously presents a sequence of past events and his/her present-time reflections upon these) (Genette 1980, 217).

The dream narratives analyzed in this paper are all, without exception narrated in the present verb tense, occasionally accompanied by waking-time reflections, thus they fall into the last two categories, namely that of simultaneous, and interpolated narratives. Not surprisingly, I have found no specific time references in the dream narratives, nevertheless, some clues permit some temporal orientation with respect to the actual autobiographical chronology.

I reconstructed the dream chronology from two sources. First, from the spatial indices specified in the dream accounts (old house, new house, Mom's house), and then from the physical state in which my grandmother appeared in the dreams (fit and healthy, stooped posture, bed-ridden dead) (Figure 1).

Figure 1: *Reconstructed dream chronology. The dashed arrows show the mismatch between* Grandma's *physical state and the spatial location in some dreams.*

In most cases, there was a correspondence between the two dream chronologies: Grandma was healthy in the old house, and she was dying or dead in Mom's house. However, in some dreams, I noticed discrepancies between the spatial location of the dream events, and my grandmother's physical state: there are dream narratives reporting Grandma dead in the old house or the new house. Curiously, these discrepancies seem to show up only in a backward direction; I have not found a single dream featuring Grandma fit and healthy in Mom's house. A tentative psychological explanation of this phenomenon might be that (in the case of this particular set of grief dreams) the reality of death seems to gradually permeate long-time episodic memories.

4. Narrative Mood

The concept of mood refers to the way in which the information delivered in the narrative is regulated. The narrative can give more or fewer details about the story in order to keep the reader at a greater or smaller distance from what it tells. Genette's category of narrative mood consists of two further concepts, namely *narrative distance*, and *narrative perspective*. I will focus on the second one here.

Narrative perspective is the point of view adopted by the narrator, which Genette calls focalization: "[. . .] by focalization I certainly mean a restriction of 'field'—actually, that is, a selection of narrative information with respect to

what was traditionally called *omniscience*" (1988, 74). Genette differentiates between three types of focalization:

1. *zero focalization*, where the narrator knows more than the characters (this is the case of the traditional "omniscient narrator");
2. *internal focalization*, where the narrator knows as much as the focal character. This character filters the information provided to the reader: "In internal focalization, the focus coincides with a character, who then becomes the fictive 'subject' of all the perceptions, including those that concern himself as object." (Genette 1988, 74);
3. *external focalization*, where the narrator knows less than the characters. S/he acts like a camera lens, following the protagonists' actions and gestures from the outside being unable to guess their thoughts.

According to Genette, the first-person narration (which is the case of the dream reports under discussion) automatically entails the second type of focalization: "The only focalization logically implied by the 'first person narrative' is focalization through the narrator" (Genette 1980, 205).

Apart from the numerous instances of the dream character (the "I" in the dreams) reporting her own thoughts and feelings in the dream narratives signaling the presence of internal focalization, the internal perspective is also manifest in her visual perception. Internal focalization seems to be one of the most consistent narrative properties of the dreams analyzed in this paper. Applying the "camera lens" metaphor used in the explanation of how external focalization works, we can assert that in internal focalization instances the camera lens is identical to the character/narrator's own eyes. That is to say, the scene described in the dream narrative coincides with the character's ("I") visual field, and this fact is sometimes explicitly stated in the dream account.

Here is an example of an internally focalized report of visual perception: "I can only see as much of the kitchen as the half-opened door allows me to see: the white cupboard in the corner, the table, the window behind the table, the bed headboard under it." This narrowing of the perspective is all the more interesting since the scene described is familiar to the character/ narrator, so she knows exactly what there is beyond her actual field of vision. Despite this, she only reports on what she can see from her visual angle within the dream.

On several occasions, when the location appearing in the dream does not seem to be a clear-cut replica of the actual scene stored in the narrator's

memory, the internally focalized perspective guides the narrator in identifying the dream scene more precisely, as it happens in the following excerpt: "I am watching out of the window of a building which most resembles the new house as if I were watching out onto the yard from the front room."

5. Narrative Voice

In Genette's narrative discourse model, narrative voice refers to the complex whole of the narrating situation, including the time of narrating, the narrative level, and the "person" of the narrator. Genette defines narrative voice as "the relationships between the narrator—plus, should the occasion arise, his or her narratee[s], and the story he tells" (Genette 1980, 215). In this section, I will apply Genette's concepts of narrative level, and "person" of the narrator in my analysis of dream narratives.

5.1. Narrative Level

Genette describes the differences in level within a narrative by claiming that "any event a narrative recounts is at a diegetic level immediately higher than the level at which the narrating act producing this narrative is placed" (Genette1980, 228). Therefore, the basic level from which any narrative starts is established by the very act of writing, which happens at the *extradiegetic* level, and the story told in the narrative is nested in this basic level at the *intradiegetic* level. Should a character at the intradiegetic level narrate a story, that will be a narrative in the second degree unfolding at the *metadiegetic* level. Many of the dream narratives analyzed in this paper display such multi-layered narrative structure.

We can see an instance of embedding in the following scene: "I know that Grandma is not alive, but I recall as she was rummaging around the kitchen in stooped posture in her purple sweater unsuspectingly, oblivious to my presence. I am approaching the door slowly so that she will notice me just at the last moment, and the surprise and delight be even greater, as it used to happen when she was still alive."

Figure 2 shows the different levels of the dream narrative above as conceived by Genette:

Figure 2: *Narrative embedding and metalepsis.*

The event of narrative recount (in this case, the act of writing the dream report) happens at the extradiegetic level. The event told in the narrative happens at the intradiegetic level, while the memory scene with my grandmother is a narrative in the second degree named metadiegetic narrative.

Up to this point, it seems to be the case of a simple embedding. However, something strange happens here. "I" slow down at the intradiegetic level (in the narrative present) so as to surprise my grandmother at the metadiegetic level (in the narrative past). This phenomenon is called metalepsis by Genette, a process in which the boundary between two narrative levels (which is normally impervious) is breached thus blurring the line between the two timeframes. Fiction writers deliberately use this phenomenon in order to create an effect of displacement or illusion. However, the one presented above is a spontaneous occurrence of metalepsis.

In another dream narrative fragment, metalepsis is triggered by the quick succession of a cognitive and a perceptual act: "I am thinking about Grandma, I know she is dead but I imagine her, and I can see her entering the door in her purple sweater, brown patterned headscarf."

In this case, the cognitive verb "imagine" launches the embedding of an imaginary scene within the main narrative, whereas the verb of perception "see" actualizes the mental image immediately, and thus the two scenes (the imaginary and the actual) coalesce in an act of metalepsis.

A very similar phenomenon occurs in the following scene, where the much-desired encounter with Grandma is linguistically expressed by the repetitive use of the subjunctive mood, and—just like in the previous example—the actualization of the desire is confirmed by verbs of visual ("I can see") and aural perception ("I can hear"): "I think to myself, how great it would be if she were alive, sitting on the edge of the couch. I can already see her sitting there, I can hear her voice, I would sit next to her, and we would embrace each other! I can see this lovely scene before my very eyes!"

5.2. Person

Laboratory dream research confirms the observation that the overwhelming majority of dreams are experienced from a first-person perspective (Revonsuo 2005, 208).[2] Moreover, in most dreams, the dream self is not a passive observer but is actively engaged in the dream events so much so, that in about 95 percent of these dreams the dream self is the central actor (209).

We can track down the equivalent of this internal perspective prevalent in dreams in Genette's narrative discourse theory. Genette distinguishes between two types of narrative: *heterodiegetic* (where the narrator is absent from the story s/he is recounting), and *homodiegetic* (the narrator is present in the story) (Genette 1980, 244). The homodiegetic type of narrative is further differentiated according to the extent the character/narrator participates in the events. S/he can either assume the role of an observer (or that of a less active secondary character), or s/he can be the main character, the hero of the narrative. This latter type is called *autodiegetic* narrative by Genette (245).

The dream narratives analyzed in this research fall into this last (autodiegetic) category: the dream self and the narrator of the dreams seem to be identical. However, this conflation of the two selves would ignore a significant difference between the two. The narrating "I" and the narrated "I" may be separated by a difference in age and life experience as is the case in Marcel Proust's novel *Remembrance of Things Past* analyzed by Genette,

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2   However, this is not the only possible perspective described in dream literature. About ten percent of dreams are experienced from an external (third-person) perspective (Revonsuo 2005, 210). Apparently, the same two perspectives are adopted in phenomena analogous to dreaming, such as remembering and imagery (Rosen, Stutton 2013, 1044).

or there might be a disparity between the states of consciousness, that is, between the waking self and the dreaming self. Although the discourses of the narrating "I" and that of the narrated "I" overlap completely for the most part in the dream narratives, there are instances where the difference between the two states of consciousness becomes obvious. In the following fragment, the dream self can recognize a person the waking self can no longer identify: "Grandma is talking to someone asking him how much he would charge for whitewashing. Then I could recognize the person, but now I don't know who he was."

Two possible psychological explanations lend themselves to explain this phenomenon: either the dream self had involuntary access to autobiographical memory at the time of dreaming, and could identify a character the waking self could no longer remember, or it was only a dream character whom the dream self knew only within the dream setting. Either way, the dream narrative makes it explicitly clear that two states of consciousness are involved.

This duality of self-awareness is reflected in the relatively frequent occurrence of bracketed remarks in the dream narratives, whereby the narrating "I" comments on the factuality of information disclosed by the narrated "I." We can see an example of fact-checking in the following fragment: "There is another piece of clothing on the other hanger, a black-and-white short-sleeved hoody-top that used to be Grandma's (in reality, Grandma never had anything like that)."

Cases like the ones presented above demonstrate that despite the personal identity of the two selves involved in the creation of the narrative, there is a double consciousness at work resulting in uneven access to autobiographical memory, and this duality is inscribed in the text.

Conclusions

Scientific research in the phenomenon of dreaming is typically carried out on a large amount of data, involving a great number of dream accounts produced by heterogeneous groups of people. The vast majority of such research focuses on dream contents, trying to determine their source, to reveal the rules of selection, and to unravel the neurobiological mechanisms underlying dreaming.

The present study proposes to provide a different research perspective by exploring the formal aspects of a set of dream narratives written by the same person over a relatively long period of time (four years), associated with a special psychological state (grief).

As envisaged by modern theories of dreaming, the dreams analyzed in this paper consist of coalesced recent and long-time memory fragments. The common characteristic of these dream narratives is that they all process and integrate emotionally charged memory traces from autobiographical memory.

The identity of the narrating self and the dream self remains remarkably consistent throughout the dreams, the narrator invariably giving a first-person account of the events experienced by the dream self. Nevertheless, at times the narrative makes it clear that the narrating "I" and the narrated "I" are in different states of consciousness, the narrating "I" knowing things the narrated "I" is not aware of, and the other way round.

The dream narratives reveal a complex time structure with instances of flashback (analepsis) and flash-forward (prolepsis), involving the cognitive operations of remembering and anticipating. Even spontaneous occurrences of embedded narratives and overlapping timeframes (metalepsis) can be observed. The creation of such complex dream narratives requires high-order cognition during sleep, which supports the continuity theory of dreaming.

The study suggests that the construction of narrative structures is not an artful invention of storytellers but rather an inherent ability of the human mind active across all states of consciousness.

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DOREL-AUREL MUREŞAN

The Importance of Forgetting in Ali Smith's *Autumn*

In a period when memory studies are flourishing and when everyone is surrounded by information concerning how to remember, Ali Smith's *Autumn*, the first novel from her seasonal quartet, is an invitation to reconsider this desire to remember everything, suggesting that sometimes forgetting might prove to be a better solution. As Richard Holmes puts it in *A Meander Through Memory and Forgetting,* "There is a goddess of Memory, Mnemosyne; but none of Forgetting [. . .] Yet there should be, as they are twin sisters, twin powers, and walk on either side of us, disputing for sovereignty over us and who we are, all the way until death" (Holmes 2008, 95). According to Smith, people should learn from nature and its course: it develops through the continual flow of the seasons, meaning that it repeats a process of death and rebirth – the only possible way to survive and grow. *Autumn* echoes the natural flow of time, but it is also "a poignant and subtle exploration of the way we experience time" (Kavenna 2016), radiating wisdom for whoever is willing to receive it.

Smith's interest in the nature of time keeps overflowing throughout the novel, as time's fluidity offers the author the possibility to constantly jump back and forth between past and present. In addition, time also seems to be cyclical, since history repeats itself around the world, as the characters of *Autumn* keep pointing out. This recurrence can be interpreted both positively and negatively: on the one hand, the repetition of the past offers the chance for a different outcome, since other people faced with the same choices might prove wiser; on the other hand, it tells about the reality of the human nature that tends to react similarly when faced with choices and challenges. However, Smith's awareness of both possible interpretations helps her in creating a hopeful novel in which the mixture of these two

streams is achievable. The fluidity of time is also obvious in Smith's style of writing. *Autumn,* thus, is a very lyrical novel, consisting of three chapters that resemble the three months of the season. However, Smith's art consists in her ability to encompass a multitude of themes and ideas, from politics to the nature of love, together with numerous intertextual references, ranging from Shakespeare to Dickens and Huxley, while also placing a contemporary pop artist, Pauline Boty, at the center of a novel about transience and hope. In addition, with *Autumn,* Smith also continues the work that she has started with her other novels while also tackling contemporary themes, as Alex Clark also acknowledges in his review:

> "Autumn" presented readers with a novel that had clear kinship to her previous work—the preoccupation with the legacy of a forgotten artist, an imaginatively wayward child, the hidden life of a mysterious adult, all somehow woven together—but which also reflected on the country's recent, momentous decision, whose impact was summarised in a short, incantatory chapter. [. . .] That doubleness—an ability to produce a novel so recognisably of a piece with her previous work, and at the same time a springboard into something new—is surely a clue to how any artist might be able to make a rapid response to new realities aesthetically viable. (Clark 2017)

However, not all reviews were as positive. In her rather negative review of the novel, Kate Bradley points out that Smith "reduces the changes in her characters' lives down to [. . .] binaries" (2017), referring especially to the division created by Brexit. Although such a statement might be reductive in itself, Smith's predilection for binaries is obvious throughout the novel: two main characters, one young and one old; two major time periods, past and present; two predominant narrative frames, dreams and memories; and the list could go on. Defined by realism and fragmentariness (Selejan 2019, 108–9), *Autumn* continues Ali Smith's experimental fiction, her choice of themes and narrative techniques such as dreams, memories, nature, and time being not only a predisposition but also an exploration of personal curiosities that the novelist confesses in an interview with Gillian Beer (Smith and Beer 2012, 137–53).

Constructed around the friendship between two characters, Elisabeth Demand and her old neighbor, Daniel Gluck, the novel starts with the surrealist dream of the latter, now a 101 years old man, who is sleeping in a nursing home and who apparently gets closer and closer to death. His long sleep is a coma from which the medical staff from the nursing home do not

expect him to ever wake up again. In this liminal state, trapped between life and death, Daniel can experience time differently, since he is in a way outside of it. Nevertheless, he also experiences a world of multiple possibilities in which thoughts can become reality. In his dream, Daniel wakes up naked on a deserted island and realizes that his body is young again. Out of nowhere, a group of girls appears on the beach and he sews leaves together with a needle and a string that he imagines, creating a costume out of them, and realizing the number of possibilities that this state offers. While wondering if he is dead or alive, if this is how being dead feels like and if dead people actually feel anything at all, Daniel enjoys his closeness to nature, concluding that "this is heaven all right" (Smith 2016, 7).

This symbolical episode has manifold meanings. Firstly, Daniel's "shipwreck" is imbued with intertextual references from Shakespeare's *The Tempest* to Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe*. Moreover, Daniel's nakedness is dual in meaning as well, since the island is both the Eden before the fall of humankind into sin, when shame did not exist, and the Eden after the fall, when shame drove people to sew together leaves and make a costume to hide their nakedness. Furthermore, Smith's genius becomes obvious as she plays with words while turning the notions of life and death upside down. In this comatose state, Daniel feels overwhelmed by energy as he approaches nature and symbolically becomes one with it. Therefore, he is more alive than he was while being awake. Words like vegetative and vegetation, that is coma and nature, transform into synonyms of life. Thus, rules of reality concerning space, time, and even the meaning of words become relative, as part of the subjective imagination of Daniel. Richard Walsh emphasizes the relativizing nature of surrealist dreams, explaining that:

> Surrealism [. . .] is more broadly an encounter between dreams and the idea of art. The Surrealists' interest in dreams was caught up with their interest in the Freudian unconscious, but the aesthetic concern behind both was the attempt to liberate the imagination from rationality. Dream logic appealed to Breton, Dali and others as a key to narrative creativity, to the primacy of the play of thought over social, moral and intellectual convention. (2013)

According to Walsh, "the close relation between dreams and narratives is apparent and manifests itself in several ways: the use of dreams in literature; narrative reports of dreams; and dreams themselves as narratives" (Walsh 2013). Walsh points out that a clear distinction must be made "between the status of dreams as experiences and so objects of narrative report, and the

status of dreaming as itself a kind of narration" (Walsh 2013). By choosing the latter type of narrative dream as a frame, Smith succeeds in creating a narrative that resembles orality, is more spontaneous, and therefore reads like a "more personal story" (Savelyeva et al. 2018, 2). Therefore, to the subjective nature of Daniel's dream, another layer of unreliability is added, relativizing the narrative discourse of the character even more.

As Daniel approaches his miraculous and unexpected recovery, which surprises everyone, the reader included, Daniel's dream continues and it transforms into a realistic description of his past as well as a very vivid description of his sister. Although this part of the dream almost resembles an inventory due to all the specific details, Daniel struggles to remember the name of his sister, who has apparently died during the Holocaust, as they were part of a mixed family—a Jew mother and an English father:

> And here he is now, sitting next to his little sister! But his little sister's name escapes him for the moment. This is surprising. It's one of the words he's held dear his whole life. [. . .] Autumn mellow. Autumn yellow. He can remember every word of that stupid song. But he can't remember, dear God, he can't. Excuse me, dear God, can I trouble you to remind me of my little sister's name? Not that he thinks there's a God. In fact he knows there isn't. But just in case there's such a thing: Please, remind me, her name, again. (Smith 2016, 181–82, 190–91)

Through Daniel's failed attempt to remember while dreaming, Smith creates a frame narrative, a memory within a dream, thus connecting dreams, memory, and history. This connection together with the frame narrative strategy makes one wonder to what extent are dreams, memories, and history similar as Ali Smith's novel suggests they are. The narrative aspect of dreams, memories, and history is what connects all of them.

In 1967, Ulrich Neisser, a cognitive psychologist, claimed that autobiographical memory is not the detailed report of everything that someone has experienced, but that only parts of these experiences remain and it becomes the duty of the person who is trying to remember to recreate their past from what was stored. Therefore, the person who attempts to remember has "momentous events," "turning points," "nuclear episodes," "recollections of the most significant single scenes in a person's 'life story'" and he uses them to create a logical narration (Neisser and Libby 2000, 318). James Olney also emphasizes the connection between memory and narrative when he states that "memory enables and vitalizes narrative; in return, narrative provides form for memory, supplements it, and sometimes displaces it" (Olney 1998, 417).

The displacement mentioned by Olney indicates that the narrative aspect of memory points to its subjectivity. In his *Fictions in Autobiography: Studies in the Art of Self-Invention*, John Paul Eakin states that "autobiographical truth is not a fixed but an evolving content, what we call fact and fiction being rather slippery variables in an intricate process of self-discovery" (Eakin 1985, 17). In other words, the boundary between what is fact and what is fiction in recounted memories is very unclear. In Daniel's case, the subjectivity of his memories is multiplied by both the use of the dream as a frame, as well as his inability to access the desired information.

Nevertheless, Daniel's personal history is also part of the grand narrative history of the Holocaust, fragments of which he remembers and recounts, adding another frame to the dream. If Ricoeur emphasizes the relationship between memory and history (2000, 7), Ali Smith places history as the smallest frame in her narrative, suggesting its automatic subjectivity, and therefore its unreliability. Moreover, the focus on Daniel's personal story and on that of his sister rather than on the historical aspects of the 1930s displaces the grand narrative of history, replacing it with the autobiographical one, emphasizing the importance of the individual in every (his)tory.

Elisabeth, the other main character of the novel, also dreams twice while sitting on a chair next to Daniel's bed. Her dreams are a reflection of Daniel's, to which the two characters can relate differently than they do in real life. In his review, Milo Hick points out that the presence of Daniel in Elisabeth's dream "brings them together in a way that cannot be realized in the waking world" (Hick 2017). Moreover, Hick explains that in this common state "Elisabeth and Daniel are able to commune through their dreams, though that link is severed as she wakes up" (2017). After waking up, Elisabeth is struck by the reality of her setting—the nursing home where Daniel is asleep—and although she can remember the sensations that the dream has offered, she cannot preserve the memory of her dream:

> That's where she wakes up. She remembers the dream for a fraction of a second, then she remembers where she is and she forgets the dream. She stretches on the chair, her arms and shoulders, her legs. So this is what sleeping with Daniel is like. She smiles to herself. (She's often wondered.). (Smith 2016, 205)

Once again, Smith plays with words, as Elisabeth's "sleeping with Daniel" can be interpreted in multiple ways. At the same time, Smith connects these dreams to the idea of memory, that is with remembering and forgetting, as

both Daniel and Elisabeth struggle with remembering, the former in his sleep while the latter in her wakefulness.

The struggle to remember and therefore her obsession for the past begins early in Elisabeth's childhood:

> When she was in bed that night she remembered her feet and the pavement passing so fast beneath them and thought how strange it was that she could remember totally useless details about things like cracks in a pavement more clearly than she could recall anything about her own father. The next day at breakfast she said to her mother, I couldn't sleep last night.
> Oh dear, her mother said. Well, you'll sleep tonight instead.
> I couldn't sleep for a reason, Elisabeth said.
> Uh huh? her mother said. Her mother was reading the paper.
> I couldn't sleep, Elisabeth said, because I realized I can't remember a single thing about what my father's face looks like.
> Well, you're lucky, her mother said from behind the paper.
> (Smith 2016, 208–9)

Memory is depicted as random fragments that are out of our control, since Elisabeth cannot remember what her mother apparently cannot forget. However, Elisabeth is haunted by a past marked by the absence of a father, by the presence of an emotionally absent mother, and by her impossible love for her old neighbor. But the obsession with the past is not displayed only through the memories, frustrations, and flashbacks of Elizabeth. In a different manner, her mother is also preoccupied with the past, as her addiction to the "The Golden Gavel" TV show demonstrates:

> Elisabeth's mother is much cheerier this week, thank God. This is because she has received an email telling her she has been selected to appear on a TV programme called The Golden Gavel, where members of the public pit their wits against celebrities and antiques experts by trawling round antiques shops on a fixed budget and trying to buy the thing which in the end will raise the most money at auction. It's as if the Angel Gabriel has appeared at the door of her mother's life, kneeled down, bowed his head and told her: in a shop full of junk, somewhere among all the thousands and thousands of abandoned, broken, outdated, tarnished, sold-on, long-gone and forgotten things, there is something of much greater worth than anyone realizes, and the person we have chosen to trust to unearth it from the dross of time and history is you. (Smith 2016, 129–30)

The comparison between the receiving of the e-mail and the biblical Annunciation to Mary is ironic since Elisabeth's mother is supposed to look towards the past while Virgin Mary towards the future. However, after participating in the TV show where she meets Zoe, her childhood idol, and begins a love relationship with her, Elisabeth tells her mother's lover: "she's been waiting for you since she was ten years old" (Smith 2016, 221). Once again, Smith locates her character in the past: a past that becomes present and a possible bright future.

Nevertheless, just as in Daniel's case, the personal, subjective histories of the other characters are intertwined in the novel with the grand narratives of national and world history, as the novel focuses not only on the Holocaust but also on the contemporary situation of a divided England because of the Brexit vote. Nothing changes, as the juxtaposition of past and present demonstrates. Hatred, division, and a general lack of trust fill the air, as people turn against their neighbors because of their different nationality:

> As she passes the house with GO and HOME still written across it she sees that underneath this someone has added, in varying bright colours, WE ARE ALREADY HOME THANK YOU and painted a tree next to it and a row of bright red flowers underneath it. There are flowers, lots of real ones, in cellophane and paper, on the pavement outside the house, so it looks a bit like an accident has recently happened there. (Smith 2016, 138)

It is interesting to notice that just like William Golding's *Lord of the Flies*, according to which human nature is frail and capable of any evil, Ali Smith's novel depicts a present reality that confirms this view. While Golding's characters were afraid that the "Reds" might find them before the British do, seeing Germany as the source of all evil and the British as their road to salvation, Ali Smith's juxtaposition of past and present suggests that the time has come when Britain has become the Nazi country, while Germany opens its arms to refugees.

However, this is not the first time history repeats itself, and just like with dreams and memories, it is impossible to control its course. Nonetheless, the focus on the individual suggests that change happens to one person at a time. Therefore, through the character of Daniel, the novel proposes a solution for the pain of the past and that of the present: "It's all right to forget, you know, he said. It's good too. In fact, we have to forget things sometimes. Forgetting is important. We do it on purpose. It means we get a bit of a rest. Are you listening? We have to forget. Or we'd never sleep ever again" (Smith 2016, 210).

Forgetting does not mean ignoring the past; it is about letting go so that change and growth might take place. According to memory theorist Dan McAdams, our present and our future depend on what we remember and what we forget:

> Certain events from our past take on extraordinary meaning over time as their significance in the overall story of our lives and times come to be known. In a sense, then our current situation in life and our anticipation of what the future will bring partly determine what we remember and how we remember it. (McAdams 1993, 295)

In the light of McAdams's words, Daniel's advice is logical. Moreover, the description of Daniel while he is sleeping, dreaming, and is unable to remember receives a new meaning:

> Here's an old story so new that it's still in the middle of happening, writing itself right now with no knowledge of where or how it'll end. An old man is sleeping in a bed in a care facility on his back with his head pillowpropped. His heart is beating and his blood's going round his body, he's breathing in then out, he is asleep and awake and he's nothing but a torn leaf scrap on the surface of a running brook, green veins and leaf-stuff, water and current, Daniel Gluck taking leaf of his senses at last, his tongue a broad green leaf, leaves growing through the sockets of his eyes, leaves thrustling (very good word for it) out of his ears, leaves tendrilling down through the caves of his nostrils and out and round till he's swathed in foliage, leafskin, relief. And here he is now, sitting next to his little sister! But his little sister's name escapes him for the moment. (Smith 2016, 181)

Becoming one with nature, that is learning from it and accepting transience, Daniel finally manages to take his advice and forget; that is how he obtains the relief that he so much longed for and is now able to awake to a new life, both literally and figuratively.

With Pauline Boty's art as inspiration, Ali Smith's *Autumn* is a collage of styles, themes, ideas, texts, and contexts that the novelist defines as follows: "Collage is an institute of education where all the rules can be thrown into the air, and size and space and time and foreground and background all become relative, and because of these skills everything you think you know gets made into something new and strange" (Smith 2016, 71–72). Therefore, Ali Smith's novel uses dreams and memories that are subjective, unreliable, and impossible to control and emphasize the relativity of everything we think or

imagine that we know. Moreover, the overlapping of past and present, which are both different and unexpectedly similar, depicts a constant repetition of history, thus suggesting that living in the past only helps in recreating it. One possible solution is "education" in this "institute" so that people are able to accept the relativity of everything and let go of the past, i.e., forget, and allow for the transformation "into something new and strange" to take place.

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Szilárd Kmeczkó

A Peculiar Worldview on the Eastern Edge
of the Former Common Homeland
The Old Bukovina as the Source of Memories
on the Basis of Gregor von Rezzori's Autobiographical Writings

The diverse, multicolored Central-European world of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy that collapsed in 1918 attracts everybody who, trying to understand their personal world experience, considers it important to put the examined phenomena in a historical perspective. Thus, it is a special feeling to meet an author whose stories take place in the old world of the Monarchy, although, the specific Hungarian viewpoint, so important for the Hungarian reader, is missing; however, this has no impact on the captivating nature of the text. Gregor von Rezzor's reminiscences—if we take the various narrators as one person—tell the story of one man: born in the provincial center Czernowitz on the eastern edge of Bukovina in 1914, he received an Austrian imperial upbringing, being educated in Austria; as a young adult, he spent years in Bucuresti, meanwhile, acquiring a strong Romanian identity that he did not deny later.

Other significant scenes in his life were Vienna, Berlin, and Rome, where he lived when he was writing his book. The mixing of the statements about the author and his narrating self is not a matter of chance but one of the confusing characteristics of the book and its reception, respectively. The reflection on it makes the almost inextricable relationship between the author and the narrator one of the important topics of the volume.

Gregor von Rezzori's volume *Memoirs of an Anti-Semite* was published in German in 1979. In terms of its genre classification, it is a novel. However, it can be looked upon as an ensemble of five short stories or novelettes. While the writings in the book have an autobiographical character, it is necessary to distinguish between the ego of the author and that of the narrator because of the scandalous title, so that we can avoid making a serious mistake

concerning the author. This is, namely, not the book of an anti-Semitic author, although the viscerally encoded anti-Semitic attitude undoubtedly proves an essential element of the narrator's worldview, which he does not even want to conceal. He speaks about it openly, with disarming honesty considering it as evident; or rather, he speaks this language. This attitude is a basic shaping power of the range of emotions and opinions about the world of all five narrators. This is the cause of the reader's confusion and perplexity, which also quite confuses the author. In an interview made in December 1989, he states, "Even if *Memoires of an Anti-Semite* were an anti-Semitic confession of its narrator, it wouldn't be a confession of me the author. I am denouncing, not confessing" (Aciman 1991, 29). The end of the citation shows that he strongly distances himself from the charges against him. However, we do not agree with this statement totally. If the book were just about a matter of exposing anti-Semitic behavior, it would hardly be so magically interesting. He confesses that his choice of title was misleading to a certain extent; however, he also blames the publisher for letting the potential readers be misled. He also tells a short pertinent story in the same interview:

> I tell you, the title was a mistake in a way. On the other hand, it attracted attention. Suddenly, I became famous in the United States. But it was a mistake in so far as it misled many people. The other night I was speaking with a gentleman who is genuine WASP, and he said, "I didn't want to buy that book, because of its title. I was repulsed by the title. There are so many of 'that kind' around me that I didn't want to agree with them by buying it." (Aciman 1991, 29)

The excellent translation into Hungarian by Ferenc Szijj came out in 1996. This misunderstanding hindered the reception of the book in Hungary so much that one of the aesthetes, who was interested in it by profession, said that he was ashamed and confused when—accompanied by explanatory notes—he dared to inquire after the book in the bookshop of a little town near the capital where he lived. As it was not available, he bought it later in one of the big bookshops in Budapest, where he was well-known, and so he did not have to be afraid of frowning, interrogative gazes. The problem, in a nutshell, is that the author does not clearly distance himself from antisemitism, and this is apparent as a charge in the professional reflections, too (Angyalosi et al. 1997, 115).

In fact, the narrator's ego, or more precisely as these are separate texts, the behavior of the various narrators and the shaping of their behavior get into the center of attention (Hoffman 1983, 235; Gaddy 2006, 148–49). Without

obligating himself, von Rezzori reflects on the suggestion that the book is imbued with anti-Semitic sentiments:

> One can also try to explain why somebody behaved in a certain way. That was what I was doing. I was trying to explain the formation of an anti-Semite. Nothing more. And I tried to do that without falling into any sort of sticky philo-Semitism—which is not even sincere in the case of most people. I have proved throughout my life my stand with Jews. I am not saying "Some of my best friends are Jews" nor "Some of my Jews are best friends." I don't have to defend myself [. . .]. (Aciman 1991, 30)

The description of the anti-Semitic behavior is not self-contained; it is not accidental either, because von Rezzori, born in 1914, is the chronicler of Central-Europe and the Central-European living conditions that disappeared with the First World War. He is the chronicler of a world whose history cannot be told with the ignorance of the Jewish element. Based on the three texts I have chosen from the five independent chapters, I try to outline how the father and his son in the footsteps of his father view their situation in Bukovina, and how the sight of the Bukovinian landscape is imbued with feelings. The plot of the writing *Skushno* takes place in Bukovina in 1927, *Troth* takes place in Vienna in 1933, and during the Anschluss in 1938, the frame story of *Pravda* takes place in Rome in 1979.

Concerning culture, the family, now being the citizens of the Romanian Kingdom, considered themselves Austrian also after the disintegration of the Monarchy in 1918. The father's Austrian identity can be traced back to one of his ancestors, Gregorio Rezzori, who started out from Sicily and arrived in Vienna in the 1750s. This procedure can be looked upon as Germanization or more precisely Austrianization, which is well documented by the choice of names of the subsequent generations. The beginning of the Austrian identity has not been immersed in the memory of the family yet. The author's/ narrator's identity—as it might be expected—consists of several elements: the child's solid Austrian identity is complemented with the young adult's fierce emotions expressing his belonging to the Romanians; however, at his older age, also his Italian identity element emerges. He expresses the changes in identity that make it more complex and richer, through two methods: "My narrator is like a snake shedding its skin or like a tree piling annual rings" (Aciman 1991, 17). The change in identity means both crossing an earlier horizon, provided that it is not about denying himself, and in this context, the partial conservation of earlier choices. Thus, the process of writing is a return to the past, a means of self-understanding that allows for

a new perspective of the examination. Von Rezzori compares this to a spiral motion: "Let us say that I return in a spiral. I return from different points of view to the same things on different levels" (Aciman 1991, 22). The various levels or layers demonstrate that he does not return to the same things. That is why the use of narrators is necessary among whom there is not an original one, from which the others would be derived: "In any case, one is always uncomfortable with who one is and with the world as one finds it. One wants to be different, but one would hate being any different from what one is. One toys with alternative selves. They are like pieces of an insoluable puzzle. There is no *ur-self*, only tentative selves" (Aciman 1991, 17).[1] The malaise is caused by the feeling of guilt about the betrayal of the great hopes and expectations of the 1920s. He does not speak about his guilty existence as about his individual experience but as about the collective European moral condition. However, it does not necessarily follow from this that he would cherish exclusively nostalgic memories about the world of his childhood and adolescence between the two world wars, and he would look at it as a shelter because he says the following: "[M]y Rumanian nationalism does not represent a mere phase in my life. [. . .] I feel Rumanian as much as I feel Italian or Austrian. But I have the greatest sympathy for Rumania. Probably because I don't live among Rumanians any longer" (Aciman 1991, 14). We should not be deceived by the flick at the end of the quotation. This is much more defense against sentimentalism than an unreasonable remark. Von Rezzori formulates a severe self-criticism of an earlier period of life: "When I think back on myself, say in 1938 until the 1950s, I shiver with disgust. I've shed so many things in the meantime" (Aciman 1991, 17). Through these removal gestures, he creates the opportunity of experimenting with more and more egos of the narrator, i.e., understanding his earlier self based on the exploration of his specific connection to the world.

Living in Bukovina, i.e., the no less colorful Eastern edge of the former multilingual and multinational empire, the son interprets his own situation in the framework of a myth, a big narrative his father has taught him, and whose central element is loyalty (troth). The child does not understand much of what his father says, and this is not always his fault. He tries to

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1   In von Rezzori's autobiographical novel *An Ermine in Czernopol* the narrator is not named—which in itself would not have been extraordinary in the case of von Rezzori—but his voice consists of several voices that cannot be reduced, and these voices speak as collective "we" (Lewis 2012, 162). Perez gets from the narrators' analysis to the question where the line between fact and fiction lies in the autobiographical writings (Perez 1982, 612).

make up repeatedly the incompletely understood narrative whose historical depth is very tempting. Paternal rebuke calls the son's fidelity into question. This is about the disloyalty to the acceptance of the opportunity that the self-understanding myth offers as a cultural-civilizational mission. The mission itself is a specific great German undertaking with a Habsburg perspective: to collect German-speaking people in a common Empire under the imperial flag, following the example of the one-time Holy Roman Empire. Consequently, fidelity outlines a fate and this gives meaning to his personal existence. Coming under Romanian rule after 1918 the loyalty to such a fate lends the personal experience such color and a depth that are beyond compare. After a period of time, the mythical story interwoven with logical contradictions forms a rounded whole for the little boy. In recognition of this, the Empire of William II proves to be treason just as the empire-building activity of Adolf Hitler, who established the new empire on territories outside Austria instead of establishing it with Austria in the center, and Austria was joined to it expletively. In Vienna, the fulfillment of many centuries of dreams did not cause complete joy after the consequences of *Anschluss* had been recognized. There is a mixed mood of disappointment:

> [T]here seemed to be born a new reality, clearer, more transparent, more energetic, more dynamic. It felt as if the fresh mountain air of Styria were blowing through Vienna. [. . .] After that German civilians swarmed in and took everything into their administering hands. They filled that mountain air with their snotty Berlin slang [. . .]. (von Rezzori 1982, 232)

A disturbing feeling overwhelms the narrator, who turns from Arnulf into Georg and is thinking about the by-the-way words of his girlfriend at the time, the Jewish Minka Raubitschek:

> She was right: an incredible breach of troth was taking place all around us, but which troth was actually being broken? One already sensed that the faith, the pure enthusiasm with which this transformation had been yearned for and then greeted, was being betrayed. Troth itself was betrayed, I thought. For instance the troth to the old empire. This Reich had no more to do with my dream of the Holy Roman Empire than with the glorious dream of the Habsburg Dual Monarchy. But I was soon tired of brooding about it. After all, I was Rumanian [. . .]. (von Rezzori 1982, 234)

The big narrative, which is the base of spiritual existence, is becoming strange as it relates to the change that fulfills the mythical story in the present from a partially outward viewpoint. However, he cuts himself adrift from it when reinterpreting the big narrative. He states that this is nothing but a messianic idea of Jewish origin. This is not the denial of the ideological framework that earlier used to give his personal life a full meaning, rather its deconstruction is interwoven with irony. The rejection of the Jews, i.e., a paternal heritage, is on his part such a deep-rooted gut feeling that even erotic proximity, intimate moments, and strong personal sympathy cannot obliterate it. The same thing happens after the fresh breakup with his Aryan lover, when still under the influence of love disappointment, after kissing Minka he notes the following with satisfaction: "At that moment, it appeared to me that if she had not been a Jew, I could have loved her even in the same way, or perhaps more than, I loved the one I had lost. Still, I felt a twinge of bad conscience, as if I were being a traitor to my flag" (von Rezzori 1982, 240). The same situation on Minka's part seems to be the reflection of the previous perspective: "I would not want to marry you if you understand what I mean. Because of certain goyish qualities of your soul. But still, you are the dearest to me" (von Rezzori 1982, 240).

Going through this spiritual journey, he can think of his father, who as a second-class citizen hates Bukovina because he, who belongs to the German-speaking minority, is lumped together with the Jews, and he has had to become unfaithful to the imperial flag, to be able to remain faithful to his deep passion, i.e., hunting in Bukovina. If irony gets close to sacred things, the son—though his love for his father does not pass away—starts to view his father and also his former self in a broad perspective. Thus, it is a fatal mistake to demand that von Rezzori should publicly distance himself from the anti-Semitic behavior.

If based on his writing *Pravda* we disclose the character of his anti-Semitism, what source his feeling of strangeness against the Jews he brought with him from his childhood in Bukovina feeds on, we will fail to reach a clear position. Angyalosi mentions von Rezzori's loving but ambivalent relation to his dead child and his relationship with the child's mother, his second wife, who is Jewish, as an example of racial mysticism based on biologism (Angyalosi et al. 1997, 117–18). It is striking to see that he cannot view his child as entirely his own, as identical with him. The visceral strangeness starting from features originating from unknown ancestors can penetrate the father-son relationship: "[W]hat utterly mournful Talmudic student in her gallery of ancestors had shone through?" (von Rezzori 1982, 269). Pondering

over the child's example, he seems to consider the transmission of spiritual and psychic structures understandable, taking the biological inheritance according to the Mendelian laws as a basis and excluding the explanation of inheritance that is limited only to environmental effects and education. As if he would deliberately leave no room for any interpretations differing from the biologically based anti-Semitism. This is not characteristic of the other texts, not even of the other chapters of the novelette *Pravda.* However, there is another opportunity to understand the complex relationship with his second wife. Analyzing their relationship, von Rezzori transforms the traditional goy/Jew juxtaposition with deep irony. In his eyes his wife always insists on the absolute and unquestionable, while the husband (von Rezzori/ the narrator) takes the relative in his defense, thus, betraying the idea of uncompromising truth, denying faithfulness to the truth perceived as the organizing principle of life and as a paternal inheritance. Thus, the goy/ Jew juxtaposition is transformed into the juxtaposition of the most goyish Jew (wife) and the Jewish goy (husband). The emphases on values can just as well change places, as the husband considers his wife's unconditional adherence to the absolute nitpicking, a blind subordination to rules, in fact, petty-bourgeois nonsense (von Rezzori 1982, 260). The particularly loose relationship to truth creates the possibility for the husband to reinvent the reality whose part is the fairy-tale reinvention of the past. This thought is the key to the understanding of the relationship between the author and the narrator in the case of von Rezzori. This difference is theoretical no matter how much they overlap based on biographical details. Every attempt to compile the author's biography based on literary texts is a mistake (Aciman 1991, 18). The piece of writing *Pravda* at the end of the volume is a closure to the work where the narrator does not speak in the first person singular. Here the distance in time is still missing. The first person singular would obscure the questionable relationship between the author and the narrator. To examine his self, the removing gesture is necessary, i.e., the narrator in the third person singular, as if he were speaking about somebody else. This "as if" is the unavoidable characteristic of the aspect of the reality of every narrated story (Rezzori 1982, 243).[2]

In fact, the juxtaposition of the most goyish Jew (wife) and the Jewish goy (husband) describes an unresolvable relationship conflict whose origin is beyond the contentious issues of everyday life, and in this respect, it

2   Perez shares similar comments in his writing *The First and Other Persons* (Perez 1982, 612).

has metaphysical/theological roots and its basis is not the relation to the *truth* but the differing views on the nature of the truth, the conflict of two incompatible conceptions of truth. The two conceptions of truth are the basis of two opposing behaviors, which reject the other due to their mutually exclusive morality. This is the conflict between truth and lie. In the husband's view, the woman is borne, her adherence to banality is blind to the truth. The narrator/von Rezzori refers to Pilat's gesture that questions the truth to the truth of memories; he visits Bucuresti 40 years later. The reference points are there, the former sites of his life are despite the changes well recognizable. The sensual verification based on the sight passes off very quickly; in fact, it is preceded by the confirmation of the landing at the airport as repatriation. He states that "the land is unchanged—the land I was born in, lived in, loved, and have dreamed about for forty years—unchanged in essence" (von Rezzori 1982, 285). Despite this, the summary of the visit is disappointing: "That was the truth behind my dreams of forty years [. . .] it was all so overwhelmingly banal" (von Rezzori 1982, 285). The unchanged material reality and the banality link up. The truth of the memory cannot be substantiated in this way, as the original medium of the memories is missing. People are not the same any longer, and thus, probably other stories are being fabricated. If it is not possible to confirm the memories by facts, does that mean that it becomes untruthful that once used to be true? Or has it always been true factually only in its fragments? In the wife's view it has, the author/narrator/husband denies it. Speaking to his wife he summarizes the truth, i.e., his truth:

> [Y]ou ought to have known that my transfigurations, the fairy tales I wove out of images from my and other people's past, were an act of love; love—as we both always knew—is identification. Well, this was the only way to identify with a world one was bound to hate and a mankind one loathed and despised. Transfiguration as the alchemists' who strove to change vulgar metals into gold—I could even identify with myself; had I not done this I would have denied myself. But I did make something lucid with my love and hate, didn't I? (von Rezzori 1982, 280)

The recreation of the past in the framework of a creative act is capable to represent something in a true way, to make it clear, to show up the truth—e.g., in connection with the narrator's ego. But those who live a long life, live more lives and can become the narrators of quite different autobiographically inspired stories. As we have seen, in the case of von Rezzori several narrative egos exist that cannot be traced back to a single original ego, and regard

must be paid to the differentiation between the author and the narrator. On the contrary, the secret of the author's ego, as von Rezzori puts it in the interview made by Bruce Wolmer, is the following: "In spite of all the strange morphologies and transformations of myself during my lifetime, the 'I' is something unchanged, something I can't explain, not even to myself, and it has its destiny" (Wolmer 1988, 17). Accordingly, the narrator's ego cannot be reduced to the author's ego. Otherwise, the continuity of the author's ego would limit the creation of the narrators. However, the novelette *Pravda* contains several places in the text where despite the removing gesture the identification of the author and the narrator seems to be natural, or at least it is not at all clear that they are about the narrator. Examining the question of self-identification of the ego along his walk of life he realizes that dreaming made his ego identical with its former metamorphoses: "The thing that made them all one and the same person was: dreaming. When he thought *I*, he felt as if he were dreaming himself up: *Somnio, ergo sum*—I dream myself up, therefore I am" (von Rezzori 1982, 250). On the other hand, this recognition—the functioning of dreaming or imagination as the guarantee of self-identity—can establish the relationship between the author's ego and the narrator's ego. Dreaming as a constitutive element allows for establishing the sameness of personal identity (von Rezzori/narrator), and also dreaming as erring or intentional deception, untruth (wife); these two opposing perceptions bring about the irresolvable estrangement between husband and wife.

Evidently, the series of tragedies shaped fundamentally the wife's fate in the course of the Third Reich, and it could have developed a specific sensitivity in her that the husband identifies as Jewish sensitivity, and this is the motif that he discovers behind her absolute volition. We can speak about such sensitivity-based behavior without having to refer to a biology-based anti-Semitism.

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The Central-European world before World War I, in which von Rezzori was born in 1914, sank irrevocably as Atlantis (Lewis 2012, 159). At the eastern edge of this old world, in the multinational Bukovina, the German cultural grounds and in connection with it the German civilizing mission gave life a special taste. The fading lights of this world, whose traces break to the surface decades later as emotional memories, made a deep impression on the little boy. This specific character of existence shapes both the direct sensual experience and the memories. As an example, it is worth considering

the following description that shows what captivating memories of the Bukovinian landscape and even the hicksville in the middle of nowhere, where the little boy spent his summer holidays are present. The text does not visualize the perception of the 13-year old boy:

> The townlet in which my relatives lived and where they were the most important employers was a settlement in the marches of colonial territory on the European continent—it had sprung up out of windblown cultural sand, as it were, and would melt away again. Especially at night, when you approached it from a distance, its forlornness under the starry sky touched you to the quick: a handful of lights scattered over a flat-topped hill at the bend of a river, tied to the world solely by the railroad tracks, which glistened in the goat's milk of the moonlight. The firmament was as enormous as the huge mass of the earth, against whose heavy darkness these signals of human presence asserted themselves with a bravery that could scarcely be called reasonable. The sight was poignant in a sentimental way, like certain paintings of Chagall's. With *skushno* in the heart, one could experience it as devastatingly beautiful. (von Rezzori 1982, 6–7)

The skushno used to be a crucial part of the emotional world of those living in this remote countryside. The skushno is "more than dreary boredom: a spiritual void that sucks you in like a vague but intensely urgent longing" (von Rezzori 1982, 1). This shapeless longing might have referred to the knowledge that this artificially created fragile world, i.e., the home, will soon disappear.

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ALICE EGED

"Past, Forgotten, Over"
Supplements to the History of the Non-Existence of Criminal Liability of National Socialist Judges

Introduction

One of the most successful German-speaking singers, Freddy Quinn, has topped the West-German charts on and off for a decade since the 1950s. His melancholy hit "Past, Forgotten, Over" is about the complaints of a lonely wanderer searching the past; however, we can look at it as the post-war prayer of the judges of the national socialist state. It is not clear whether the jurists in question knew the hit but there is evidence that the approach *what is over, is over, let us not disturb the past* met the sympathy of many of their compatriots.

The first stage of criminal liability relating to felonies committed on behalf of national socialist Germany took place on 20 November 1945, when 24 major war criminals were brought before the court. Between 1946 and 1949 further lawsuits ensued, one of these was the jurists' trial conducted by the Americans in Nurenberg in 1947. In the course of the impeachment processes, only the jurists did not plead guilty from among the Nazi criminals. According to the indictment, the sixteen lawyers caught in the lawsuit were accused of using the law for the persecution and extermination of people (Stál 2018, 86). Ten defendants were condemned but they all received amnesty until 1956. The number of the judges and prosecutors involved in the proceedings was very low, on top of all that, the symbolic figures of the regime were missing from the dock. The lack of the confrontation with the past is particularly conspicuous in the legal profession, as no judges or prosecutors were convicted by a final court judgment because of their role in the criminal justice of the national socialist regime in the decades following the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany, although

the jurists were active helpers of state terror, "the dagger of the assassin was concealed beneath the robe of the jurist" (qtd. in Taylor 1949, 73) as the American military court formulated in the reasoning of the judgment in 1947 (Görtemaker and Safferling 2016, 13).

In historical literature, there is no debate about the fact that the so-called denazification process that lasted for years and was initiated by the Allies in 1945 and meant the cleansing of the German public life and morals for years, was not very successful. This statement as it has been demonstrated above is even truer for the scrutiny of the legal community. A debate is rather generated by the question to what extent *Renazifizierung* can be assigned to the ill success of the process of denazification. In fact, the senior officials of the judicial system of the national socialist state lost their positions after the war, however, many of them returned to various—even the highest— levels of the judicial system after the Federal Republic of Germany had been established. It is also important to see that the denazification process cannot be separated from the process of brainwashing. The latter one was a task that required extraordinary effort in the first place on the part of the U.S., and its aim was the deconstruction of the deep structures of the German collective identity similar to the immigrants that learnt in America how to become democratically-minded citizens (Frank 2014, 7–8). The brainwash of the jurists was also a part of the plan, and probably, the acceptance of the new value system helped them to get integrated into the democratic legal order. Nevertheless, the connection between the jurisdiction in the first decades of the history of the Federal German Republic and the national socialist past is thought-provoking and raises several issues that Werner Holländer's case and the procedures followed in its wake point at. A special court (*Sondergericht*), which otherwise did not have the competence to do so, sentenced the 28-year old young Jew to death among others because of race defilement, and he was executed. Between 1933 and 1945, the German courts handed down death sentences at least 32.000 times, half of which showed the diligence of special courts (Friedrich 1998, 15). Seven years later criminal proceedings were instituted against the judgmental judges in a German court. After three years the lawsuit ended in acquittal.

Werner Holländer's Condemnation

The expulsion of the Jews by legal means started in April 1933. A lot of them lost their jobs, which had a bitter consequence on the life of the persons concerned; their social isolation remained at a low level. The anti-Semitism

and the living space theory that were markedly decisive for the ideology of national socialism raised the terror to state level and pushed the principles of morality that had been accepted for centuries into the background. The livelihood of the Jews became significantly limited, as they could not join public service, pursue certain occupations, teach at universities, and join the army. The Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honour launched in 1935 (see *Gesetz zum Schutze des deutschen Blutes und der deutschen Ehre RGBl I* 1935, 1146–47) banned mixed marriages between Aryan Germans and Jews and criminalized sexual relations between them. The concept of the imperial citizen was defined, thus, creating the legal possibility for the declaration of Jews as second-rate citizens. The law decided who was a Jew mainly according to racial anti-Semitism.

Paragraph 2, which prohibited extramarital relations, was significant from the viewpoint of criminal justice. The courts interpreted the affected section broadly because they considered all kinds of seemingly erotic contact as the realization of the facts (Friedrich 1998, 342–43). Only men—both Aryan and Jew—were involved in criminal prosecutions as offenders, women were present in these procedures as witnesses. In the reasoning of their judgments, the judges spoke about the strangeness, depravity, unscrupulousness, animal passion, and the kinky and guilty habits of the Jewish race abundantly. The penalties were severe, namely, several years in prison were imposed on the Jews for an alleged caress, accosting, or calling for a date on the street. With wartime difficulties growing, life in the hinterland was also getting more and more unpredictable and increasingly severe even with death sentences made in the course of court proceedings. There is no data available on the number of persons subject to the proceedings; however, their number is estimated at thousands.

The judicial council which after a one-and-half hour's trial in Kassel on 21 April 1943 sentenced Werner Holländer to death consisted of Fritz Hassencamp, President, Edmund Kessler, Judge-Rapporteur, and Bernhardt Assessor.[1] The police procedure started following the denunciation of one of his former girlfriends in May 1942. Miss Elsa W. became pregnant; however, she decided to terminate her pregnancy. She wanted to get decompensation from Holländer in addition to the reimbursement of the costs of her hospital treatment. The public defender visited Holländer, who had been arrested, in the prison two or three times and made it clear for him that the prosecutor

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1   The first name of the judge Bernhardt does not appear in any of the documents.

accused him of race defilement and exposing someone else's physical integrity to grievous bodily injury, and that he proposed the imposition of the death penalty.

The jury questioned Holländer's former partners and the lead detective. Based on witness statements and the defendant's pleading guilty, the court considered it proven that Holländer had broken 2. § of the law "for the Protection of German Blood and German Honour," i.e., he committed race defilement (*Rassenschande*). Furthermore, he endangered the physical integrity and health of one of his sexual partners. The court decision recorded the bearing of the case and the justification as it follows (Friedrich 1998, 397–402). Holländer had Hungarian ancestors, his well-to-do parents immigrated to Germany before World War I. He was born in Cologne; however, he had only Hungarian citizenship. At the age of six, he was baptized, and then he was raised in the Lutheran faith. He went to school in various towns of Germany, far away from his parents under the supervision of host families, he eventually studied engineering. His friends, acquaintances described him as a pleasant, friendly boy who liked courting the girls with great pleasure and the girls welcomed his approach; he also came into intimate contact with several of them. It was in February 1941, that as an adult he became aware of the fact that his parents who at that time already lived in Brasil, were Jews, and he himself was a Jew, too. In early 1941 Holländer applied for an engineering position at the firm Henschel & Sohn in Cologne, however, he had to present documents proving his lineage before starting his job. The documents issued by the Lutheran parish in Cologne revealed that his parents belonged to the Israelite denomination. He did not share this essential information on his lineage with his would-be employer, on the questionnaire issued by the company, he declared himself to be of Aryan descent. In the course of his life, Hollländer came into close contact with several Aryan women; however, he remained single. During his university studies, he got acquainted with Katharina W., who was a costume designer at the opera houses in Darmstadt and then in Cologne, in 1936. He had a love affair with her until early 1942. He did not share the new pieces of information about his descendence with Katharina W., thus, it did not have a role in their breakup. In March and April 1941, he occasionally got into contact with the Aryan and married D., of whom he also took nude photos with her consent. He kept silent about his lineage in this case, too. In summer 1941, he got acquainted with the Aryan Miss H. who was a telephone operator. After their first sexual intercourse, Holländer got a sexually transmitted infection the cure of which needed a longer

medical treatment. Before he recovered from the infectious disease, he got acquainted with the Aryan Elsa W. in a tennis club. Holländer did not tell either the girl or her parents that he was a Jew. They could not guess the truth just because a Jew was not allowed to be a member of the tennis club, i.e., the defendant gave false information when he joined the club. The relationship between Holländer and Elsa W. became closer and closer. The defendant was invited to the girl's parents on several occasions. Also, the parents considered their relationship serious, thus, when they got to know of their daughter's gravidity in spring 1942, they urged them to get married. It was then that Holländer said that something was wrong with his lineage, but he did not confess the whole truth and he did not mention his venereal disease either. Finally, the pregnancy was aborted.

In the course of the trial the court expressed serious doubt about Holländer's statement, i.e., he came to know the authentic history of his lineage only in early 1941. According to the judges, the defendant must have been aware of his Jewish descendence earlier than that because there were many signs of it, among others his mother's name (Buchsbaum), his paternal grandfather belonging to the Israelite denomination, his elder sister's marrying a Jew, his parents' expatriation from Germany in 1939. There was no fully verified evidence that Holländer knew of his Jewish origins before 1941. Hassencamp led the trial in a calm tone, none of the judges made anti-Semitic remarks and they did not hinder the defense attorney in his activities either. The defense attorney did not initiate an evidentiary procedure; neither did the court order it ex officio. Each witness acted restrainedly, and Holländer was quite passive. At the last word, he pleaded guilty, but he considered the prosecutor's proposal for the death penalty too severe.

After the trial, the court withdrew to make a verdict. At the dispute, no contemptuous remarks were made about the Jewry according to the judges. There was a professional discussion between Kessler and Bernhard. The latter one did not approve of the imposition of the death penalty, and he brought up another case as an example, where a court of similar composition conducted a lawsuit against the accused on charges of race defilement, the accused was sentenced to 8 years in prison. Kessler's objection was that the induced abortion made this case more serious and that the defendant was enjoying himself while the German soldiers were fighting on the front. Hassencamp fluctuated between the two opinions; finally, he supported Kessler. No formal voting took place (see *Lfd. Nr.951 3a Ks 3/50 LG Kassel JuNSV Bd. XLIX*, 452). It took a few minutes to pronounce the verdict

and it immediately became non-appealable as giving notice of appeal was procedurally not possible.

The court found Holländer guilty of race defilement in four cases. The justification of the judicial body (Friedrich 1998, 397–402) pointed out that Holländer's defense, that the law "for the Protection of German Blood and German Honour" did not apply to him because he was a foreign citizen, was not accepted. Nor was it considered a rescue circumstance that the defendant was brought up in the Christian faith and he did not ever consider himself a Jew. The court assessed it as an aggravating circumstance that the defendant concealed his Jewish descendence and did not mention his venereal disease either, although this information would have deterred his partners from contacting him or continuing their relationship. The justification continued saying that the guilty person's behavior proved the insolence and the unscrupulousness of the accused person. The court considered it also an aggravating circumstance that Holländer deceived his employer and the tennis club by providing false information. The fact that the defendant promised marriage to Elsa W., although he knew very well that this was completely impossible, was subjected to particularly severe criticism. The conclusion was that the defendant's acts justified the general judgment about the Jews, according to which it is an inferior ethnic group pursuing a spoiled and depraved lifestyle, which is dangerous for the German people. The circumstance, the court added, that the acts were committed in the second and third year of the war, when Germany was fighting a life-and-death struggle against the Jews, supported the degenerate character of Holländer's, who misused his guest rights. Because of the fourfold perpetration, the defendant was branded an entrenched criminal, thus, there were grounds to apply the 20a § of the Penal Code against him. This paragraph, which was included in the Penal Code on 23 November 1933, made it possible to impose a prison sentence of even up to 15 years in the case of repeated intentional crime (*Gesetz gegen gefährliche Gewohheitverbrecher und über Maßregeln der Sicherung und Besserung, RGBl I*, 1933, 995). Although Holländer had a clean record, the court found recidivism in his case. The Penal Code that was amended with effect from 4 September 1941 offered the court the opportunity to impose the death penalty on the offender classified as an established criminal, provided that the act committed could be assessed as a crime against morality based on the 176–178. § of the Penalty Code (*Gesetz zur Änderung des Reichsstrafgesetzbuchs 1. §. RGBl I*, 1941, 549).

The plea for mercy to the Attorney General was rejected; thus, the sentence was carried out on 30 May 1943. Holländer was ordered to pay the

expenses of the lawsuit. According to the minutes, Holländer took note of the decision without showing any emotions. However, this contradicts the letter Katharina W. wrote to a friend, who was Holländer's friend, too. She reported on the trial. The letter says that Holländer was a broken reed; after the judgment had been delivered, he could not hold back his tears (Löwenstein 2010, 9). As a Judge-Rapporteur, Kessler prepared the written redacted version of the verdict. The written justification, however, contradicts in several aspects the testimonies that were made in the criminal suit filed against the judges after the war.

The Judges of the Holländer Lawsuit before the Court[2]

After the Federal Republic of Germany had been established, the case of Werner Holländer was the subject of criminal proceedings three times: in June 1950 in Kassel, in February 1951 in Frankfurt at the Provincial Court of appeal, and in March 1952 in Kassel again where the judgment was pronounced. The defendants of the procedure were Edmund Kessler and Fritz Hassencamp, Bernhardt participated in the procedure as a witness.

Fritz Hassencamp was born in 1878 in Frankenberg. He studied law in Tübingen, Berlin and Marburg. Having finished his studies, he took up a position in Kassel and Schlüchtern as a court clerk, and then he was appointed judge in Neuhof. He worked at the City Court of Kassel from 1926, after a short time, he was transferred to the Provincial Court where he became the Chairman of the Criminal Council. In 1932, he became a member of the council of the Special Court in Kassel, a year later he was appointed its chairman. He held this position until the end of the war. Before 1933, he was a member of the German People's Party (Deutsche Volkspartei), but he did not engage in active political activity. In 1933, he joined the National Socialist German Labour Party (NSDAP), and became an assisting member of the SS; he supported this organization monthly. His professional knowledge was not thought much of, consequently, it was always ensured that colleagues with reliable expertise be assigned to the council led by Hassencamp. He rarely took part in the wording of the judgments occasionally he made stylistic

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2   For the section see *Lfd.Nr.951a LG Kassel 29.03.1952 JuNSV Bd.XLIX, LG Kassel*, *29.03.1952, 3a Ks 3/50*, 449–478; *Lfd.Nr.951b LG Kassel 8.06.1950 JuNSV Bd.XLIX, LG Kassel, 28.06.1950, 3a Ks 3/50*, 479–484; *Lfd.Nr.951c OLG Frankfurt/M. 07.02.1951 JuNSV Bd.XLIX, OLG Frankfurt/M., 07.02.1951, Ss 374/50*, 485–88.

corrections to the decisions. In 1945, after the collapse of Germany, he was dismissed from his job.

Edmund Kessler was born in Kassel, he made his university studies in Leipzig and Marburg, and he obtained his doctorate in 1926. In 1933, he was appointed to the Provincial Court in Kassel, at that time he was 31 years old. His colleagues kept him in evidence as the most qualified judge. After successfully passing his legal examinations, he failed to get a seemingly promising position from a professional point of view in Berlin because of an eye disease he acquired in his youth. He took this very hard and it further strengthened his unsociable lifestyle. His scientific interest centered on the investigation of the motivation of juvenile offenders. He was a member of the legal examination committee in Kassel and one of his tasks was the mentoring of court clerks. In the year of the national socialist takeover, he joined the National Socialist German Labour Party and became a member of several party-affiliated organizations, thus e.g. he led the legal department of the Hitlerjugend. In 1939, he became a member of the Special Court in Kassel, in 1943 he was transferred to Marburg where he was appointed chairman of one of the criminal councils. Besides his work at the court, he was a lecturer at the Faculty of Law of the University in Marburg, and he published several scientific and educational papers on various fields of criminal law. As a member of the Special Court led by Hassencamp, he participated in two procedures where a defendant accused of race defilement was convicted. It has to be noted that he suggested that a more lenient penalty be imposed than usual on several occasions; in fact, it even happened that he referred the defendant to involuntary medical treatment, thus, saving him/her from the death penalty.

In 1950, the court examined whether the defendants applied the legislation in force in 1943 appropriately. The court stated that this examination could only be performed embedded in historical-political relations of the time and not in historical-political relations of today. Holländer admitted to having committed these acts and the statements of the four female witnesses coincided with them. The admitted acts were criminal offenses under the law in force at the time, the law providing for the imposition of penalties, and the authorities could not dispense with this. Kessler and Hassencamp, the court continued, classified Holländer as an entrenched offender. However, Holländer's personality was not revealed carefully enough, consequently, they could not have been convinced of his criminal propensity. The court went on arguing that it was not explored either, how deeply Holländer's

state of mind was affected by the realization of the shocking information about his descendence. Kessler and Hassencamp should have considered the fact that the disclosure of his Jewish origin would have meant sending the young man to a concentration camp and excluding him from society. Kessler and Hassencamp acted negligently because in the absence of evidence they treated Elza's becoming infected by Holländer as a fact, and they did not summon the physician who had treated him either. They were satisfied with a certificate, which, moreover, did not support their presumption. Consequently, Kessler and Hassencamp breached their judicial duty to make a conscientious inquiry into the facts. In 1950 all this prompted the court to consider the judgment too serious. However, the wrong judgment does not in itself justify holding the accused accountable, the intentional application of biased law enforcement is a precondition for criminality, the court stated. The implementation of biased law enforcement cannot be achieved through negligence, thus, the inconsiderate procedure of the defendants does not substantiate the charge. The former panel member arguing against the death sentence was heard as a witness. Bernhardt—without remembering the details—stated that a professional debate took place between Kessler, Hassencamp, and himself in the dispute following the trial. He also definitely stated that the idea of intentional application of biased law enforcement did not present itself in his fellow judges, they also ignored serious statements about Judaism. The defendants also denied the charges. The court was critical of the slanderous statements about Judaism in the justification of the verdict formulated in 1943. For example, it disapproved of the term "sign of Jewish impudence." This and similar sentences can make an impression on the reader—the court deemed—that the verdict was not made solely based on legal arguments but also other considerations played a role in it. All this was to be condemned, the verdict said, but their judgment had to be based on the political situation at the time. Both defendants—by their testimony—were fanatic national socialists who were affected by the propaganda, thus, it can easily be imagined that the sentence to be read in the justification of the contemporary verdict quoted above and the like were to be understood as epithets in brackets, and also Bernhardt's testimony strengthened this version, the court stated. All this was also supported by Kessler's statement he made in the course of the trial that his legal ego had never accepted the act prohibiting the mixture of Aryan and Jewish blood, however, he did not share this with his colleagues for fear of the repulsive behavior of his environment. Holländer's moral conduct especially against Elsa W., which was unacceptable for Kessler, was an important motive for making the death

sentence. The court acquitted the defendants but ruled they should bear the moral responsibility.

The prosecution appealed the verdict, so the procedure continued at the Regional Court of Appeal in Frankfurt in February 1951 where the first-instant decision was set aside. The Court of Appeal agreed with the finding of the Court of First Instance that the defendants substantiated the death sentence in their written reasoning not merely based on legal arguments. The judicial council thought that this could not be saved saying that it was not these unprofessional considerations that led to the serious judgment. The Court of First Instance accepted the defense of the defendants, namely, that they fully identified with the National Socialist ideology, that is why the most important question was to clarify how much the defendants' worldview influenced the verdict, certainly the Court of First Instance had not disclosed this issue with sufficient thoroughness.

At first, the court revolved around the legal facts of biased law enforcement in the repeated first instance proceedings. Its starting point was that the criminal conduct was the misapplication of the law that could be achieved by undermining procedural law or substantive law, or even both. The field of the former was primarily the conduct of the trial, that of the latter one was mainly the verdict. If, for example, the judge deliberately fails to make the necessary inquiries into the case, and this involves advantages or disadvantages for one party or the other, he commits a biased application of the law. The judge commits biased application of the law also if he considers the verdict incorrect and unlawful in itself, i.e., it is contrary to his conviction. The condition of establishing biased law enforcement is that the offense is intentional, i.e., if it occurs because of human negligence or error—the Regional Court argued—, the biased enforcement is not realized. It does not materialize even if the conduct of the judge is characterized by a possible willfulness, i.e., when the offender can foresee the consequences of his conduct and reconciles himself to it. After this, the Provincial Court sought answers to three questions. The first question was whether the hearing was conducted in breach of procedural law; secondly, whether substantive law was applied incorrectly; finally, whether the judges, despite their internal convictions and considerations out of the law, acted to the detriment of the accused. The Provincial Court found that the court headed by Hassencamp did not seek to investigate adequately what had happened. Instead of ordering evidentiary procedures, it almost slavishly accepted the allegations in the indictment though some of them were not substantiated convincingly. It could not be clarified, for example, how long there was a risk of infection

due to Holländer's venereal disease. The court did not examine Holländer's personality, so it could not even prove his criminal mind authentically, which was dangerous to society, although National Socialist law also required this. The Provincial Court even quoted Kessler's study entitled *Verbrechen und Strafe* where the author was discussing that an obsessive criminal who was dangerous to society had a lack of willpower, consequently, could only live like a criminal. At that time, it was not clarified in detail either whether Holländer alone was the seductress in his relationships or also his girlfriends were. Nor did the court study Holländer's working conditions in-depth and it mentioned it as a shortcoming that none of his colleagues were summoned as witnesses. This is also incomprehensible because witnesses described Holländer as a kind and friendly person, and in their testimony, the judges themselves spoke of him as an intelligent, likable young man. The Provincial Court blamed Hassencamp and Kessler because they did not take into account that Holländer was unaware of the illegality of his actions claiming that—although he knew the laws of racial protection—, he as a Hungarian citizen was not subject to the laws. Holländer's mistake, i.e., that he thought he was free to do a forbidden act, was legally a relevant circumstance, consequently, the circumstances of this should have been clarified in any case. The error affects the conscious side of intentionality, it is its handicap, because of which the person in error exhibits conduct, which he would not have done without being in error. Error alone does not preclude culpability if it is caused by negligence, the law also punishes negligent offenses, however, they shall be taken into account as a mitigating circumstance when imposing a sentence.

However, the Provincial Court ruled that the shortcomings in the conduct of the trial were not due to the deliberate conduct of the defendants. In its reasoning, the Provincial Court explained that the lack of evidence procedures could be explained by Hassencamp's professional unpreparedness and not by his disregarding them deliberately. Kessler's conduct could not be justified by a lack of professional knowledge, however, the intent was not demonstrable either. According to the Provincial Court Kessler's eye disease might have caused him to judge each case more strictly than others did. Hassencamp's and especially Kessler's opinion was determined solely by Holländer's affair with Elsa W., although his other relationships revealed that Holländer did not take advantage of her female partners and was not a marriage swindler. In view of these, the Provincial Court concluded that the judgment was delivered in breach of substantive law, to the detriment of Holländer. The answer of the Provincial Court to

the third question, i.e., whether the judges acted contrary to their internal convictions and based on considerations out of law to the detriment of the accused, was that this could not be proved based on the available data. In the case of Hassencamp, the possibility emerged that he possibly acted under the guidance of his superior Delitzsch who was at the same time the president of the court. It was well known, and it was clear from the testimonies that Delitzsch as a promoter of violent and extremely severe punishments, held briefings, by choice, and this happened also in the case of the Holländer-lawsuit. However, Hassencamp denied that he wanted to meet Delitzsch's expectations. Kessler did not participate in briefings, at least no information was provided to this effect. This can be true because Delitzsch only had contact with the presidents of the panel of judges and councils. In the case of Kessler, the court also considered it an important supplement that Kessler identified himself as a legalist for whom it was evident that even the strictest laws had to be observed. Analyzing Hassencamp and Kessler's judicial attitude, the Provincial Court found that Hassencamp was easy to be influenced by other people or circumstances. He disguised his professional insecurity by accepting the opinions of his colleagues easily. He maintained a fair relationship with his colleagues, and his trials were characterized by a calm tone. He had never been anti-Semitic; however, he was strongly influenced by the national socialist propaganda. Kessler, with his excellent professional skills, was a much more complex personality. His legal activity was characterized by sophistication, goal orientation, and self-confidence. External factors like the party, the press, the climate of opinion, did not influence the formation of his resolutions. It should be noted that this is contradicted by the fact—also recorded in the minutes—, according to which Kessler expressed his regret because of Bernhardt's disagreement before the verdict was pronounced in 1943, and he told him that the people would not accept a mild judgment (Friedrich 1998, 407). Kessler may have been guided by a blind belief in the need for ruthless application of national socialist laws, thus, moral concerns could not hinder him in his activity. Kessler acted under his national socialist conviction, however, this attitude later proved flawed. The reasoning of the Provincial Court says that it cannot be ruled out that Kessler considered his reasoning for Holländer's judgment as a special legal achievement since he was the first to apply a provision of the Penal Code concerning the death penalty to the Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor. Finally, the Provincial Court acquitted both defendants in the absence of evidence. The verdict came in force.

Epilogue

The vast majority of jurists in the National Socialist dictatorship cooperated with the regime, and their activities significantly contributed to the stable operation of the system. However, they were not accounted for after 1949. Instead of prosecuting them, acts were born to terminate the denazification procedures. Only few of them felt personal responsibility for what had happened between 1933 and 1945. The dismissal of the judges in the Holländer trial was not an unusual case, the others were spookily similar to this one. The argumentation of the courts exemplifies the desire to forget the past, the difficulties of facing felonies, and undertaking legal quibbling to acquit the defendants.

Each time the courts were satisfied with the conclusion that the jurist defendants judged under the law in force at the time, however, the establishment of facts was incomplete. Judgments teeming with anti-Semitic sentences, that can already realize the facts of biased law enforcement on their own (Hoeppel 2019, 350–51), were considered clichés and showed a preference for relativization, although it was obvious that these affected the outcome of the lawsuits significantly. The perpetrators were excused with the fact that they were in the service of a dictatorship, they could not withdraw themselves from the effects of violent propaganda, they were only guided by the requirements of the age and they met the expectations of their environment. In any case, the recurring appearance of these rescue motifs in court reasoning draws a picture of a schizophrenic judge or prosecutor who declares themselves legal positivist; however, at the same time, they work to let the demon of dictatorship come within the walls of justice. The German courts testify to a peculiar interpretation of legal positivism when they put the example that generations of lawyers were raised at German universities to honor the letter of the law even before 1933, and that law and morality did not exactly overlap. Although it goes without saying, the German judges seemed to have forgotten about the fact that morality is not a matter of political taste but a measure of human action.

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3.
VARIATIONS OF IDENTITY

Andrea Horváth

Post-democracy and Globalization
About the Europe-theories in the Work of Robert Menasse[1]

Many European citizens see the gradual emergence of the European Union as an impressive political development. The basis for this association is the common experience, the overcoming of wars and crises, which have shown us all that Europe has found the way to a specific form of a supranational organization. As Walter Shilling draws attention to it, one ought not to forget that Europe would have never been in the ability of this performance without the political, economic, and military support of the USA (2020, 9).

If you follow the tendencies of the last decades, you can see that the European Union is more and more interested in the transfer of important competences from the nation-states to the European institutions. The purpose of greater integration and its failure have already shown themselves in the consequences of the "Treaty of Lisbon," which is "not an expression of the self-determination of a European people's sovereignty but goes back to an act of foreign determination by the member states" (Schilling 2020, 9). Since the EU is not a self-supporting organization, it does not have democratic legitimacy. Even the European Parliament is not able to ensure the missing preconditions of post-national governance and a democratic process on the European level. The current crises, from the financial and sovereign debt crisis to the crisis based on the illegal immigration of people from Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, as well as the health-economic overcoming of the Covid-19 pandemic, are increasingly leading to growing resistance of citizens in almost all European countries and reinforcing the anti-European attitudes that claim the failure of "Europe as a peace project."

Even if the conflicts are often raised in the media because of nation-state interests, there is no threat of war in Europe. This was emphasized by German Chancellor Angela Merkel in her speech to the European Parliament on November 13, 2018, agreeing with Jean-Claude Juncker, "there would never again be a war between European countries" (2018). For a long time now, other criteria have applied to the creation of the state union and the satisfaction of EU citizens, namely that of positive economic integration and a successful internal market. However, the skepticism of the citizens of the European Union is growing, as many conflicts of the EU arise from the fact that, on the one hand, the European Union is supposed to respect the national identity of its member states, and, on the other hand, there are accusations that national identity includes the right to political self-determination. It can be observed that there is a certain re-nationalization going on in the EU countries at the moment, creating an upheaval in European politics.

This upheaval in Europe can also be observed in contemporary cultural and literary studies. As Michaela Nicole Raß and Kay Wolfinger point out in their volume *Europa im Umbruch: Identität in Politik, Literatur und Film,* two interrelated focal points can be observed in these changes: on the one hand, one can observe a growing shift to the right in many EU countries; on the other hand, rising nationalism can lead to a weakening of democracy and thus to a possible disintegration of the European Union, which can bring about the disintegration of the nation-states (2020, 3). The problem also includes Brexit, the consequences of which are also clearly interpreted as a threat to the dissolution of the EU. In recent years, both literature and art have turned to the conflicts and crises in which Europe and the European Union find themselves. Authors and writers, various experts in media studies react to the upheaval, both the politics of the day and the images and traditions of/about Europe are questioned and often conceived in dystopias. Raß and Wolfinger also point to another trend in which not only artists and writers share the same questions and anxieties, but academics from history, sociology, and political science also describe the political crises and warn of a possible disintegration of democracy.

The discourse on Europe has gone through changes in recent years, the traditions of the discourse on Europe have been on the one hand challenged anew by the political changes, the crisis of the Euro, and by the problems of refugee policy, on the other hand, just despite the changes, the intensity of the discourse on Europe has been strengthened and has gained complexity.

The idea of Europe also determines the overall picture used by cultural and literary studies, one speaks of European literature, but it is also understood

to include common values, motifs of a unified European literature. These productions are based on the Europa-Mythos, Europe serves here as a figure of reflection, as, for example, in the connection between femininity and violence. In this cultural conception of Europe, the most important aspect is to concretize strategies that define the idea, the image of Europe, by showing typical European characteristics of a unified culture.

The question of European identity is interrogated by several authors such as Yoko Tawada or Hans Magnus Enzensberger. These questions are as much about national identities as they are about the tasks of a supranational European identity. In this framework, the problem of migration is also addressed by presenting both the appropriation of a European identity and the preoccupation with the question of the "non-European." In particular, the discussion of alterity is strongly included in the texts of authors with an immigrant background.

An important aspect of the discourse on Europe are utopias or dystopias that describe or criticize the current cultural or political situation of Europe, or just reflect the possibilities of how European democracy, the crisis of the European Union can develop further. As part of the discourse on Europe, literary texts—especially French literature—focus on the disintegration of European identity and the breakup of the European Union, or—as in Martin Walker's novel, on the other hand—describe Germany's attitude toward the EU.

Criticism of the European Union is not only addressed in political-public discourses, but more and more works focus on the democratic deficit and bureaucratization in the EU. The EU-critical novel *Sanftes Monster Brüssel oder Die Entmündigung Europas* (2011) by Hans Magnus Enzenberger already deals intensively with the construction of the EU. The current issues of these critical writings also question the old traditions and seek a new social and political role for the intellectuals or authors who have been increasingly speaking out in recent years in the political discourse.

The Austrian writer Robert Menasse breaks with the tradition of EU criticism. In his works from recent years, he combines the demand for a supranational or post-national European identity with the depiction of Europe as a political construct. As a politically committed intellectual, Menasse is intensively following the fate of the European unification project. He has spent the last few years shifting his position from critic to supporter, and he explains the reasons for this in his 2012 book essay, *Der europäische Landbote: Die Wut der Bürger und der Friede Europas oder Warum die geschenkte Demokratie einer erkämpften weichen muss (The European Country Messenger: The Anger of the Citizens and the Peace of Europe or Why*

the Given Democracy Must Give Way to One Fought Out). Menasse analyzes the constructional and functional flaws of the European institutions of Parliament, Council, and Commission, and, as Antje Büssgen notes, sketches a vision of a post-national Europe:

> The design flaw is that the nations whose power was to be broken had to be institutionally endowed with power in the Union—precisely because they are representatives of nations who have to come together to overcome nations. Of course, if we think back to the beginning, it didn't happen any other way: To create post-national development and supranational institutions, national governments first had to decide this with each other. Only the governments of sovereign democratic states had the legitimacy to surrender or communitize sovereign rights. To this end, authority had to be created in which the democratically legitimized representatives of the nation-states could meet and make their joint decisions according to rules of the game recognized by the national parliaments. This institution is the European Council. (qtd. in Büssgen 2015, 297)

According to Menasse, it is now the European Council of nationally elected heads of government that bears decisive responsibility for the crisis of the European integration process, which has been smoldering for years and has been the subject of public debate under the catchword "democratic deficit." Since the 2008 banking crash in the United States and the resulting global financial and economic crisis, which had devastating social consequences, especially in southern European countries, the accusation of a democratic deficit and the declining willingness to renounce national sovereignty have developed into a fundamental crisis of legitimacy for the European unification project. Menasse understands the rapid global expansion and the catastrophic extent that the economic crisis has been able to gain in some European states less as purely economically caused than as the result of poorly balanced national and transnational competences within European institutions and thus as a symptom of a crisis of political power. A new concept of democracy that meets the requirements of transnational politics must be developed, he demands, to protect European politics from the dangers of populism and thus from a relapse into nation-state limitation, especially in times of crisis. Only in this way could Europe preserve its historically grown values in the intercontinental, global game of powers and markets and remain politically credible, capable of action, and valid.

With this crisis analysis, Menasse places his reflection on Europe in the broader context of economic and cultural globalization, which must seem self-evident because it is timely because our epoch is longer to be considered a "global age" (Martin Albrow) or a "second modern age" (Ulrich Beck) in the eyes of sociologists and political scientists.

In 2010, Robert Menasse launched a series of publications, signaling his new interest in the European integration project with an essay on the crisis of the EU published in *Die Zeit*. While he heaps praise on the EU Commission, his essays are critical of the EU Parliament. The reservations concern the election procedure and the composition, both of which are still too national in character (Menasse 2012, 54, 83). A scandal that "many deputies from populist anti-EU lists would be elected to parliament." There was a danger that this would turn it into the "central regulars' table of the anti-Europeans" (Menasse 2012, 83). Menasse's verdict on the European Council, in which the heads of state of the member nations are represented, is scathing. He sees them as the destroyers of the European unity project. Other than in the case of the Commission and the Parliament it wasn't about a supranational institution. The "democratic legitimacy" of the European Council was "mere chimera," since the "heads of government" had come to power in "national elections" in which considerations of competence to make "supranational decisions" (Menasse 2012, 36) had played no role. This institution defended nothing but "national interests" (Menasse 2012, 51). In essence, he said, the Lisbon Treaty, which came into force in 2009, was a "soft coup by the nationalists." This document had "massively increased the power of the [European] Council" (Menasse 2012, 54). But do not the intergovernmental discussions and decision-making in the European Council also qualify as "European"?

Lützeler rightly asks why Menasse ignores one of the oldest organs in Brussels-Europe, the Council of the European Union, also called the Council of Ministers (2020, 20). Based on the text, it can be established without a doubt that Menasse's object of hatred is the European Council, i.e., the group of heads of government of the nation-states. He introduces three arguments why the Council should not form part of the European Union's power system.

According to Menasse, the heads of state assembled in the European Council represent only the interests of their nations. The European movement, Menasse argues, has set out to destroy nationalism, and this goal can only be achieved if nation-states were abolished. The author also sees no difference between nationalism and national identity. "National identity" is considered by him to be "a shabby ideology that has regularly led

to wars and crimes against humanity" (Menasse 2012, 64). Can this still be said in general about the national self-image of citizens living in today's EU states? The European Union, Menasse notes in the same context, is a "project to overcome nationalism and nation-states" (2012, 93). The European movement is indeed committed to overcoming nationalism. But did the European strategists with political responsibility also want the nation-states to be abolished? Nation-states can aspire to many things. After World War II, the Western European states chose to tame their nationalism and use their energies to promote a continental peace and economic project. The Coal and Steel Community, the EEC, the European Community, and the European Union were built by nations. Menasse goes further in his radical critique by imagining that as nations dissolve, the democracy we know and practice should also disappear. But no one knows what to make of Menasse's vague hints about a future "transnational democracy" (2014, 18).

Menasse also criticizes the priorities within the EU: he would prefer to replace nation-states with regions. He sees "regional identity" as "the root of European." "Europe" is "in truth a Europe of the regions" and thus the European representation of the people may also become "a parliament of the regions." Not the nations, but the "regions," it is said, should elect "their deputies to the parliament," and this, in turn, would determine the "president of the commission" and the "commissioners." This would create a European democracy that would not disturb the European Council with nationalism (2012, 88, 67, 43, 87).

As Büssgen shows, he no longer argues for the plausibility of the conceptual parallelization of democracy, but rather proceeds from the reflection of a new, contemporary, and integrationist concept of democracy in the European Land Messenger (2015, 316):

> The overdue debate on how the European project could be democratized and what a post-national democracy would ultimately have to look like has so far failed not only because in the minds of most people "democracy" is still experienced and understood merely as national democracy and that therefore "democratization" for them can only mean the demand for more plebiscitary democracy within national democracy. Another reason why the debate is not getting off the ground is that even the critics of the EU's democratic deficits generally do not consider the EU to be democratizable at all; on the contrary: They believe that "democratic engagement" can only prove to be resistance to the EU. The EU is seen as a project of the corporations, a project of capital. (Menasse 2012, 73)

Menasse also sees the problems of the EU-specific institutional system as the reason for the financial and economic crisis. He assumes that the founding idea of the European construction was determined by the political actors of the World War to "overcome nationalism in a post-national development" (qtd. in Büssgen 2015, 317). Menasse often emphasizes that "the political elites of the time" (2012, 13) were strongly convinced of the death of the nation-states. On the one hand, he pays tribute to the political elites of the postwar period who realized this project; on the other hand, he speaks of the "historical cunning of reason" (Menasse 2012, 42) because they first wanted to economically secure the integration of the European states in this plan. With this analysis, Menasse ties in with the concept of the "regime of collateral consequences" by Beck and Grande, who use the cunning of reason to argue for a cosmopolitan Europe:

> Europe is the seen unseen, willed unwanted—the master plan of not having a master plan. For only in this way (one tacitly assumes) can the "idea of Europe," however vague its current concretization, become real. [. . .] It is not on the open stage, in a heroic political act, that European society comes into being, but behind the backs of the actors, with the power of secondary consequences. [. . .] The hallmark of this side-effect history of Europe is a fundamental ambivalence: On the one hand, it expresses a kind of cunning of reason that allowed Europe to step out of the long shadow of its warlike history and put its national egocentricity into perspective. On the other hand, a Europe of secondary consequences is something that, however, at the same time overturns people's living conditions and therefore provokes a newly forming national and ethnic resistance to Europe. (Beck and Grande 2004, 60)

Menasse's recognition continues to apply to the economic underpinnings of unification, but, as Büssgen points out, it calls into question the entire institutional structure as it prevents the intention of transnational interdependence and jeopardizes the peace-keeping function of the European Union (Büssgen 2015, 319). But it is precisely this institutional structure that brings with it the dynamic whereby the heads of state and government elected in the national member states face a conflict between their representation of their national interests and the pan-European interests in Brussels. Menasse shows in detail how, especially in the financial crisis, such nationally determined policies hinder and complicate understanding. That is why, for him, the European Council, in particular, is blocking deep integration and is thus also partly responsible for the financial and economic crisis (Menasse 2012, 37–39). In this sense, it can be stated that the financial crisis is actually

a crisis of the institutions of the European Union, and ultimately, according to Menasse, it is a political crisis:

> No, the crisis is of course a political crisis, but it is also not the political crisis of one member state of the EU or some member states, but it is a political crisis of the Union as a whole. It has arisen and grown to this size as a result of the entrenched contradictions in the EU's political-institutional system, and it can only be resolved by further developing the EU's political system, by resolving its internal contradictions. The crisis is clearly the result of the now completely outdated compromises institutionalized in the Union's political constitution: The EU is a bold project for overcoming nationalism and nation-states on this continent, necessarily born of historical experience and already legitimized by its own history as the longest period of peace in Europe. (Menasse 2012, 93)

But when you analyze crises, forecasts and proposals are also expected. Unlike other EU critics, Menasse sees hope in overcoming the crisis. He sets the task for European politics by drawing attention to the historical genesis of the system. "How do you get rid of," Menasse says, "a construction that was originally unavoidable and necessary, and that was meant to be only a temporary one, but that can only be abolished if those involved agree to their own abolition?" (2012, 57). His criticism includes the abolition of the European Council, which should not be interpreted as unfeasible, but rather precisely as the end of the "politics of side effects" (Beck and Grande 2004, 60) and could lead to the social and political peace in Europe. However, Büssgen illuminates that it is very risky for an essayist intellectual without political practice to interpret current political problems. The Belgian scientist sees in this border-crossing-experimental freedom in Adorno's sense "principally over-interpretations" (Adorno 1998, 11).

In any case, it can be stated that Menasse's enlightenment work and crisis analysis show the right way to Europe, in that the nation-state in its historically familiar form should be overcome and replaced in its social ordering function by genuinely European, transnational structures. Ultimately, Menasse's plea is less a plea for a transnational than a plea for a post-national Europe. He proposes "the flight forward" as the only way to preserve democracy and peace in our globalized world:

> With Europe, as it is, the European nation-state loses its democratic legitimacy, but without Europe, it loses the most important pillar of its existence. Inevitably, then, its provinces, ethnic groups, and religious communities, which today are already

everywhere abandoning national solidarities and networking transnationally, will fall over each other. The only way out of the crisis for the nation-state, the only salvation left for its democratic constitution in this situation, is the flight forward, the path already prescribed by the "key provisions" of the Basic Law in Articles 23 and 24 [. . .] into a democratization of the fragmented and pluralized, post-national constitutional regimes with which we will have to live one way or another, for better or for worse, and not only in Europe. (Brunkhorst 2012, 345)

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Xiaorui Du

The Americanization of the Patriarch
A Feminist Critique of Washington Irving's *A History of New York*

As a father figure of American fiction, Washington Irving is seldom friendly to his female characters. His short story "Rip Van Winkle" features a "hen-pecked" (1835a, 235) protagonist who has to wander away from his wife, Dame Van Winkle, in order to be heralded into a new American republic. After waking up from a 20-year-long slumber, gone are both the British monarch and Rip's nagging wife—to his relief. In "The Devil and Tom Walker," the greedy Tom refuses to share the treasure with his equally greedy wife and sees the latter's death as a good thing so that he may satisfy his greed alone. In "The Legend of Sleepy Hollow," before introducing Katrina Van Tassel, Ichabod Crane's lover, Irving comments on Ichabod's turn of fate as follows: "he would have passed a pleasant life of it, despite the Devil and all his works, if his path had not been crossed by a being that causes more perplexity to mortal man than ghosts, goblins, and the whole race of witches put together, and that was—a woman" (1835b, 335). Given such approaches to representing women, a present-day moralist cannot go wrong by calling Irving a sexist, male-chauvinist, misogynist, or simply woman-hater.

Yet his career of denigrating women and "idealizing patriarchy" (Warner 2000, 776) did not start with any of the above short stories. His first major work, *A History of New York from the Beginning of the World to the End of the Dutch Dynasty,* published first in 1808, is not only an earlier but richer source of such ways of characterizing women. Though a book of history in name, it is only rather loosely based on facts. Irving deliberately made it a "good-humored satire" (Irving 1860, 11), allowing him even more freedom to fictionalize his plot and portray his female figures with hostility. The result

is a large book whose story has a frame of real history, some historical figures but mostly made-up details.

To date, scholars who have studied this book focus mainly on its historicity or the lack thereof. For example, *The Knickerbocker Tradition: Washington Irving's New York,* edited by Andrew B. Myers (1974), is an anthology dedicated to exploring topics such as history, politics, religion, and the image of New York in the book. Insko (2008) commends Irving for his efforts in expanding historical writing. Regarding Irving's manifestly discriminatory attitudes towards women and men, Insko mentions the fact that Irving can be a great source of knowledge about "early American conceptions of masculine selfhood" (2008, 607). Scraba (2009) unpacks the strategies that Irving uses in creating a rather rich source of "cultural memory" for New York. McGann (2012) examines how the many elements in Irving's book match, reflect, and satirize real American history. In his essay "Irving's Posterity" (in which *A History of New York* is only fleetingly mentioned), Warner (2000) investigates a related topic but focuses on Irving's reasons for representing women negatively against a societal trend in America that sees the power of patriarchy waning.

Much in the same way, women are denigrated in the book itself, and existing scholarship shows negligence of its gender aspect, which is quite a prominent one—not least because of the simple fact that the knowledgeable and pedantic Diedrich Knickerbocker mentions very few female names in his entire historical account. This study attempts to examine Irving's approach to representing women and find out how such an approach reflects his conception of the patriarch as he undergoes Americanization. To achieve this goal, I will first look at how Knickerbocker builds a patriarchal world with his androcentric narration of the origin of the cosmos and the birth of the Dutch colony in North America. I will then explore women's role in the Dutch colony in comparison with that of the patriarchs. Last, I will analyze how women are scapegoated as the culprits when the Dutch colony falls into the hand of the neighboring English colonies. I will then discuss the significance of the fate of Peter Stuyvesant, the last governor of the Dutch colony, as it relates to the historical background, i.e., when the Dutch colony becomes American territory after being annexed by the "Yankees." I argue that he essentially transitions from a European feudal patriarch, who, embodying the conventional senses of the word, is "a societal elder, has legitimate power over others in the social unit, including other (especially, younger) men, all women and children" (Pilcher and Whelehan 2004, 93), into the American patriarch, who pursues maximal individual freedom and

personal success—both being values that young America chose to uphold as it endeavored to establish itself—while dominating women.

Androcentric Genesis Narrative

A History of New York opens with an account by the author's persona of his experience as the landlord of a hotel accommodating a mysterious lodger, whom he later found out to be Diedrich Knickerbocker. Without knowing the real identity of the lodger, the landlord and his wife find him knowledgeable and philosophical. They thus speculate that he is someone of import. The fact that he leaves the hotel without paying his bill propels the landlord and his wife to open the saddlebags which contain the *History of New York*. Thus begins an account of the *his-story* of the world by Mr. Knickerbocker—Irving's second and more substantial persona in the book—who, while recovering the past of a place from oblivion in a semi-fictional fashion, also promotes an androcentric agenda. He attaches great importance to such an effort by himself as a historian, as he egotistically professes that "cities of themselves, and, in fact, empires of themselves, are nothing without a historian" (Irving 1860, 32), thus granting himself the authority and room to graft his own agenda onto this historiographical project and treating history in the same way as he will treat his women—as an "other" that is not to be represented matter-of-factly but manipulated in one's own ideological preference.

Before presenting his own conjecture on Genesis, the knowledgeable Knickerbockers cites many other myths and theories. In so doing, he also makes sure to infuse misogyny into his interpretation of such myths and theories. In one instance, he describes nature as "Dame Nature, who with the proverbial fickleness of her sex [. . .] seems really to take pleasure in violating all philosophic rules, and jilting the most learned and indefatigable of her adorers" (Irving 1860, 40). His depiction of planet earth assumes a similarly misogynistic voice that seeks to tame and dominate his feminine subject: "But the untoward planet pertinaciously continued her course, notwithstanding that she had reason, philosophy, and a whole university of learned professors opposed to her conduct" (41). The many male professors and philosophers that Knickerbocker cites are his accomplices in injecting an androcentric undertone into the Genesis stories. In another instance, he invokes the ridiculous theory of Hutton who believes water was omnipresent on the planet and that the earth will eventually dissolve into the water again and considers this theory superior to the other two that involve a "tender-hearted damsel of antiquity [and] the dame of Narbonne in France" (47).

By having only males in command of the accounting for Genesis and having the feminine roles either tamed or excluded, Mr. Knickerbocker demonstrates an insistence to remodel the world according to his own androcentric vision.

Such an insistence also applies in his speculation on how America was first discovered and inhabited. He mentions the likes of the biblical Noah, Christopher Columbus, the Canaanites as the possible discoverers of America and describes them as "a variety of fathers" (Irving 1860, 65) as if America has no "mothers." Despite being essential as mothers, wives, and sisters of the males, women are clearly forbidden from assuming the mantles of "first discoverers" and "founders" of America. They are but tools that the enterprising patriarchs use to discover, found, and conquer America, which itself "is female" (Fetterly 1978, xiii), an object only to be passively "discovered" and "founded" by males in their androcentric agenda. In fact, not only "nature" and "America" are designated with womanhood, but also the ship—a tool par excellence—is also construed as feminine, which is why the "illustrious adventurer set sail was called the Goede Vrouw or good woman" (Irving 1860, 95). This name would not sound very unfamiliar to someone used to hearing actual ship names such as "Arbella"—the real ship that some English settlers sailed in in 1630.

Despite such an emphatic suppression and negligence of women, Knickerbocker, the narrator, is not an entirely callous historian. Though only implicitly, he expresses empathy for the native "savages" killed by European settlers by mocking the preposterousness with which the Europeans that came to America saw its natives: "the two-legged race of animals [. . .] cannibals, detestable monsters, [. . .] giants [and] outlaws" (Irving 1860, 68). Yet the fact that he has empathy for the natives but singles out women as the demographic group that is unworthy of his tender feelings only reinforces how strong and deep-rooted his misogynist proclivity is.

Women in a Patriarchal World

In the preamble to Diedrich Knickerbocker's narration, Irving makes it clear that his approach to recounting the history of the New York Dutch colony is by characterizing the colony as patriarchy. Narrating its history, therefore, comes disproportionately down to reporting the discovery of the place by Henry Hudson, the reigns of Wouter Van Twiller, William Kieft, and Peter Stuyvesant in the colony. Such "days of the Patriarchs" are considered "good old times" (Irving 1860, 29) that compare favorably with the alleged degeneration of the author's own times. To serve this view, Diedrich

Knickerbocker romanticizes the founding of the colony into an immediate success, so much so that there is no mention of the usual hardships that would plague the first colonial settlers. The village Communipaw, for instance, is able to quickly develop into an idyllic paradise. The narrator does not hesitate to attribute its success to its preservation of the European patriarchal traditions:

> Communipaw, in short, is one of the numerous little villages in the vicinity of this most beautiful of cities, which are so many strongholds and fastnesses whither the primitive manners of our Dutch forefathers have retreated, and where they are cherished with devout and scrupulous strictness. The dress of the original settlers is handed down inviolate from father to son—the identical broad-brimmed hat, broad-skirted coat, and broad-bottomed breeches continue from generation to generation; and several gigantic knee-buckles of massy silver are still in wear that made gallant display in the days of the patriarchs of Communipaw. (100)

While preserving the tradition of its place of origin certainly helps the settler society organize itself and protect itself from threats internal and external, it also perpetuates an unjust gender order where men clearly dominate women. Women—none of whom is important enough as to merit a name in the eyes of the narrator—are essentialized as the "fairer sex," the "gentle sex," "lass," "maiden," "old wives," "housewives," "fair dames," "beauteous damsels," "strapping wenches," "buxom lasses" and "young vrouws," as if their entire existence must hinge on their comparison with and relations to men.

To be sure, women are not seen as entirely unworthy, but their worth is purely in the domestic realm when they are subservient to their husbands and confined to their traditional roles. Therefore, during "the honest days in which every woman stayed at home, read the Bible" (Irving 1860, 173) and "every dutiful wife through Amsterdam made a point of enriching her husband with at least one child a year" (163), Davis and Anthias classify women's roles in a nation-building process into four categories: "active participants in the nationalist struggles for liberation; as mothers, the biological producers of subjects and national populations [. . .] upholders of the boundaries of nations [. . .] teachers and transmitters of national culture; and as signifiers of nations" (qtd. in Weinbaum 2007, 169). In the building of the Dutch colony, women's roles are obviously restricted only to the second and most primitive category. Thus the best of them are—if older—housebound and—if younger— "radiant as a sunflower, and luxuriant as a full-blown cabbage" (Irving 1860, 174), suggesting a disproportionately biological existence. The men, who

monopolize power in patriarchy, are reactionary to any changes, especially those that may threaten their dominance, dismissing them as "barbarous innovations" (100). Therefore, "like wise men and sound philosophers, they never look beyond their pipes [. . .] so that they live in a profound and enviable ignorance of all the troubles, anxieties, and revolutions of this distracted planet" (99).

Given the book's satirical nature, Irving would use Knickerbocker's voice to mock men as he does women. Yet such ostentatious impartiality serves to widen the gender gap in men's favor. All the patriarchs, for instance, have undesirable traits or are given to absurd conduct: Oloffe Van Kortlandt was thus prone to daydreaming, Wouter Van Twiller to nonsensical judgment, William Kieft to irritability, and Peter Stuyvesant to obstinacy. Yet they are seen as individuals with flaws, which amplifies their humanity. Women, on the other hand, are conceived as a group that is plagued with intrinsic defects that render them ineligible to function outside their biological and domestic roles. However, the narrator apparently posits that the inferiority and submissiveness of women are exactly what makes the Dutch colony a success. And as shall be seen, behaviors that threaten to undermine the power relation will accordingly be considered as a threat to the very existence of the colony.

Scapegoating Women for the Fall

As is the case in real history, the Dutch colony was later threatened and eventually annexed by the more powerful Englishmen—or "the Yankees"— living close to them. However, the threat posed by the English was made manifest less through the depictions of their military might or military aggression than through the degeneracy of the Dutch colony and the "corruptive" influence of the English on the Dutch society against which the Dutch women are portrayed to have particularly little immunity.

Despite not being in a position of power, women are seen as the most obvious embodiments of the symptoms of the Dutch colony's degeneracy when it happens. Knickerbocker thus complains about how few and short women's petticoats are—to such a degree that Peter Stuyvesant has to use his power as governor to offer recommendations on how such fashion may be rectified. While the Dutch women are never officially acknowledged to play the aforementioned role of the "upholders of the boundary of the nation" as categorized by Yuval Davis and Anthias when the Dutch boundary is overstepped by the English, they are immediately scapegoated for not living

up to the role. Therefore, the Dutch women are depicted to harbor neither will nor power to defend against intruding Englishmen, allowing them to quickly attract "the light affections of the simple damsels from their ponderous Dutch gallants" (Irving 1860, 198). Young Dutch women, "with that eager passion for novelty and foreign fashions natural to their sex" (198), even take on the English courting practice of bundling, in which the male and female sleep together fully dressed before getting married. This novel change, the narrator suspects, contributes to the population increase.

Women are also portrayed as the indirect cause for the Dutch colony's failure to rise to the challenge posed by the English. As the governor of the colony, William Kieft responds in a confoundingly inept way too early English aggression by making a proclamation, which is explained away by his submission to "petticoat government" (Irving 1860, 216), that is, government by his wife, who, "in governing the governor, governed the province" (224). Such a government is satirized by the narrator as has been "neither laid down in Aristotle or Plato [. . .] of the nature of pure, unmixed tyranny" (216), suggesting a "government" by women is a dangerous anomaly that ought to be avoided at all cost.

Last, women are also scapegoated to be ominous signs of the eventual fall of the colony. Governor Stuyvesant's effort to regulate women's fashion proves to be a failure, leaving women to "wear their petticoats, and cut their capers as high as they pleased" (Irving 1860, 407). His inability to control women is hinted by the narrator to portend a disaster for New Amsterdam, as immediately after relating this incident, Knickerbocker presents a metaphorical description of the suddenly changing weather in New Amsterdam: "It was, however, but a bit of blue sky in a stormy day; the clouds are again gathering up from all points of the compass, and, if I am not mistaken in my forebodings, we shall have rattling weather in the ensuing chapters" (408). The change in women's fashion is equated to the changing weather, both harbingers of the disaster to come: the final invasion and takeover of the English.

Patriarch Americanized

The ill-prepared Dutchmen prove to be no match for the English invaders, who annex the territory but leave them to manage their daily affairs and "retain peaceful possession of his house, his vrouw, and his cabbage-garden" (Irving 1860, 454). The Dutch colony thus comes to an end—and with it Peter Stuyvesant's feudal and patriarchal rule. Being conquered by the

"Yankees" hints at the Americanization of this European colony. The real American republic was to be founded only a century from this moment, but for Peter Stuyvesant, his abdication from governorship already weans him off his identity as a European patriarch and transitions him into an American patriarch. Whereas the European patriarchs have been described as "in a manner, absolute despots in their little domains, lording it, if so disposed, over both law and gospel, and accountable to none but their mother countries" (154), the American patriarch, as now exemplified by the deposed Peter Stuyvesant, is a private one, who "in his domestic empire maintained strict discipline, and a well-organized despotic government" (462). As for an individual, his relationship with the government is a contentious yet distant one, as the British government, which Peter Stuyvesant abhors, has granted the Dutch colony autonomy much as the Americans did during the independence movement. While holding on to power within the family, he also finds "that tranquility of mind which he had never known amid the distracting cares of government" (460), suggesting his rather successful transformation from a European feudal patriarch to an American private patriarch. What has not changed is his hostility toward women: "Even in this extremity he still displayed the unconquerable spirit of Peter the Headstrong; holding out to the last gasp, with inflexible obstinacy, against a whole army of old women" (464). Such antagonism is also shared by Irving's later protagonists such as Rip Van Winkle. America to these patriarchs is the land of maximal freedom—not only from a tyrannical government but also from domestic duty. As the embodiment of domestic duty, women in the eyes of the American patriarchs are naturally seen as the impediment to their pursuit of maximal freedom.

Irving's conception of the American patriarch finds even stronger expression in the two narrators of the book, to whom Peter Stuyvesant is a predecessor: the pseudo-named Seth Handaside, the author's alter-ego in the opening account, is one of them. He is the landlord of the "Independent Columbian Hotel"—a metaphor for the American republic, and he constantly feels compelled to express his disdain towards his wife, representing her as shrewd, intrusive, impatient, and snobbish. Their mysterious lodger, the free-wheeling historian Knickerbocker himself is another, perhaps fuller American patriarch. He is the only one of the three American patriarchs who gets to do away with a wife—the American patriarch's impediment to maximal freedom. As someone "seeking for immortality" (Irving 1860, 18), he manages to accomplish this pursuit by bestowing the world a "treasure" he boasts of, that is, *A History of New York*. With such a success and the

"various honors and distinctions, together with an exuberant eulogium" (26) that ensue, Diedrich Knickerbocker qualifies for a member of "natural aristocracy," a distinctive American product that Thomas Jefferson defines as based on "virtue and talents" (1813), which the despotic and inept Dutch colonial rulers clearly lack. However, one cannot help but notice that much as Diedrich Knickerbocker embodies such an ideal, his failure to pay for his lodging to the landlady reveals a troubled relationship with women and Irving's difficulty in accommodating women in his vision for the American life.

Conclusion

Readers of *A History of New York* should be mindful of the book's year of publication. It was a time when America had only recently become independent as a republic amid a sea of monarchies in Europe. To legitimize its existence required Americans not only to build a strong and self-reliant nation but also to create a culture that went along with its republicanism and "natural aristocracy." America was a frequent object of ridicule by Europeans. One anonymous Englishman's harsh words were particularly poignant: the Americans have "no national literature and no learned men" (qtd. in Melvin 1983). Irving's efforts in literary creation provided a forceful response to such ridicules. *A History of New York* exemplifies this response by not only blending history and fiction but also giving expression to the American man that had come to supplant the European man in the New World. This American man is a patriarch perhaps by intention because being an ordinary male is not enough—he has to be despotic, independent, libertarian, and accomplished as the combination of Peter Stuyvesant, Seth Handaside and Diedrich Knickerbocker comes across to be. In Irving's effort to elevate the American man, the American woman—the immediate object of the former's projection of his inferiority complex—becomes the unfortunate collateral damage.

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CHRISTINA CHEVEREŞAN

Divisiveness Within
The Jew as a Dispute in Philip Roth's *Operation Shylock: A Confession*

1. Introduction

Philip Roth's 1993 experimental journey into impersonation and pseudo-self-reflection(s) stands out as a creative exploration of the deep structure and (dis)order of Jewishness, outside the framework which had, by then, become familiar to the author's devoted readers: that of post-Holocaust American Jewry and its flirtations with or detachments from its traditional and, oftentimes, mythical, rather than literal, tangible roots. Disputes about the true essence of Jewishness and what being a proper, authentic, valid(ated) Jew might mean to both individuals and communities are taken one step further in *Operation Shylock*, as the debate is, even geographically, re-/dis-located to Israel.

The protagonist, who bears the name of Philip Roth, is put in a position to meet in person his abusive double, jocularly nicknamed Moishe Pipik. The main character's allegedly autobiographical narrative is abruptly interrupted once he finds out, from several sources, that in Jerusalem, somebody has usurped his name and writer status to make public appearances and advocate for Diasporism as the only acceptable practical solution to the ongoing Jewish problem. As such, the imposter seeks to reestablish a presumably ancestral order, militating for the organized return of exiled Jews from Israel to their European countries of origin.

Surprisingly to some, yet understandably to others, the aforementioned rhetoric finds quite a number of adepts besides the fervent initiator. Its core arguments may be found in passages such as the following, which appears early in the novel, but reverberates throughout, finding numerous echoes:

> In the aftermath of the Holocaust, Israel was the Jewish hospital in which Jews could begin to recover from the devastation of that horror, from a dehumanization so terrible that it would not have been at all surprising had the Jewish spirit, had the

Jews themselves, succumbed entirely to that legacy of rage, humiliation and grief. But that is not what happened. Our recovery actually came to pass. In less than a century. Miraculous, more than miraculous—yet the recovery of the Jews is by now a fact, and the time has come to return to our real life and our real home, to our ancestral Jewish Europe. (Roth 2000, 28)

Such radical statements—allegedly belonging to "the author of *Portnoy et son complexe*" (Roth 2000, 31)—directly or indirectly target a strategic, geopolitical, and cultural remapping of the world at the end of the 20th century, and are not at all uncommon in *Operation Shylock*. The dissonant voices featured in the novel all hold strong beliefs and act accordingly. Therefore, the cast of characters is distributed as comprehensively as possible, to represent a host of particular communities and ideological trends. American and/vs. European and/vs. Israeli Jews, Diaspora vs. Homeland, Israeli vs. Arab: such dichotomous, if not multiple confrontations are at the heart of Roth's effort to integrate and echo versions and perceptions of his ever-announced, never renounced "Jewish mischief."

2. What Is Fair and to Whom?

While, in *Operation Shylock*, fact and fiction are interspersed on purpose, to allow for both plausibility and invention, the real-life situations and preoccupations that Philip's journey to Israel echoes are easily discernible and all the more disturbing. The text, the metatext, and the context equally contribute to the reader's own, free assessment of and positioning towards certain types of attitudes. However, the gist of the matter lies in the inherent tensions that surround the state of Israel: its creation, history, demands, and retributions. In this respect, the more aggressive and stubborn the expressed points of view are, the higher the degree of verisimilitude of a burdensome and heavy inter- and trans-continental atmosphere appears to be. Legitimacy and power rank among the topics cleverly embedded between the lines, particularly as it is not only representatives of various Jewish groups who get a voice, but also the radical alterity, embodied by the likes of George Ziad.

Former colleague of Philip's at the U.S. college they both graduated from, Ziad has returned to his Palestinian homeland to find it endangered, if not altogether shattered, by perpetual conflict with the State of Israel. The educated, Westernized Arab's perspective is meant to complicate things even further in the novel and to expose aspects that the Jewish community, disunited as it may be (and, as such, subject to analysis in many of Roth's

highly criticized works), may be reluctant to address. Thus, one must point out Roth's daring foregrounding of a matter that goes beyond ethnicity, community, ownership, or territory: that of history and/vs. humanity.

It is not seldom that the question of (in)humane treatments and behaviors surfaces in *Operation Shylock*. While the looming ghost of the Holocaust and its inherent mixture of horror, denial, guilt, and capitalization of grief is ubiquitous, Roth employs his cast of non-Jewish characters to bring to the fore other situations in which tension might border on cruelty, dehumanization, and sheer viciousness. Thus, as pointed out by close readings such as Andrew Furman's, the invoked scenes of trials against Palestinians, judged in all-Jewish courtrooms by an all-Jewish cast of public servants, or the feelings of Israeli soldiers, who often find themselves caught between their allegiance to the State of Israel and their disapproval of its violent practices against whoever might be considered an enemy are meant to emphasize the constant ethical battles that govern a territory of conflict and rupture, rather than harmony, peaceful coexistence, and mutual understanding.

On the one hand, as an anecdotal rabbi-figure might likely point out, each of the featured voices is right, truthful, and entitled in his or her own value system. Moreover, paradoxically, all their discourses are as full of passion and devotion to certain idea(l)s as they are persuasive and cleverly anchored in carefully-designed realities. What Roth, however, challenges and exposes is the deeply biased nature of the perception and representation of reality, via rhetoric and action alike, and the composite picture that, inevitably, results. As Sylvia Barack Fishman points out,

> Operation Shylock suggests that the Palestinian has become in some ways the double of the Jew. Roth's empathetic skill in rendering these parallels deceives at least one critic, Harold Bloom, into seeing Israel-hater Ziad as the book's most sympathetic character (35). On the contrary, in the context of the plot as a mystery quest for Jewish identity, protagonist Philip Roth says he listens to anti-Israeli diatribes "with cold-hearted fascination," as if he were "a well-placed spy" (129)— which he later becomes. He understands exactly how Ziad and men like him feel, exactly what they are experiencing, but he knows them to be in opposition to Israel's welfare and survival. Despite his sympathy and his awareness of the ways in which their experience mirrors his own, he is a partisan to the Israeli cause. (1997)

As can be deduced, the entire series of doublings, mirrorings, impostorships, and impersonations that spins the plot of the novel illustrates, in fact, the author's own postmodern, fragmented meditation on the mechanisms of socio-

historical responsibility and justification, as well as on the interconnectedness and sinuous patterns of affection and affliction among communities of alternative victims and perpetrators. As presented by an entire series of voices, those roles have been either interchangeable, or consistently modified and redefined by the tidal waves of historical crisis and response, as well as by individual and, more prominently, communal attitudes. The controversial Mossad agent, Smilesburger, who tries to recruit Philip for an operation ("Shylock"), is enough of an antagonist already to afford an inconvenient warning regarding the persistence of the ubiquitous, and apparently insoluble, Jewish doom:

> The Jew's lack of love for his fellow Jew [. . .] is the cause of much suffering among our people. The animosity, the ridicule, the sheer hatred of one Jew for another— why? Where is our forbearance and forgiveness of our neighbor? Why is there such divisiveness among Jews? [. . .] Angry disputes, verbal abuse, malicious backbiting, mocking gossip, scoffing, faultfinding, complaining, condemning, insulting [. . .] Part of the Jewish problem is that the voice is too loud. Too insistent. Too aggressive. No matter what he says or how he says it, it's inappropriate. (Roth 2000, 207)

Such inquisitive, scathing passages demonstrate the fact that part of what has been considered by some the inappropriateness of the novel resides in the unapologetic unmaskings it provides. It pushes boundaries and throws audiences out of their comfort zones, forcing them to think along with every single interlocutor and to incessantly shift sympathies and empathies, while attempting to analyze and form an objective, detached opinion.

3. Inherent Vices: Ambivalence, Parallelism, Hybridity

The experimental narrative is the product of a kaleidoscope of conflicting states of mind and affairs. What seem to be the characters' sometimes exaggerated outbursts are, in fact, expressions of everlasting clichés and concerns that revolve around and roll out of the multiple discourses of Jewishness. Hatred, envy, jealousy, loss, (self)-projection, (self)-denial are part of the essentially infested atmosphere, heavy with burdens and accusations, that Roth strives to capture and render ominously transparent.

Fishman aptly comments upon the parallelisms that shrewdly underlie the apparently disparaged plotlines:

Underlying the clever games with mirrors is Roth's warning that many qualities which Jews and non-Jews alike may prize in the Diaspora Jewish personality are based on vulnerability to the ever-present reality of antisemitism. [. . .] While Jews may argue among themselves about "who is a Jew" and endlessly examine their splintered identities, Roth suggests that one of the primary defining factors of Jewishness are the boundaries provided by antisemitism, embodied on two historical sides by the European antisemites who participated in the Holocaust and by those among the Arab population who would happily do away with the Jewish State. Roth suggests that complicating the enmity of the relationship between Jews and the persons who hate them are the emotional and symbolic elements that connect them. He indicates that European antisemites hated the Jews with an implacable hatred partially because they envied them and partially because they projected onto the Jewish personality everything they hated about and wished to eradicate from themselves. *Operation Shylock* indicates that some Palestinians, on the other hand, hate the Jews of the Jewish State because they see the parallels between the now stateless Palestinians and the once stateless Jews, and they believe that Palestinians have been turned into the Jews of the Middle East and made to suffer for the deeds of European Christianity. (1997)

This minute, engaging and insightful commentary points at both the seriousness and the intricacy of a book that daringly testifies to the irony and (vicious) circularity of history, functioning as a cautionary tale against obtuseness, intolerance, narrow-mindedness, and self-centeredness. If, on the one hand, each of the characters who get a voice in *Operation Shylock* does have a plausible version, solidly grounded in his or her understanding of events and circumstances, a comprehensive dialogue between all of them appears impossible, as fragments of discussion are disparaged, while militantism and propaganda replace effective communication. As if placed in the tower of a panopticon, the fictional Philip observes the restlessness in a world that still insists on searching for (chrono)logical order where explanations for human and political behavior have been increasingly abolished.

One of the novel's major concerns, thus, goes beyond definitions and reconfigurations of the belligerent (Jewish) self, into the greater philosophical realm of ontological mechanisms. By setting in motion an entire theater of shadow-selves, Roth essentially questions the validity of traditional understandings of human action, reaction, and, even more importantly, interaction. The perverse twists and turns of recent history are

put into perspective, as pointed out in Roberto Farneti's "The Horror of Self-Reflection":

> The confession given in *Operation Shylock*, a confession about the vacuity of one's motivational stance, is a radical form of reflection that shows that the reasons given in order to defend one's status as "animal rationale" are mere rationalizations. The perpetrators maintained that their actions were driven by "causes, clear answers," whereas here there are no causes, no reasons. In *Operation Shylock* Roth addresses the perpetrators by exposing their epistemic attitude towards themselves: "causeless events don't exist in your universe" (Roth 1993: 79). But causeless events do actually exist and become visible once we abandon our Aristotelian world-view to enter a universe cleared of the language of agency, autonomy and responsibility by which we describe our normative outlook. (2008, 11)

Indeed, at a closer look, what the novel's allegedly fantastic construction and experimental plot emphasize is the fact that defining the Jewish self necessarily equals accepting plurality, the simultaneous coexistence of parallel lives, and multiple features. Moreover, this concerns not just an ethnic, cultural, religious community and its elusive "identity." It rather encompasses the entirety of the postmodern condition, challenging conservative understandings of fixedness and rigid determination. Roth's world, as depicted in *Operation Shylock*, allows for reconsideration and transformation, alongside the randomness and entropy that often govern decisions and trajectories: "An ordinary person who purely by accident gets caught in historical struggle. A life annotated by history in the last place you expect history to intervene. The cruise. Nothing could be safe [. . .] In neutral territory, the protected trip. *But there is no neutral territory*" (Roth 2000, 204).

This rather marginal description in the novel could metaphorically expand to capture the struggle of almost every character, as they are all shaped and determined by the mood swings of a history which rules out neutrality and mutual understanding. That is the essential tragedy that Roth pins down in this controversial writing: humanity's blindness to change and difference, its stubborn opaqueness to individuality, in favor of mass judgments and collective expectations, its lack of nuances. What the reader witnesses is an example of how art does, in fact, parallel life in the way in which the apparently pretentious, multilayered text reflects the problematic, split psyche that Jewish writing has been examining and attempting to faithfully portray for ages.

If this seems confusing to you, dear reader, suggests Roth, think of how strange it is that multiple realities permeate the very air we breathe. Realities multiply horizontally and vertically. That is, people and societies can have simultaneous double lives, as spies do and as authors do, or they can experience a variety of different existences sequentially, as did both the perpetrators and the victims of the Holocaust, who moved from a nightmare existence into seemingly ordinary American daylight. As Moishe Pipik watches Philip Roth watching Demjanjuk and his accusers, it becomes clear that the realities of Jews are especially strange. The name "Jew" is used for different types of people: American Jews and European Jews and Sephardi Jews and Israeli Jews and the grotesque image of Jews who inspired the character of Shylock are all called by the name "Jew." What is even stranger, Roth insists, all persons—especially persons who are authors and/or Jews—actually contain a number of different people. Just as an author contains and creates a whole world of characters, each of whom reflects something of him but none of whom is identical with him, the Jewish people include many disparate individuals and disparate societies as well. Each Jewish psyche is splintered into a plethora of oppositional identities, asserts Roth in *Operation Shylock*. The Jewish people war amongst themselves as to how Jewishness is defined because each Jew comprises numerous Jews. (Fishman 1997, 145)

4. Split and Simultaneity

Seen through such a lens, Roth's ingenious pretext of sending his alter-ego protagonist to Israel to meet his impersonator and meditate upon writing, discourse, and Jewishness alike becomes easier to decipher. Just as Philip and his fabricated double coexist to the point of coalescing, at least from the misled public opinion's point of view, this fictional duo itself, alongside other (reversed) mirror-images, is made "real" by the imagination of its creator, wherein it is born. Roth purposely resorts to juggling with the doppelganger motif, which has made an entire career in world literature, particularly in the Central and Eastern European areas that provided both inspiration and awareness for himself as an author, while he was growing increasingly attached to and cognizant of the depths and meanders of Jewish consciousness and evolution across continents.

By investing his homonymous alter ego with recognizable elements from his own biographical trajectory, he sets the ground for a farcical exploration of the self, which grows evidently bigger and more intriguing than a mere journey into the author's privacy. Much like Roth after surgery, under the influence of painkillers and sleeping pills, the protagonist is even more

vulnerable to deceit and likely to stagger hesitantly between reality and hallucination, fact and fabrication. Moreover, he is in a position to constantly question, challenge, second-guess, de-/re-construct stories, as he has a clinical, post-surgery condition that includes psycho-analyzable alternations between awakeness and dreaming. He notes: "The imposturing other whose inexplicable antics I had been warned about by Apter and Aharon and whose voice I'd heard with my own ears was a specter created out of my fear of mentally coming apart while abroad and on my own for the first time since recovering—a nightmare about the return of a usurping self altogether beyond my control" (Roth 2000, 20).

The driving force of the novel and the mechanism of its psychological and philosophical construction become clearer upon catching such relevant glimpses into creativity and fictionalization as art, refuge, and plunge into the abyss. More attuned to his times and their underlying issues than his provocative aloofness might have sometimes indicated,

> Roth thus creates a multifaceted "hybrid" fiction that shows what Linda Hutcheon describes as the "mixed, plural, and contradictory nature of the postmodern enterprise" [. . .] The opening passage of the novel calls attention to the fact that Roth creates his comic vision by exploring ramifications of the double. He calls attention to the double as a literary theme by having the narrator (Philip Roth) allude to Dostoevsky's *The Double* and Gogol's *The Nose* [. . .] Psychological commentaries on the double, or the "Delusional Misidentification Syndrome Involving the Self," taken from case studies of primarily psychotic persons, show the following: the double usually is a projection of the person's own unacceptable desires; the double is seen by no one other than this person; and the person usually becomes paranoid as the double acts out his/her unconscious desires. (Safer 1996, 162)

It is, therefore, against this background of absolution due to an alleged lack of personal responsibility that the disturbing speeches and interactions of the novel can, legitimately, unfold undeterred. Everything that might be otherwise repressed, unacceptable, uncomfortable under regular circumstances becomes justifiable as soon as liability is transferred to the very similar, yet altogether different other. This interplay of transfer and appropriation is essential to Roth's investigation of and headlong plunge into irrationality. The "confession" may be seen at once as candid and/or forged, depending on its content.

If Philip, the disconcerted impersonee in *Operation Shylock* may be a projection of Roth's own confrontation with inner and outer discourses

and dilemmas of the (Jewish) self, Pipik is designed to illustrate a distorted, bizarre, ultimately biased and diseased, dark side of his American idol and (forced) counterpart. The paradoxical aspect is that this shadow-self and his Diasporic rants are neither completely disingenuous, nor totally divorced from a reality that Roth had personally faced: that of oftentimes exaggerated sensitivities, facile offenses, and accusations of anti-Semitism. As further pointed out by Elaine Safer,

> The duality of ideas posed by the concept of the double is at the center of *Operation Shylock*. On one level, there are the shifting realities of Philip Roth, the fictional author, Pipik, the shadow self, or the other, and the real author Roth. All three represent a quest central to the novel: how does one define the Jewish self? On a broader level, another question raised is how does one define the shifting nature of the existential self, a self that can possibly be a brutal torturer in a prison camp and later be celebrated as a paragon of virtue in a civilized suburban community. (Safer 1996, 165)

It is, therefore, not in the least surprising that interest in the novel goes far beyond the mere conundrum of Jewishness, overwhelming as it may be, and the outrage its depiction has triggered in various types of audiences. What Roth aims at is simultaneously multilayered and ambitious, with a view to the higher realms of decoding human nature and its inherent vices, hypocrisies, subterfuges, and strategies. Alongside the conflicts and complications of private and public relationships branching out into the known and unknown spaces revealed by a transcontinental search for existential "truths," the plural Roth that is reflected in the book's pages does contribute to a larger reflection on cultural identity. It is a meditation on the articulation of self and/vs. other in a globalized universe, which increasingly boasts the effacement of borderlines and the opening of minds. It witnesses multiple exceptions and vicious reminders of segregation, (self)-ghettoization, pigeon-holing, resistance, and aggressiveness towards any form and manifestation of alterity.

5. Projecting the Irrational: Plurality, Polyphony

Once more, the structure of the work parallels its exposure of postmodern multiplicities, illustrating an essential question that seems to repeat itself obsessively: "How could I be both that and this"? (Roth 2000, 41). In his pungent, habitual manner, via his character's voices, Roth throws sarcastic wake-up calls at the naïve onlooker, connecting macro-History with

microhistories. On the one hand, with undisguised reference to the Nazi regime, Roth makes it clear that, even historically speaking, positions are never trenchant and allegiances are never completely clear, politics and humanity being often at loggerheads, while interest and affection may quarrel: "The Germans have proved definitively to all the world that to maintain two radically divergent personalities, one very nice and one not so nice, is no longer the prerogative of psychopaths only" (Roth 2000, 41). On the other hand, in the fictional case of doubling at hand, the first in-person meeting between the "real" Philip Roth and the "fake" Philip Roth offers the "authorized" Philip Roth (i.e., the author) the opportunity to tackle yet another issue:

> You have the Freudian belief in the sovereign power of causality. Causeless events don't exist in your universe. To you things that aren't thinkable in intellectual terms aren't worth thinking about. A lot of smart Jews are like that. Things that aren't thinkable in intellectual terms don't even exist. How can I exist, a duplicate of you? How can you exist, a duplicate of me? You and I defy causal explanation. Well, read Jung on "synchronicity." There are meaningful arrangements that defy causal explanation and they are happening all the time. We are a case of synchronicity, synchronistic phenomena. Read a little Jung, Philip, if only for your peace of mind. "The uncontrollability of real things"—Carl Jung knows all about it. (Roth 2000, 52)

Such passages are not only meant to distinguish between the radically different persons and personas that Philip Roth masterfully creates and analyzes in the novel, but also to raise awareness of the cultural and ontological shifts of the late 20th-century paradigms. Center and margins are no longer clear-cut entities, therefore power-relations and the ensuing hierarchies prove shattered, reshuffled, and relativized. Much of the quarrel on the nature and essence of Jewishness itself is annihilated by the realization that supremacy, exclusiveness, and fierce competition may no longer be the immovable rules of the game, that polyphony and inclusiveness might provide better solutions to ancestral problems. The necessary change of approach that Roth pleads for is somewhat anticipated in the fragments from the Appelfeld interviews, wherein the latter states: "I didn't understand, nor do I yet understand, the motives of the murderers. I was a victim, and I try to understand the victim" (Roth 2000, 55).

It is this renunciation of the sometimes futile establishment of causality, guilt, and retribution in favor of identification with and thorough internalization of the emotional struggles of various sides which appears

to guide a book that uses the convoluted definitions of Jewishness as a pretext for researching the matter of identity as a whole: "If, according to the postmodern metaphysics of identity, there is no essential self, can there be any essence to social or ethnic identity? Or, from the other direction, does the possibility of an irreducible ethnic identity finally undermine the free play of impersonation to which Roth's fiction has been committed?" (Shostak 1997, 739).

6. Cultural Identity: Exposures and (De)Essentializations

Such mental and ethical battles occupy the foreground of the imaginary trip to Israel, as well as shape and steer the inner contradictions of the split self (individual—Philip vs. Pipik, as well as communal—Zionists vs. Diasporists, nationalists vs. assimilationists). As also pointed out by Karen Grumberg, "the conflict between Pipik and Philip pits a Jewish identity against a more universal human self" (2018, 12). Roth's chosen method, that of a tragic-comical, playful, yet serious critique of rationality as an efficient way of comprehending and solving contemporary issues, is meant to convey socio-cultural distress and unease, by putting them in contexts of representation which might strike a familiar chord with readers of all geographical, ethnic, ideological extractions. By resorting to farce and the collage techniques of mixing fact and fiction, Roth manages to be at once polemical and political, under the clever guise of delusion, confusion, paranoia, and to ask "troubling questions about the definition of a Jewish identity and the responsibilities of the Jews—American and Israeli" (Safer 1996, 158).

"If it weren't that Israel was Jewish, would not the same American Jewish liberals who are so identified with its well-being, would they not condemn it as harshly as South Africa for how it treats its Arab population?" (Roth 2000, 90). Kamil's insinuation and Philip's reaction to his even harsher comparisons with Nazi Germany are as hard to digest, as the tension is difficult to fully understand or navigate in the novel. Nevertheless, parallelisms and quasi-mythical representations of communal identity are part of the highly subjective web of cultural constructs that both writer and reader must operate with. While, in one of the aforementioned passages, the versatility of the Germans was brought to the fore as an example of "synchronicity," in another passage it is the Arab tradition that is equated with "dissimulation":

> Perfectly natural in both roles at the same time [. . .] Doctrinally speaking, dissimulation is part of Islamic culture, and the permission to dissimulate is

widespread. [. . .] People say one thing, adopt a public position, and are then quite different on the inside and privately act in a totally different way. They have an expression for this: "the shifting sands." (Roth 2000, 92)

The Jewish lawyer's discourse is yet another example of stereotyping that Roth includes in his complex take on identity politics and the fluidity of community-assigned roles. Via ideological discourses taken to the extremes, Roth manages to express skepticism as to the glorification of essentializing, communal selves that prove, in fact, multi-faceted and perpetually shifting. This alignment of paradoxes dominates the novel, proving as disconcerting to the impersonated protagonist as it may be to the reader. From mental lability and anxiety to revolt, rebellion, and hyper-subjectivity, from elitism, intellectualism, rhetorical sophistication to propaganda and religious fanaticism, from estrangement and lamentation to denunciations of egocentrism, xenophobia, rampant violence or ethnic fantasies, there is little, if anything, that Philip Roth avoids to put his finger on in his story of "The Uncontrollability of Real Things."

7. Conclusion: On the Futility of Conflicts

Debra Shostak's 1997 article for *Contemporary Literature* aptly summarizes Roth's game of mirrors and constructs:

Roth rewrites the myth of return, bringing the reader back around to his central metaphysics. [. . .] Roth's overt answer to the question "What Is a Jew?" is the same answer he gives to "Who Is Philip Roth?": it is all impersonation. [. . .] After all, just how self-hating, alienated, and neurotic is Roth, the quintessential Diaspora Jew, to have written such a testament to the Jewish self? Philip Roth enters identity politics only to urge that identity of any sort is a pipik. (1997, 750)

By literally investing himself in his writing and creating an entire line of alter-egos, simulacra, lies, and deceptions, Philip Roth showcases the limits of (self-)representation and (self-)construction in life and literature alike. At the same time, he succeeds in outraging as well as liberating parts of his readership, to whom he exhibits exemplars of quasi-pathological discourse and rhetoric, easily identifiable in an immediate reality that needs not be necessarily filtered through the lens of Jewishness. Hence, he does achieve his purpose of transforming his topical writing into a challenge to meditation about the human condition and its constant betrayals in general. The novel

foregrounds the futility of various types of conflicts, based on distorted understandings of difference as value assessment: "What comes first [. . .], nationality or Jewish identity? Tell us about your identity crisis" (Roth 2000, 168).

By closely following the meanderings of various characters' psychological and pathological relations with the individual and communal selves and others, he exposes the failure of binary oppositions. Thus, he attempts to engage the reader in a more mature, more responsible, more culturally-aware response to the intricacies of representation and interaction in a global age wherein local, regional, national histories and trajectories are overwritten and conflated. While the ultimate tool is, as many a time, humor, and the end product could be placed under the title suggested in the *Epilogue*, "a subjectivist fable," the final answer is not that identity has vanished altogether, but rather that it is plural, paradoxical and in need of acceptance as such, just as the "Jew" can simultaneously be "worldly negativity. Seductive verbosity. Intellectual venery. The hatred. The lying. The distrust. The this-worldliness. The truthfulness. The intelligence. The malice. The comedy. The endurance. The acting. The injury. The impairment" (Roth 2000, 243).

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Liu Meng

Migratory Memory and Identity of the Diaspora
Chinese Migration to Hungary

Introduction

Starting from the discussion of the economic life of Chinese immigrants in Hungary, the paper discusses the use of memory of migration to and survival in the new environment, the creation of cultural traditions, and the formation of Chinese communities through the construction of hybrid identities. Relying on diaspora theory, I will examine migratory and diasporic memory in the Chinese community in Hungary, to test the usefulness of "diaspora" and "cultural memory" as concepts in the study of the Chinese community.

Chinese Immigration to Hungary

In just over a decade, from the mid-1980s to the late 1990s, waves of ambitious new Chinese immigrants flowed from mainland China to Hungary. The uniqueness of the Chinese immigration in Hungary lies in that it consists mainly of business new immigrants（商业移民）belonging to no traditional communities, unlike the clans, blood relatives, and secret societies that control the American and British Tang communities (Nie and Linda 1993). In other words, the previous flow of immigrants to Western Europe that emerged after the reform and opening up of mainland China was a chain of immigrant networks that began with migrants who settled in Western Europe before WWII and continued to expand. In contrast, contemporary migration to Eastern Europe was spearheaded by a group of people engaged in long-distance trafficking of small goods (e.g., clothing, shoes, hats, toys, textiles, etc.) between China and the Soviet Union, and the initial migration was dominated by people with a strong economic consciousness, most of

whom were engaged in commerce and settled in Eastern Europe. One of the most representative Eastern European immigrant countries is Hungary.

Significant migration to Hungary began in the early 1990s with a change in the political environment. At that time, the social systems of Hungary and Eastern European countries changed one after another, and to escape from the economic crisis, these countries adopted a more flexible policy in attracting foreign investment. Some Chinese who were good at conducting business responded to this message and came to try their fortune in Eastern Europe. But at that time, only Hungary and China had signed a mutual visa-free agreement. Therefore, Hungary naturally became the first target destination for those leaving China. The years 1991-1992 were the peak years for the Chinese to travel to Hungary. Since the implementation of China's reform and opening-up policy in 1978 and especially after China relaxed its rules for approving people leaving the country in 1985, "the number of border crossings into Hungary by Chinese citizens jumped from nearly zero in the mid-1980s to 11,621 in 1990 and 27,330 in 1991" (qtd. in Nyíri 2003, 242). In 1991, the Hungarian police issued Hungarian "blue cards" (Permanent Residence Permit) to 398 holders of People's Republic of China citizenship, and another 5,000 Chinese received "yellow cards" (Temporary Residence Permit) (Nyíri 1998, 355). From 1989 to the beginning of 1992, within a short period of two or three years, Hungary was home to at least 30,000 Chinese (Li 2002, 553). Later, Hungary and China resumed the visa system. Coupled with the Hungarian government's relatively harsh economic policies toward the Chinese, Chinese immigration began to decline. The Chinese in Hungary can be said to come from all over China, but especially the Zhejiangese and Fujianese are more numerous. Among them, there are quite a few people with university degrees. They are engaged in a narrow range of occupations with the majority of them being in business, except for a very small number of people who run newspapers, accounting firms, and medical practices.

Memories of Conducting Business: From the Snakeskin Bag to the Container

Already in the early days of Chinese merchants starting to do business in Hungary, Chinese people often shared information about business and life, forming a community of the Hungarian Chinese diaspora. Arguably, the Chinese community living in Hungary can be defined as a diaspora. The term diaspora refers to the scattering of people away from the ancestral homeland (Cohen 1997, 10). Robin Cohen further argues that

Though often conceived in terms of a catastrophic dispersion, widening the notion of diaspora to include trade, imperial labor and cultural diasporas can provide a more nuanced understanding of the often positive relationships between migrants' homelands and their places of work and settlement. (2003, 3)

Thus, the term "diaspora" refers to the Chinese community engaged in trade in Hungary and the Chinese immigrant mobility in Hungary in all walks of life as "The new Chinese immigrants who entered Hungary in the early 1990s may have been cadres, students, workers or farmers before they left the country, but after arriving in Hungary, most of them went into business" (Li 2002, 654). By 1997, there were nearly 3,000 other Chinese private enterprises in Hungary. The process shows that private interests have developed rapidly in Hungary.

The Chinese migrants in Budapest constitute a diaspora community. In this community, the sense of community is sustained by various ties, including kinship, trade, and shared culture (Peters 1999, 20). To make a better living, Chinese entrepreneurs in Hungary started as a family unit, using kinship ties and a common cultural background to expand their trade. When the Chinese businessmen first arrived, they found sites in Hungary where they could start their business. They set up stalls to sell small goods at bus stops, subway stations, and next to food markets where there was a lot of traffic. Most of the goods such as essential balm, cool oil, hairpins, headbands, brooches, pearl necklaces, leather jackets, and needlework were brought by train from China through Moscow to Hungary in snakeskin bags. As Lin Muwei, a Chinese restaurant owner in Debrecen, remembers,

In the 90s we went to Hungary together to start a business, almost every three to five months we have to board the west to east train, from China to a dozen or even dozens of snakeskin bags or suitcases, carried to Hungary to set up a stall for sale. It was a hard time, where there was a home, where to sell things, where is home. Later when times were better, I stayed with everyone and rented an apartment in partnership. We worked from dawn to dusk, and in the evenings we would get together to learn the extremely difficult Hungarian language, like a family gathering in the evenings at home. At that time, we were like a big family, we all came from Fujian, our cultural backgrounds were similar, we all spoke the Fujian dialect, even for the winter solstice, whoever made "XI"[1] would share it with each other, and we didn't feel lonely. (2020)

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1   "XI" is a traditional dish for the winter solstice festival in Fujian Province, different from the custom of eating dumplings in most Chinese provinces.

In the process of trade, the memory of the Chinese homeland is a medium of interpretation for the Chinese in Hungary, identifying a common culture in the Chinese community. The Hungarian Chinese diaspora in the 1990s, which carried their "home" with them, implies a sense of belonging and collective identity of the Hungarian diaspora. This sense of belonging and collective identity precipitated in the family in the first place, where the expatriates adhered to the traditional Chinese "family culture," i.e., a family-based economic and cultural structure, representing the family or clan. In traditional Chinese culture, doing well is "glorious to the ancestors," while doing anything wrong may be a disgrace to the "family honor." As "all Chinese culture is built on the concept of family, and the concept of family comes before the concept of humanity" (Liu 1994, 50), the Hungarian Chinese diaspora functioned in the same way. This reflects the fact that the diaspora is settled and active in Hungary, but maintains strong emotional ties with the country of origin (Sheffer 1986,3). William Safran argues that "diaspora" applies to minority communities living outside of their home country, claiming that one of the characteristics of members of these communities is the maintenance of collective consciousness, vision, or shared mythology about the true location and history of their ancestral homeland (1991, 83–99). The "home culture" is here transformed into a collective consciousness, constituting a collective identity that influences the construction of the group's identity.

However, diasporic identities are not fixed, but fluid and changing as they are often "creolized, syncretized, and hybridized" (Gilroy 2000, 122–32). To study the identity of the Hungarian diaspora, it is necessary to examine "identity" in the context of Hungarian society. Even as identity is "socially situated, socially maintained and socially transformed" (Berger 1967, 194). Much in a Heideggerian framework, "Familiarity with the world is the way the world comes into being for the subject, that is, the way the subject encounters and makes sense of the surrounding world through his/her place-world" (Gaál-Szabó 2011, 3). Familiarity is maintained by memory, and memory maintains the coherence and integrity of the self (Grygar 2004, 31). Thus, we must examine social events associated with memory to understand identity—events that are not individually experienced but collectively constructed collective memories (Paez, Basabe, and Gonzalez 1997, 150).

Collective memory is always about a common past associated with a particular group. This commonality and the meaning it holds allows group members to distinguish themselves from other groups and to develop a special affection for the group to which they belong and a sense of solidarity

among its members. Chinese businessmen's stall business was maintained until the end of 1990, and in 1992, when the Hungarian government enforced the centralized management of market places, local Hungarian companies established several places with simple houses, stalls, and venues in Budapest, which they rented to Chinese businessmen. Chinese markets were formed in this way, such as the Four Tigers Market, Copania Market, Shanghai Market, of which Four Tigers Market is the largest and most representative, covering an area of 40,000 square meters. The Four Tigers market marked the beginning of the formation of a sizeable Chinese market. It was located in the 8th district of Budapest, in an open space between a train track and a street. The name derives from the name of the 8th district called "József," which sounds similar to "Four Tigers" in Chinese. The renaming of the "Four Tigers Market" by the Chinese marks the process of inhabitation of the place through tethering it to what is familiar to them. The name was taken over by Hungarians as they simply call it the "Chinese Tiger Market" (Nie 2021).

In the 1990s, the "Four Tigers Market" alone was home to thousands of Chinese merchants and was the largest distribution center for Chinese goods in Hungary. In this marketplace, the business habits of the Chinese in Hungary provide ample evidence of this commonality of the Chinese business community in the past. Stores and markets in European countries usually close from Saturday afternoon and do not open for business until the following Monday. In China, holidays are a good time to do business. Therefore, when a large number of Chinese came to Hungary to do business, they did not follow European customs. Markets such as the "Four Tigers" were naturally open on weekends. Although no one forced a Chinese businessman to do business on holidays, it was as if they did business as usual. Except for a few holidays such as Christmas, the Chinese merchants who sell in the market can be said to be busy all year round. As Yang Liyan confesses,

> Day after day, year after year, we all felt physically and mentally exhausted, but no one wanted to lose a day's turnover, those days were very unforgettable, and now and then I will tell my son about the 90s in Hungary business story, I use this story to remind him of the difficulties of life and to continue to carry forward the fine traditional culture of "hard work" in China. That's how the days go by! (2021).

The habit of hard work is a reproduction of traditional Chinese work habits in a new living environment. The understanding of the self through work and the difference in work habits allow the Chinese business community

to distinguish itself from other groups, inspiring and enhancing the special feelings that the expatriates generate for the group to which they belong and the sense of solidarity among members of the expatriate community with each other.

The entrepreneurial past of the Chinese businessmen in Hungary has come to be crystallized in their desire to repeatedly tell their descendants about their past. They sublimate the group values of diaspora based on which Chinese immigrants could construct their identity. Diaspora in Hungary in the 90s, "the ability to suffer" was mentioned and emphasized by them, and in their words, "That's how the days go by!" These views of "living a good life," refined by the collective memory of the diaspora, have become the common sentiment and value orientation. The experience of engaging in business activities to "settle down" during the migration process has enabled them to develop the ability to "endure hardship," which is one of the elements in the process of their identity construction.

In addition, the Chinese diaspora's life in the 90s of "Hungarian literacy" is also noteworthy. Just like the experience of Lin Muwei, the Chinese community gathered at night to learn the Hungarian language, and this process formed the evaluation index of the community identity of the expatriates. As Yuan Long said, "When I first came to Hungary, I couldn't speak the language, so I used to gesture with my hands and carry an electronic calculator with me when I sold my goods. At that time, to exchange market information, I had to learn Hungarian with a hard head. More than ten years have passed, and now I can speak it quite well" (2020). In the memories of the expatriates, those who could speak Hungarian were more likely to be accepted in the marketplace and to be recognized by the expatriate community.

In the decade, the Chinese businessmen continued to learn and improve, and their business expanded. With the expansion of Chinese business, Chinese businessmen got rid of the snakeskin bag, turning to containers. By the end of 1990, a company named Hua Lun sent the first batch of Chinese small goods to Hungary by air. This company became the first Chinese importer; from then on, the Chinese business began to substitute the lifting box for the container, which is a huge turn in business for the Chinese in Hungary. Since then, the "small commodity container economy" from China to Hungary has developed rapidly. Yuan Long described,

> Now it's all about shipping in containers, but back in the 90s, everyone used boxes or snakeskin bags for their cargo. One of the boxes I used to move goods in those days is still in my house, the box I used when I first set foot on Hungarian territory

with my luggage, and later I bought other boxes and put them together to move goods from China. Now this suitcase is leathery old and broken, but every time I see it reminds me of those years when I started my business. (2021)

The economic shift from the "bag" to the container not only documents the past but also pushes diaspora life toward settlement in the new land. In this process of moving between China and Hungary, memory transcends territorial logic and becomes a catalyst for diasporic identity building and diasporic community building as "Memory, rather than territory, is the principal ground of identity formation in diaspora cultures, where 'territory' is decentered and exploded into multiple settings" (Fortier 2005, 184). Memories generated in the transforming setting in Hungary support the construction of the Chinese diaspora community.

Nostalgic Memories and Identity of the Chinese in Hungary

The life of Chinese expatriates in Hungary has not always been glamorous. Between 1995 and 2000, the Hungarian government imposed a supplementary tariff on imported goods as a unilateral evaluation policy on goods from China to stabilize the economy. The so-called "evaluation" means that regardless of the actual price of the goods, they are all taxed according to the Hungarian customs valuation. In this way, the customs declaration price of a container was roughly between 20,000 and 50,000 U.S. dollars, and even if the cheapest goods were loaded, the customs declaration price of a container was close to 20,000 U.S. dollars. This means that the price of customs clearance increased eight times compared to the previous one. Yang Yongqian believes that this situation was largely of the Chinese's own making. Before the implementation of the "tax assessment" policy, some Hungarian customs officers were taking bribes, and many Chinese people were taking advantage of them to under-declare customs duties. As a result of this widespread phenomenon, the Hungarian customs did not believe in the bill of lading at all, so the "tax estimation" began. On the other hand, Chinese companies risked all the benefits they had gained by understating the tariffs in the competition for a limited market. The market retail price of some textiles was often lower than the domestic retail price (1998). In the long run, this kind of vicious competition led to difficulties in the operation of many Chinese enterprises, and some Chinese faced unemployment and bankruptcy.

Such financial difficulties have left an imprint on Chinese memory. As Lin Muwei, who has lived in Hungary for 15 years, describes,

> Generally speaking, Chinese expatriates living in Hungary usually describe their lives over the phone, including the good education their children receive, and their own work and living environment. Telling their families that they have a car and a house in Hungary, that they have a discretionary income compared to subsistence families in urban China, that they are able to secure spending and travel, and reinforcing the image of the affluent West. Even the children are trilingual in Hungarian, Chinese, and English at the same time. The attraction of such excellent educational resources and environment also becomes a kind of bragging capital. But the truth is that there was a time when I was missing my home country every day and thinking about returning to it every moment due to financial pressure. (Lin 2021)

Despite the mobility and possibilities in Hungary, the ambiguous situation has prompted Chinese people in Hungary to look for a "sense of home" in nostalgia. Svetlana Boym argues that restorative nostalgia manifests itself in attempts to return home, rebuild a home, and fill the memory gap (2010, 4). Nostalgia arises when Chinese people in Hungary try to trace the continuity of their self-identity after experiencing changes in their lives, due to cultural and social differences. Although nostalgia cannot fill the lack in their actual lives, it can salvage the lack emotionally and let people feel a sense of belonging again through remembering. As Yang Liyan says, "I have lived in Hungary for 20 years, and my home in Hungary now is not like my childhood home in China, but my childhood memories of home remind me every time as if my memories of playing at home happened yesterday, which also reminds me of who I am and where I came from" (Yang 2020). Memory and nostalgia are the emotive threads that help weave the way to identity, which often attempts to recreate the fabric of the community of origin in new contexts (Portelli 2016,1–10). Nostalgia is usually not an isolated recollection of the past, but a series of imagery to express oneself. As Lin's account illuminates, the landscape, the food, the joy of childhood, and the warmth of family are all important parts of the narrative. Many Chinese in Hungary decorate their homes with pictures of their hometown, cook hometown-style food, and seek out hometown associations in which they use the dialect of their hometown. These practices can help them build up the courage to live in a foreign country. There are also group Chinese activities to help them adapt to life in Hungary.

These collective Chinese activities are inseparable from the traditional Chinese culture. Each nation has its own unique traditional culture, and the transmission of tradition is inevitably tinged with nostalgia. But in fact, tradition is not a passively accepted content handed down from the past, but reconstruction and reinvention in and based on the present, through which people reproduce their culture and shape their cultural memory and collective identity. Hobsbawm and Ranger argue that such "invented traditions" include both traditions that are invented, constructed, and formalized, and those that emerge in an indistinguishable way in a short, chronologically identifiable period of time (2004, 1). Specifically, these are traditions that enhance communal cohesion or define membership.

One palpable example is offered by the Chinese Lunar New Year ("Kínai Tavaszünnep"). According to the Chinese cultural tradition, the Chinese Lunar New Year is celebrated every year. Since 2017, the festival has been jointly organized by Chinatown and the Hungarian-Chinese Cultural Association in Hungary. For the Chinese community in Hungary, this has become an expected program during the Chinese Lunar New Year period every year. The festival usually lasts 2 to 3 days and consists of a parade, a food exhibition, a display of traditional cultural elements, and several shows. According to the news posted by the Hungarian media xpatloop, in 2019, the cultural festival lasted three days, "The three-day festival features a long list of cultural and entertainment programs, including a panda show, traditional Chinese medicine with free on-site diagnosis and treatment, tea art, kung-fu, costumes (Qipao, Hanfu), musical instruments (Erhu, Guzheng, Waist drum), calligraphy, and drawings" (XpatLoop 2019). The 2020 cultural festival was temporarily canceled due to the epidemic, but according to the news posted on the website earlier, the festival was set up full of traditional Chinese cultural elements, especially the setting off of firecrackers, the parade in traditional Chinese costumes, the hanging of red ribbons on the wishing tree, dragon and lion dances, folk music and musical instruments, folk dances, kung fu, cheongsam, and many other cultural performances, as well as Chinese tea-making and tasting, Chinese food and Chinese calligraphy and painting and paper cutting, Chinese medicine consultation and other programs (XpatLoop 2020). Every year the festival is like a traditional Chinese "temple fair (庙会),"[2] where the Chinese in Hungary actively participate in the biggest annual Chinese festival. The Chinese New Year Festival 2019 had more than 30,000 participants, more than 50

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2   Temple fair (庙会): commonly known as a Chinese rally.

Chinese cultural experiences, more than 500 paintings and calligraphies, more than 900 stage performances, and 300 volunteers, 90 percent of whom were Chinese (XpatLoop 2019). The festival is now an important event in the Chinese New Year celebrations, where Chinese people are physically present and emotionally connected, reinforcing the cultural meaning, and understanding of the Chinese New Year. It offers the possibility to promote and pass on the concept of the homogeneity[3] of family and nation and the best traditional culture.

The Chinese Lunar New Year Festival has become a tradition in the Hungarian Chinese community to celebrate the Chinese New Year, which is a social nostalgia act. In social nostalgia, cultural symbols of the past are often re-adopted. When Chinese people in Hungary talk about traditions, the purpose is not to pursue the meaning of the past, but to emphasize their uniqueness and enhance their sense of identity through them. Their identity can be thought of as the identity that is formed when their cultural collective is defined through the use of shared traditional cultural elements. Similarly to people in China celebrating their traditional Chinese culture, Hungarian Chinese people put up spring scrolls on the eve of New Year's Eve to welcome the Chinese New Year. They write luck briefs on the left and right, glued vertically to the sides of the door. Spring festival scrolls are considered a spiritual symbol to protect families from spiritual harm, and it is an indispensable annual New Year's Eve costume for the Chinese community in Hungary, too. The fifth day of the Chinese New Year is also the birthday of the God of Wealth. On this day, Chinese people eat dumplings because they are shaped like a golden yuan-bao in the hope that the God of Wealth will stop by their house for a while. The God of Wealth is widely worshiped in Taoism and Chinese folk religion. He is typically depicted holding a golden yuan-bao in his hand. The shape of the golden yuan-bao is very unique and represents the highest value during the Chinese Empire.

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3   The idea of homogeneity of family and state originated from the blood kinship in the political system of feudal society in China, "the king, the minister, the father, the son" but with the changes of the times, the connotation of homogeneity of family and state has changed significantly, which reflects more of a collective consciousness and ethical concept, "the small state is everyone." The family here has gone beyond the concept of "family" (family of three) in the general sense, and even extends to the family of blood relatives, the family of friends, the family of the community, the family of the city, and the country as a national community. The values conveyed through the idea of the family and the state as one structure have been the fine traditional virtues that the Chinese people uphold a—family harmony, neighborly harmony, kindness to others, patriotism, etc.

The symbolism behind collective Chinese activities like the Chinese Lunar New Year is of particular importance. Assmann refers to the synthesis of symbolism as a cultural form, arguing that "a cultural identity conforms to, consolidates and, above all, reproduces a cultural form. Through the medium of cultural forms, collective identities are constructed and passed on from generation to generation" (Assmann 2015, 145), partly as the reproduction of cultural forms represent identity negotiation and the protection of the self:

> the intercultural communication act always already entails identity negotiation in a more heightened way, while the outcome of negotiation does not primarily denote reconciliation or harmonization of differences, i.e., identity juxtaposition; but the protection of the cultural self, blending into the dominant culture with some degree of the old cultural self retained, or even the risk of losing identity. (Gaál-Szabó 2018, 175)

The reproduction of cultural identity as part of identity negotiation is further supported by Alfred Grosser, who argues that identity comes from the memories of the past and the traces it leaves in the body and consciousness (2010, 33). Every time memory of traditional Chinese culture is involved in the construction of the identity of the Hungarian Chinese. Thus, individual memories do not only comprise individual memory but also are mixed with collective memory.

Conclusion

Starting from the discussion of the economic life of Chinese immigrants in Hungary, this paper argues that the Chinese community as a diaspora group gains identity through efforts to maintain ties with kinship communities in China as the ancestral country of origin (Tölölyan 2007). As a social construction itself, it has struggled to establish itself as a visible community, while both maintaining Chinese identity and creating a new identity meaningful in Hungary. In this process, there is a collective concern and expression for the well-being of the Chinese ancestral homeland, which plays an important role in the lives of Chinese immigrants both at the symbolic and normative levels (Morawska 2011). The presence of the ancestral homeland is reflected in the memories of Chinese culture. Memory always plays an important role in the formation of identity, and identity is maintained by memory as it "connective function carries over into an interpretative horizon of future events" (Gaál-Szabó 2019, 120). In the process of identity

formation, the memories of the Chinese in Hungary show the colors of Chinese culture, such as the spiritual guidance of "family culture" and the values of "hard work" in life. The Chinese communities "conscientiously seek to retrieve and reproduce some of [the] social practices and cultural icons in order that migrants 'remember' and reconstruct the customary meanings migrants find in their daily lives" (Andrew P. Davidson and Kuah-Pearce Khun Eng 2008, 3). In this process, Chinese Hungarian identity is constantly being shaped in ways that transmit and develop immigrants' attitudes towards life as, for example, in the case of the reproduction of traditional culture in cultural festivals, the display of traditional foods, the performance of traditional customs, etc. while forming new memories. In this paper, we found that the Chinese immigrant experience in Hungary works as a catalyst to form a new identity through oscillating between old and new memories. The openness and fluidity of memory allow Chinese migrants in Hungary to reconceptualize themselves in the present, and memory shapes personal identity and belonging by generating meaning in the process (Davidson 2008,13).

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Bianca Gabriela Palade

Issues of Identity in Cuban American Fiction

The United States of America is often defined as the melting pot of the world, a place where a multitude of ethnicities and cultures meet and coexist. In one of her novels, Cristina García, a Cuban American writer, defines the peculiar type of exile that is Cuba—only one flight away from Miami, and yet seemingly part of a different world: "Cuba is a peculiar exile, I think, an island-colony. We can reach it by a thirty-minute charter flight from Miami, yet never reach it at all" (Garcia 1993, 219). Cuban Americans have been migrating to the United States during several exoduses, ever since the Cuban Revolution in 1959, a political event that ensured Fidel Castro's power over Cuba and triggered massive waves of migration from Cuba to the United States of America. Naturally, with each migration wave, different perspectives came both towards the homeland and the new home, leading to the emergence of several kinds of opinions within the cultural and literary scene as well.

The Cuban American literature that is in the interest of this paper is the one written by a particular type of immigrants who represent an emergent point of focus for various scholars analyzing Cuban American literature—that of the one-and-a-half generation or 1.5 generation of immigrants. As mentioned, since 1959 mass migration from Cuba to the United States was constant, given the immensity of such movements a distinction was necessary between the several generations of immigrants that fled Cuba. Therefore, scholars have identified two main generations—the first and the second generation. While the first generation of immigrants is comprised of adults who chose to leave Cuba as adults because of the oppressive regime that Castro enforced, the second generation of immigrants represents the children of the first generation:

those born of Cuban parents, but born and raised in the United States with no other link to their Cuban culture, except for their parents.

Given the importance of these two generations, it is natural for scholars to mainly focus on them, on their experiences, on their relation to Cuba, and also, on the well-encountered generational gap between these two generations and mentalities. However, there is one more generation that has sparked the interest of critics and scholars who deal with ethnic Latino literature: the in-between generation of one-and-a-halvers. To comprehend and thoroughly analyze the impact that migration had upon its subjects, one must define the group of immigrants the subjects belong to. Throughout the years, several generations of immigrants were identified, each generation with its own specificities and different ways of coping with their new life. Holloway-Friesen (2008) distinguishes two main generations of immigrants: the first generation that consists of individuals who arrived in the United States as adults seeking either better life conditions or an escape from oppressive political regimes, and the second generation, who consists of individuals who were born and raised in the US with no direct ties to their parents' home country. As expected due to the growing popularity of Latino writers, most literary critics focus on the immigrant experiences of these two generations, and when put together, literary critics tend to look at the generational and cultural gaps between the two groups.

Without aiming to minimize the importance of these two generations, I argue that in order to gain an in-depth understanding of Latino American ethnic literature, it might not be sufficient to only look at the two opposite categories of immigrants but also to take into consideration the in-between generation, known as the 1.5 Generation. The term "1.5 Generation" has been used to define the Latino American immigrants who left their homeland at a very young age or even during their teenage years. As per their name, they are in-between generations because they were not put in the position to make the decision of leaving the country themselves, given that most of them left during their childhood. As such, by not being born in the US, but still spending most of their formative years there, they experienced different insecurities and inadaptability to get accustomed to life as an American, which was not the case for second-generation immigrants. The same Holloway-Friesen mentions that the 1.5 Generation was seldom a top priority for literary critics or sociologists, thus leading to a path of unexplored characteristics and experiences of a generation of immigrants who are defined by the notion of biculturalism. In other words, they are part of both cultures, and they do not despise either of them.

The importance of the one-and-a-half generation is ensured both by their bicultural perspective but also by their affinity towards their native culture and the one they are trying to acquire. Concretely speaking, such is the case of writers such as Cristina García, who is part of this generation and does not withhold any hatred towards her homeland because she did not leave because of poverty or because she was unable to attend to her basic needs— she was forced to leave because of political factors. What can be observed while reading her fiction or even her press interviews is the constant longing for her homeland. García is part of the intellectual category of immigrants who transpose their experiences into fictional work and besides giving the reader the means to get acquainted with the Latino American culture/society they also discover their roots while producing their literary works. This new generation of writers who—as opposed to authors like Gabriel García Márquez or Carlos Fuentes, who were both parts of the Latin-American boom and experienced first-hand dictatorship—have experienced only scarcely life under a dictatorship but have become familiar with it and its strong and long-lasting reverberations through their parents or other relatives. Consequently, it can be argued that their experience is more ideological than pragmatic and it is influenced by subjective factors.

Latino American literature, and Cuban American literature implicitly, gained more popularity in the past few years and it has become known not only in the United States but also worldwide. In his entry in the *Cambridge Companion to Latino-American Literature*, John Morán González argues that one of the main objectives of Latino American literature is to put into fiction the life experiences of Latin American immigrants, who left their homelands and sought a life in the United States, thus, leading "to the formation of Latino/a communities physically situated within the United States but cognitively situated at a transnational multiplicity of cultural and linguistic practices" (Gonzales 2016, 310). In other words, as is often the case with ethnic writers, they are physically in one place (i.e., the US) but emotionally and even mentally they are not prepared to let their previous lives/homes behind. Therefore, they often live at the boundary between the old and new, history and the present, and find themselves unable to fully integrate into mainstream American culture precisely because of their in-between status.

In her book *Cuban-American Literature of Exile: From Person to Persona*, Isabel Alvarez-Borland deals with the issues of diaspora literature. She explains how the ethnic literature produced in the US is influenced both by the migratory waves writers belong to and by the generation of immigrants they belong to. Alvarez-Borland explains how even though they might share

common themes (such as exile, displacement, or identity loss) the point of view from which they share the story of the diaspora varies quite a lot between them. Their share of the story is influenced by factors such as the time they spent so far in the US or the immigration generation they are a part of. She argues that the story of a first-generation writer differs from that of the second generation, whilst the 1.5 generation offers a stand-alone perspective toward their native and new country, different from all of above: "[. . .] a different attitude toward the native and adopted countries is also evident *within* the second generation when we compare the literature of those writers who left [their homelands] as adolescents or preadolescents and those who left as infants or who were born to Cuban exile parents in the United States" (Alvarez-Borland 1998, 6).

Moving along with the topic of the one-and-a-half generation, Alvarez-Borland offers an interesting perspective regarding the Cubans who are a part of it. Using the words of Gustavo Pérez Firmat who argues that the input of the one-and-a-half generation of Cuban artists on the American popular culture was crucial, she builds on it further exposing the unique condition of these immigrants who are bound to deal with two different crises: moving from adolescence towards adulthood and transitioning from one country to another, from one socio-cultural environment to a completely different one.

Cristina García is one of the most famous writers belonging to the one-and-a-half generation of Cuban American writers. García was born in Cuba in 1958, one year before the Cuban Revolution and Fidel Castro's coming to power. Two years after the triumph of Fidel Castro's revolution, when she was still a child, her family moved to New York with the hope of getting away from the oppressive regime which would soon be recognized in the entire world as one of the most brutal political regimes of the century. García and her parents are among the first generations of immigrants who left Cuba shortly after the Revolution, thus ensuring their place as first-generation immigrants and political exiles.

Taking into consideration the categorization presented in the first part of this article regarding the generations of immigrants coming to the United States, it is important to briefly explain the inclusion of Cristina García in one of the categories. Her parents, being some of the first immigrants who left Cuba as adults due to the obvious political circumstances, enter the category of first-generation immigrants. This category, as previously explained, is made up of adults who made a conscious decision to leave their homelands, regardless of the reason. For the Cubans of that time, the main reason for them leaving is related to Fidel Castro's oppressive regime. When it comes

to immigration, both the reason for their migration and the exile wave they belong to shape their adjustment to life in the United States.

As exemplified in the first part of the paper, the attitude of the immigrants towards their homeland depends on the immigrant category they belong to. As such, the first generation of immigrants experiences a strained relationship with their homeland, a bitter-sweet one, beautified by the experiences of a pre-communist Cuba and tainted by the current political situation that made them leave everything behind and flee to a new country basically without any material provisions. The one-and-a-half generation, which is the main focus of this paper, however, stands aside from the other two generations of immigrants mostly because of their affinity towards their homeland. As such, Cristina Garcia builds on this issue, as it will further be illustrated in the following paragraphs.

In her essay "Politically Writing Women in Hispanic Literature," Martha Rubi explains how Cristina García's life is naturally shadowed by her migration experience, even though she was raised in the United States. She lived in a multi-racial neighborhood, which is a fairly different experience from other Latino immigrants who tend to gather together in the *barrio*, a place called by many scholars a means of encapsulating culture. In the sense that Latino immigrants gather in these neighborhoods and transform them into a replica of their homeland, such an example at a bigger scale is Little Havana, a place meant to mirror their homeland. Though their intentions are somehow caused by instinct and can be considered a way of coping with the process of immigration and adjustment to a new country, this encapsulation of culture might have negative consequences as well, as it is up to a certain extent separating them from life in mainstream America. Ergo, it can be argued that such activities convolute their adjustment process into their new homeland.

Cristina García lived for a few years in a multicultural environment, living in either Italian, Irish, or Jewish neighborhoods and a Spanish-speaking household. As Martha Rubi argues, García's first novel, *Dreaming in Cuban,* ponders on the issue that "there is no one Cuban exile but diverse kinds" (Rubi 2011, 248). As for her career, after spending some time in Italy and then in Germany, she returned to the United States and pursued a career in journalism. It was precisely her career as a journalist that evoked her enthusiasm towards her Cuban heritage, and in 1992 after the birth of her daughter Pilar and the publishing of *Dreaming in Cuban,* she became a full-time writer and dedicated her career to rediscovering her Cuban identity, but also to promoting and making Cuba and Cuban American culture known worldwide.

Until now, in her career as a writer, she produced a variety of literary works, ranging from writing novels for different audiences to editing anthologies about Cuba and the Cuban culture. During the span of 29 years, García wrote multiple stories, among which: *Dreaming in Cuban* (1992), *The Aguero Sisters* (1997), *Monkey Hunting* (2003), *The Lady Matador's Hotel* (2010), *King of Cuba* (2013), and *Here in Berlin* (1993). What brings her novels together is the unique way in which she tries to make peace with two identities. In a typical one-and-half generation fashion, she is fascinated by her heritage and by her former culture. But, at the same time, she tries to emphasize the experiences that immigrants have in their exile, hence, a remarkable mixture occurs in each novel. To further discuss this argument, what will follow is a close analysis of several factors that are relevant for the theme of identity in Cristina García's first literary work, a novel that prompted her career as a writer—*Dreaming in Cuban* (1992).

Dreaming in Cuban is perhaps the most famous work of García. When asked in an interview by Scott Brown what prompted her to write the novel, she explained that it was a mixture of three main things: her returning to Cuba for the first time since her exodus, the journalist career that ventured her towards Miami (a massive center of Cuban immigrants), and also her reading poetry which further led to introspection about her identity: "The sense of not fitting in either in Havana, or in Miami, the heart of the Cuban exile community, made me start questioning my own identity. Where did I belong? What did it mean to be Cuban? And the poetry made me feverish to write" (García 1993, 249). Therefore, she emerged in a journey of finding her own identity, whilst simultaneously introducing to the world a new facet of Cuba and of Cuban American writing.

Identity is naturally a common trope in ethnic writings, and in many ways, ethnic writers explore who they are or who they should be now that they are living in a new country. In *Dreaming in Cuba,* García manages to include the theme of identity (issues) in a brilliant and complex manner, while also managing to center the theme on multiple characters. The novel follows three generations of women who are separated both geographically and generationally. As such, we are introduced to a multitude of stories and events that shaped the characters of these women, all of them told in a non-linear fashion, by a third-person omniscient narrator. As García underlines, "Writing these women's stories, too, enabled me to consider the infinite ways one could be Cuban and Cuban American" (García 1993, viii).

As explained, the novel focuses on three generations of women: Celia del Pino, the matriarch of the family, a strong-willed nationalist who chose to

remain in Cuba, despite all the hardships she lived there, and to dedicate herself to Castro's Revolution; Felicia del Pino, daughter of Celia, a woman who faced tremendous hardships and eventually went mad and, to escape the trauma she faced, she resorts to the rituals of *santeria*, which will eventually kill her; Lourdes Puente, the daughter of Celia, who is considered a traitor because she chose to leave Cuba and follow her American dream; and finally, Pilar Puente, the granddaughter who, just as García herself, left Cuba with her mother Lourdes when she was only two years old.

In her novel, García explores the theme of identity through her characters as she simultaneously tries to find her own roots and recover the essential parts of her *cubanita*. As mentioned before, for the writers belonging to the one-and-a-half generation, the place of their birth and their roots became a major point of curiosity and reflection that they want to discover. Even more so, by looking at a family saga, García's inclination towards history (or in her case political circumstances) and the way in which it affects one's identity can easily be spotted. When asked if she considers hers a political exile, García claims that "I feel like I grew up in the wake of my parents' exile rather than enduring the loss directly. But while I don't consider myself an exile, I've had the privileged of experiencing two cultures at very close range, participating in both and belonging to neither entirely" (García 1993, 255).

The questions of identity that García includes in this novel are multiple and can be analyzed from a variety of perspectives. She cleverly includes issues of political identity, for example in the case of Celia's war with her daughters regarding her communist views. Celia has dedicated her entire life to El Lider, whom she idolizes, a fact which is a constant reason of disdain in her relation with her daughters, who both despise the communist regime that their mother promotes: "My mother says that Abuela Celia's had plenty of chances to leave Cuba but that she's stubborn and got their head turned around by El Lider" (García 1993, 26). Her idolization toward El Lider helped her overcome the past difficulties she faced and offered her several roles within Cuban society. Nevertheless, none of those reasons have managed to help her win her daughters back:

> Her daughters cannot understand her commitment to El Lider. Lourdes sends her snapshots of pastries from the bakery in Brooklyn. Each glistening éclair is a grenade aimed a Celia's political beliefs [. . .] and a reminder of the ongoing shortages in Cuba. Felicia is no less exasperating. "We're *dying* of security!" she moans when Celia tries to point out the revolution's merits. [. . .] [H]er daughters prefer the luxury of uncertainty, of time unplanned, of waste. (García 1993, 117)

It comes as no surprise that given the circumstances of García's migration to the United States the political factor is interlaced with the identity factor. Lourdes represents another example of the complex way of García's inclusion of identity in her novel. She is a first-generation immigrant, who left Cuba because of obvious political reasons and tried to fulfill her American dream. To accomplish that, she bought a bakery and tried to fully embrace her new American life. For her, America was everything one could need to thrive and overcome possible past traumas such as her own: "Lourdes considers herself lucky. Immigration has redefined her, and she is grateful. Unlike her husband, she welcomes her adopted language, its possibilities of reinvention. [. . .] She wants no part of Cuba, no part of its wretched carnival floats creaking with lies, no part of Cuba at all, which Lourdes claims never possessed her" (García 1993, 73).

Regardless of her newly-found Americanness, there is something that Lourdes misses and is unable to pinpoint. The way through which she tries to fill the void is by overindulging in every aspect of her life, from her eating habits to her sexual life to compensate for that fraction that is missing: "Lourdes was reaching through Rufino for something he could not give her, she wasn't sure what" (García 1993, 21).

Regarding the theme of identity issues, García includes in her novel Pilar Puente, daughter of Lourdes, as her alter-ego. What the author does is to rediscover and represent Cuba, through the eyes of a teenage Cuban American, who endures a rupture from her Cuban heritage, and has a strained relationship with her mother, partially caused by the same rupture. Pilar Puente is a teenager who besides having to deal with the changes that teenage years bring, she also faces another identity crisis—that of her Cuban origins. Just as the author herself, Pilar left Cuba when she was two years old and got separated from her Cuban heritage entirely as her mother had no interest in conserving a single thing related to Cuba. Her only connection to Cuba is through the mystical conversations she has with her grandmother, Celia.

Pilar lives with the constant belief that her life would have been better if she had stayed with her grandmother in Cuba, instead of going to the United States. Towards the end of the novel, just as the author, she visits Cuba and her family there. What is interesting to note is that Pilar's belief that she belongs to Cuba and that she is Cuban, not American, is radically changed after she visits Cuba. She starts to understand that although her roots are Cuban she does not belong there anymore. Her not belonging to Cuba is a fact even her mother comments upon when during a night out in Cuba Lourdes notes that

her daughter dances like an American and stands out in the crowd. However, Pilar's trip to Cuba is essential for her identity, just as García's was, and she manages to receive a closure regarding her identity after traveling there:

> I've started dreaming in Spanish, which has never happened before. I wake up feeling different, like something inside me is changing, something chemical and irreversible. There's a magic here working its ways through my veins. [. . .] I love Havana, its noise and decay and painted ladyness. I could happily sit on one of those wrought-iron balconies for days, or keep my grandmother company on her porch, with its ringside view of the sea. I'm afraid to lose all this, to lose Abuela Celia again. But sooner or later I'd have to return to New York. I know now it's where I belong—not *instead* of here, but *more* than here. (García 1993, 236)

To conclude, Cuban American writing has become an increasing point of interest of scholars dealing with Latino American literature written in English. As discussed, these types of writings should always be analyzed in close relation to the context in which they were written and to the background of the author. Otherwise, the complex interpretations of such writings might simply elude the reader. Cristina García's *Dreaming in Cuban* is a great example of this type of analysis, as her novel also represents her own search of her lost Cuban identity. Even more so, her being part of an in-between generation of writers, a generation that encourages the process of going back to one's roots to fully comprehend one's identity, has made it possible for her to comprise a greater understanding of the complex issue that identity is.

In her novel, García included the issue of identity on several levels, from political to personal identity, each of the characters discussed struggling with the shortcomings of such issues. As briefly shown, both the issues of migrating to a new world but also the ones related to staying behind or being the one left behind have been included in her novel, therefore, demonstrating that *Dreaming in Cuban,* besides exploring such complex themes, also functions as a means of understanding Cuban American life and the issues that ethnic writers face. Ultimately, on top of being great proof that identity issues and/or the search for identity play a vital role in Cuban American fiction, García is also the spokesperson of an entire generation of immigrants, who were not used to being part of the main narrative.

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4.

METAPHORS OF DISGUST, ABREACTION, AND THE JOY OF THE GAZE

Andrea Csillag

Metaphoric and Metonymic Expressions of Disgust with and without Adjectives in English

Introduction

The language of emotion shows how we conceptualize the generic notion of emotion and specific emotions such as anger, fear or happiness. The linguistic expressions denoting our emotion experiences are used either literally or figuratively. Our figurative expressions are classified as metaphors and metonymies (Lakoff 1987, Kövecses 1990, 2000). They depict various details accompanying emotions including physiological and behavioural reactions as well as facial expressions.

The present paper is part of an investigation into the language of disgust, which is one of the six universal basic emotions (Ekman et al. 1972, 1999). At an earlier stage of my research, I studied the language of disgust based on a corpus built from sentences on the internet site https://sentence.yourdictionary.com/disgust and found that it contains a number of metonymies and metaphors. I also found that a considerable number of linguistic expressions contain a combination of some adjective and the term disgust. The present paper aims to find out how the adjectives occurring in the corpus contribute to the concept of disgust.

Disgust

Disgust is an emotion we experience when we taste, smell, touch or see something distasteful, revolting or potentially dangerous to our health or well-being. The most common and the most typical bodily reactions are frowning, opening the mouth, protruding the lips, wrinkling the nose, as well as spitting, turning away and even vomiting and/or pushing away the object that triggers the emotion (Darwin 1999/1872, 256–60).

Following the Darwinian tradition, Ekman et al. (1972) identify disgust as a universal basic emotion besides anger, happiness, sadness, fear and interest. They claim that facial expressions going together with disgust are biologically determined therefore they are practically the same and easily recognizable throughout different cultures all around the world.

Plutchik (1980) summarizes the course of disgust reactions as follows: people experience disgust when they see a gruesome object and consider it as a potential poison for them. (He calls the gruesome object the disgust elicitor.) When people meet a disgust elicitor, they typically make a disgusted face, frown, protrude their lips and wrinkle their nose, etc, and often push the disgusting object away or turn away from the object and they may even vomit. Plutchik claims that such a course of reactions may take place anywhere and everywhere in the world regardless of culture therefore he concludes that the phenomenon has an evolutionary significance.

McGinn (2011) has a philosophical approach to disgust. Comparing disgust to hatred and fear. He claims that the three emotions are similar in that they are reactions to things that are seen as potentially dangerous and harmful but the three emotions are different because hatred and fear are existence-dependent emotions while disgust is not an existence-dependent emotion. He explains that people only feel hatred and fear when they are faced with existing dangers but one may feel disgust in cases when a disgust elicitor is present and also in cases when no disgust elicitor is physically present, however, it appears in people's minds, which means that people may react with disgust to things or situations that they only imagine. Therefore, McGinn claims that disgust is rather a consciousness-centred emotion than a body-centred emotion because what really counts in the coming about of disgust is some kind of mental proximity to something that disgusts the experiencer and the reaction that follows is avoiding mental/perceptual contact with the disgust elicitor no matter whether it is real or imaginary.

Cognitive Linguistic Background to the Study of Emotion

Cognitive linguistics views the language of emotion as an exhaustive store of expressions capturing a large number of details of specific emotions and emotion in general. Consequently, we are in the position to understand emotions in their complexity by investigating their component parts: a system of conceptual metonymies, a system of conceptual metaphors, a set of concepts linked to the emotion concept in question and a category of cognitive models, one or some of which are prototypical (Kövecses 1990, 40).

Metonymy and metaphor, the two most directly relevant notions to the present paper, are viewed as cognitive mechanisms (Lakoff 1987, Kövecses 1990, 2000), which underlie figurative expressions of emotions. Metonymy is "a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity is mentally accessed via another entity" (Radden and Kövecses 2007, 336), which means in the study of emotion language that an emotion under investigation (the target domain entity) is mentally accessed by a physiological change, behavioural reaction or a facial expression (the source domain entity). The expression *He is white as a sheet*, for example, may stand for fear, that is, the emotion fear is accessed via a physiological change of skin colour in the face area and the expression instantiates the metonymy BLOOD LEAVES FACE STANDS FOR FEAR (Kövecses 1990, 70).

Metaphor is another cognitive mechanism in which the target domain entity is understood in terms of a source domain entity (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). With reference to emotions, it means that emotions are understood in terms of concrete experiences such as fire, heat, war, container and so on (Kövecses 1990, 2000). Based on the analysis of a number of emotion concepts Kövecses (1990, 2000) finds that (a) one emotion may be conceptualized by several metaphors, e.g., LOVE IS FIRE, LOVE IS WAR and LOVE IS A JOURNEY instantiated by *He is burning with love, She conquered him* and *It's been a long, bumpy road*; (b) several emotions may be conceptualized by one metaphor, e.g. LOVE IS FIRE and ANGER IS FIRE instantiated by *He was burning with love* (Kövecses 1990, 46)*, Those were inflammatory remarks* (Kövecses 1990, 58); and (c) specific emotions converge in the generic concept of emotion captured in the metaphor EMOTION IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER (Kövecses 1990, 144–59), which conceptualizes the prototype of emotion. The container metaphor of emotion is instantiated by expressions like *I am filled with anger/love/disgust*.

Disgust Metaphors in Related Literature

Researching cognitive linguistic literature on the language of disgust in English I have found two studies: Stefanowitsch (2006) covering disgust in a corpus-based analysis of several emotions and their metaphors in English and Kuczok (2016) discussing a considerable number of English and Polish expressions of disgust and comparing English and Polish metaphors of disgust in his corpus-based investigation. (In the present paper I focus on Kuczok's findings only in relation to English expressions of disgust.)

Stefanowitsch (2006, 89) presents a list of source domain entities of English metaphors of disgust. I include Stefanowitsch's DISGUST metaphors with some of his examples below:

DISGUST IS A MIXED/PURE SUBSTANCE—*pure disgust, mixture of disgust and EMOTION*
DISGUST IS A SUBSTANCE IN A CONTAINER (UNDER PRESSURE)—*X fill Y with disgust*
DISGUST IS AN OPPONENT—*X fights down disgust*
DISGUST IS PARALYSIS/A DISEASE—*X be sick with disgust*
DISGUST IS HIGH/LOW (INTENSITY)—*disgust rise (in X)*
DISGUST IS COLD—*shiver of disgust*
DISGUST IS FOOD—*bitter disgust*
DISGUST IS LIQUID—*disgust floods through X*
DISGUST IS PAIN—*tremor of disgust*
DISGUST IS AN ORGANISM—*root/seed of disgust*
DISGUST IS HEAT—*X fuel disgust*
DISGUST IS A BALLOON—*X inflate with disgust*
DISGUST IS A HEAVY OBJECT—*heavy disgust*

Kuczok (2016) arranges English and Polish metaphors of disgust into the following groups:

a. physiological metaphors (cf. Apresjan 1997): DISGUST IS BEING SICK, SHUDDERING and GRIMACING—*I feel sick with disgust; The thought sent a shiver of disgust over her skin; Internally Adam grimaced as he recalled Anne's sarcasm;*
b. metaphors with sensory experiences as source domains: DISGUST IS TASTING SOMETHING BAD, SMELLING SOMETHING BAD, SEEING SOMETHING SPOILED/ SOMEONE ILL/ SOMETHING DIRTY/ SOMETHING UGLY, and SEEING/TOUCHING AN UNPLEASANT ANIMAL—*Cleaning it out is yucky; The whole thing smells crooked to me; rotten weather; dirty little secrets; the whole ugly truth;*
c. force dynamic metaphors (cf. Talmy 1988): DISGUST IS A REPULSIVE FORCE and DISGUST/OBJECT OF DISGUST IS AN OPPONENT—*the seedy texture, which is off-putting to some; This notion that people were slaves is repugnant;*

    d.   ontological/reification metaphors: DISGUST IS A CONTAINER, DISGUST IS AN INSTRUMENT/MEANS FOR DOING SOMETHING and DISGUST IS A FLUID—*He raised his hands in disgust; Anger and disgust flooded my poles;*

    e.   orientational metaphor (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980): DISGUST IS DOWN—*debasing habits of life*.

The two lists above are rather different, however, there are some similarities: both Stefanowitsch and Kuczok identify the OPPONENT and the CONTAINER metaphors. Stefanowitsch identifies paralysis/disease, while Kuczok being sick as a source domain for disgust metaphors. I find that they can be subsumed under the DISEASE metaphor. Stefanowitsch identifies food, while Kuczok identifies tasting something bad as source domains, which again can be subsumed under the FOOD SUBSTANCE metaphor. It is interesting to note that the linguistic expression *a shiver of disgust* is understood as an instantiation of the metaphor DISGUST IS COLD in Stefanowitsch's analysis, while as an instantiation of the metaphor DISGUST IS SHUDDERING in Kuczok's. Based on my own research I argue that the expressions *a shiver of disgust* and *She was shivering with disgust* refer to a physiological reaction and instantiate the metonymy SHIVERING STANDS FOR DISGUST or to put it more generally PHYSICAL AGITATION STANDS FOR DISGUST (cf. Kövecses 1990, 70–73, PHYSICAL AGITATION STANDS FOR FEAR—*he was shaking with fear*). In a similar manner, I question Kuczok's physiological metaphor DISGUST IS GRIMACING and I claim that linguistic expressions of grimacing instantiate the metonymy GRIMACING STANDS FOR DISGUST, which can also be subsumed under PHYSICAL AGITATION STANDS FOR DISGUST. As for the rest of the two authors' findings, the differences may be explained by the differences in their corpora. On the other hand, the study of metonymies must have been outside the scope of their analyses, which explains the lack of reference to metonymies in their papers.

Disgust Metaphors and Metonymies—My First Research Findings

For the aim of my research, I have built a corpus of sentences presented on the internet site https://sentence.yourdictionary.com/disgust. My corpus contains 175 sentences, all of which are combined with the term *disgust*. *Disgust* is used as a noun in 169 sentences and as a verb in 6 sentences. Studying the examples I have found that the sentences capture a wide range

of disgust experiences, among which there are descriptions of subjective inner experiences of disgust as well as descriptions of facial expressions, behavioural and physiological reactions accompanying the emotion. In the first phase of my research, I have identified four versions of the container metaphor in my corpus:

> DISGUST IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER—*The sight of her right now must fill him with disgust.*
> DISGUST IS A SUBSTANCE IN A CONTAINER—*This way of solving [. . .] the ultimate problems of thought has had many followers in cultured circles imbued [. . .] with disgust.*
> DISGUST IS A SUBSTANCE IN THE EYE CONTAINER—*He made no attempt to hide the disgust in his eyes.*
> DISGUST IS A CONTAINER—*I have seen customers put the merchandise back and walk out of a store in disgust when the line at the cash register was too long or not moving fast enough.*

In my corpus, I have also found instantiations of versions of the animal metaphor, which has not been identified by either Stefanowitsch (2006) or Kuczok (2016):

> AGITATED HUMAN SOUND PRODUCING IS ANIMAL SOUND PRODUCING—*He read it thoroughly and when he failed to find anything useful, discarded it with a loud snort of disgust.*
> AGITATED HUMAN BEHAVIOUR IS ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR—*Brutus started after them, snarling and barking his disgust.*

My corpus shows a relatively wide range of disgust metonymies (however, I have not come across any of them in the literature I have consulted):

> PHYSICAL AGITATION/AGITATED BEHAVIOUR STANDS FOR DISGUST—*Jackson shook his head with disgust.*
> WAYS OF LOOKING STAND FOR DISGUST—*Sneering at Jackson with disgust, Victor stood in front of Elisabeth and began hitting her.*
> WAYS OF BREATHING STAND FOR DISGUST—*The single word was a combined expression of disgust and distress.*
> WAYS OF SPEAKING STAND FOR DISGUST—*[. . .] the whole mass of prisoners suddenly started to one side, exclamations of horror and disgust were heard.*

The above metonymies have instantiations of their specific-level versions, respectively:

> SHIVERING/SHUDDERING STANDS FOR DISGUST—*He frowned and gave a shudder of disgust.*
>
> SPITTING STANDS FOR DISGUST—*I have to spit with disgust every time I see his wrinkled old face.*
>
> GRIMACING STANDS FOR DISGUST—*With a grimace of disgust, he began to turn away*
>
> SIGHING STANDS FOR DISGUST—*The wives then review the rule guide left by the other wife, which usually results in some raised eyebrows or sighs of disgust from the wives as they read about the rules of the family they are about to join temporarily.* (N.B.: The expression *raised eyebrows* instantiates WAYS OF LOOKING STAND FOR DISGUST.)

On the whole, I have demonstrated that the concept of disgust comprises both metaphors and metonymies just like any other emotion concept.

Adjectives in Expressions of Disgust

My corpus contains 26 example sentences composed with 17 adjectives modifying the noun *disgust*. The adjectives are *absolute, deep, great, intense, justifiable, lively, moral, outright, profound, puritan, sheer, sickened, sneering, total, utter, visceral,* and *violent*.

My research questions are:

a. What aspects of disgust do the adjectives refer to?
b. What metaphorical/metonymical meanings do the adjectives have in expressions of disgust?

Looking through the sentences containing the adjectives listed above I find that the adjectives can be classified into three thematic groups, which describe three aspects of disgust: intensity ((a) *deep* and *profound* and (b) *absolute, great, infinite, intense, sheer, total,* and *utter*), behaviour/physiology (*lively, outright, sickened, sneering, visceral,* and *violent*), and morality/justice (*justifiable, moral, puritan*).

The question of intensity is relevant to all emotions and it is conceptualized in several versions of the intensity metaphor. Stefanowitsch (2006, 92–94)

identifies two versions: INTENSITY OF EMOTION (DISGUST) IS DEPTH and INTENSITY OF EMOTION (DISGUST) IS SIZE, which are, too, instantiated in my corpus, cf. sentences (1–2) and (3), respectively:

1. *All I feel for you is deep, deep disgust.*
2. *So ended the Eighth Crusade—much as the Sixth had done—to the profound disgust of many of the crusaders.*
3. *Accordingly, he endeavoured to temporize and to avoid a rupture, to the archbishops' great disgust.*

It must be noted that the image of depth is associated with the container image conceptualizing emotions as fluids or substances in a container and the container is normally mapped onto the human body (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).

I have identified two further versions of the intensity metaphor INTENSITY OF DISGUST IS INFINITENESS and INTENSITY OF DISGUST IS TOTALITY, which are instantiated by examples (4) and (5):

4. *The shrinkage of the great empire into the realm of old France caused infinite disgust.*
5. *You just have total disgust for the whole lot of them.*

The second group of adjectives refers to several details of the behavioural and physiological reactions of someone experiencing disgust. The terms *outright* and *violent* in examples (6–7) are related to behaviour in general, *sneering* in example (8) is specifically related to visual behaviour, while *lively, sickened* and *visceral* capture physiological reactions as in examples (9–11):

6. *Much to the shock and, in some cases, outright disgust of friends and colleagues, I opted for Blackpool.*
7. *His assertion that the Celtic race was incapable of assimilating the highest forms of civilization excited "violent disgust".*
8. *Opinions range from fanboy love to sneering disgust with a fairly clear line of age drawn between the two.*
9. *In 1869 the government of Santo Domingo (or the Dominican Republic) expressed a wish for annexation by the United States, and such a step was favoured. Washington, comprising wholesale frauds on the public revenue, awakened lively disgust.*

10. *In sickened disgust, the weary traveller made his way back to Ujiji, which he reached on the 13th of October.*

11. *I will readily concede that my visceral disgust for what Gary Glitter was doing influences my views.*

I find that all the examples (6–11) present disgust in terms of an animate entity, however, not as an organism (cf. metaphor DISGUST IS AN ORGANISM—*growing disgust, root/seed of disgust* (Stefanowitsch 2006, 89) but a human being capable of mental, visual and physical behaviour, as well as physiological reactions. Thus the metaphor DISGUST IS A HUMAN BEING.

The third (small) group of adjectives *justifiable, moral, puritan* describe certain details of justice and morality. Examples (12–14) instantiate the metaphor DISGUST IS A MATTER OF MORALITY/JUSTICE:

12. *[. . .] whose justifiable disgust at the sight of discarded chewing gum or of dog turds on the pavement made him find alternative routes home.*

13. *They have fostered a sense of moral disgust at the very ideas of secular American liberalism.*

14. *Puritan disgust with whole new legs triggers the most.*

In sentence (13) the term *foster* activates the cognitive model of growth and development (for cognitive model/ICM, see Lakoff 1987). One can foster an interest, attitude or growth in general, which are associated with living organisms and human beings. Therefore, I think, here we witness an interplay of the metaphors DISGUST IS AN ORGANISM/HUMAN BEING and DISGUST IS A MATTER OF MORALITY, or to put it differently *foster moral disgust* is an instantiation of the double metaphor DISGUST IS AN ORGANISM/HUMAN BEING UNDERSTOOD AS A MATTER OF MORALITY.

The discussion above shows that the seventeen adjectives (*absolute, deep, great, intense, justifiable, lively, oral, outright, profound, puritan, sheer, sickened, sneering, total, utter, visceral,* and *violent*) exemplified in my corpus all have metaphorical meanings and conceptualize the intensity, behaviour/physiology and morality/justice aspect of the emotion disgust. The novelty of this part of my research is that I have identified two "new" versions of the INTENSITY metaphor, INTENSITY OF DISGUST IS INFINITENESS and INTENSITY OF DISGUST IS TOTALITY and the metaphors DISGUST IS A HUMAN BEING and DISGUST IS A MATTER OF MORALITY/

JUSTICE. I have also pointed out that the latter two metaphors may combine in the double metaphor DISGUST IS AN ORGANISM/HUMAN BEING UNDERSTOOD AS A MATTER OF MORALITY, cf. sentence (13).

Conclusion

In the present paper after giving a brief account of the emotion disgust and the cognitive-linguistic background to the study of emotion, I looked through what metaphors of disgust have been identified in the corpus-based studies by Stefanowitsch (2006) and Kuczok (2016). However, both authors identify the CONTAINER metaphor as the most central metaphor of emotion, Stefanowitsch and Kuczok identify different versions of the CONTAINER metaphor: DISGUST IS A SUBSTANCE IN A CONTAINER, DISGUST IS A CONTAINER in their corpus. The rest of their lists of disgust metaphors are rather different. The two authors share the view that the phrase *a shiver of disgust* (and similar expressions of shivering and shuddering) are metaphoric conceptualizations of disgust (Stefanowitsch argues for DISGUST IS COLD, while Kuczok argues for DISGUST IS SHUDDERING). However, in my view, similar expressions are metonymic conceptualizations of disgust and instantiate the specific-level metonymy SHIVERING STANDS FOR DISGUST, whose generic-level metonymy is PHYSICAL AGITATION STANDS FOR DISGUST. Likewise, I disagree with Kuczok's metaphor DISGUST IS GRIMACING on the grounds that grimacing is another form of physical agitation, therefore expressions like *Internally Adam grimaced as he recalled Anne's sarcasm* are to be analysed as instantiations of the specific-level metonymy GRIMACING STANDS FOR DISGUST. As can be seen, such an analysis leads us to the realization that disgust is not only conceptualized by metaphor.

My corpus-based research findings presented in this paper clearly show that disgust, just like other emotions, is conceptualized by both metaphor and metonymy. In my corpus, the majority of metaphoric expressions are instantiations of one of the versions of the CONTAINER metaphor. I have identified the following four versions: DISGUST IS A CONTAINER / A FLUID IN A CONTAINER / A SUBSTANCE IN A CONTAINER / A SUBSTANCE IN THE EYE CONTAINER. Another group of examples instantiates one of the two versions of the animal metaphor, which I have identified in relation to disgust in my corpus: AGITATED HUMAN SOUND PRODUCING IS ANIMAL SOUND PRODUCING and AGITATED HUMAN BEHAVIOUR IS ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR.

According to the cognitive view of emotion concepts, details of physiological and behavioural reactions serve as the basis of metonymic representations of an emotion under investigation. I have identified the following metonymies in my corpus of disgust: SHIVERING/SHUDDERING STANDS FOR DISGUST, WAYS OF LOOKING STAND FOR DISGUST, GRIMACING STANDS FOR DISGUST, WAYS OF BREATHING STAND FOR DISGUST, WAYS OF SIGHING STAND FOR DISGUST, WAYS OF SPEAKING STAND FOR DISGUST, SPITTING STANDS FOR DISGUST. All the aforementioned metonymies are specific-level versions of the generic-level metonymies PHYSICAL AGITATION STANDS FOR DISGUST and AGITATED BEHAVIOUR STANDS FOR DISGUST. Most of the details captured by these metonymies have been listed as characteristic reactions accompanying disgust, cf. Darwin (1999/1872) and Ekman et al. (1972).

The analysis of adjectives modifying the term *disgust* shows that three aspects of the emotion are captured: intensity, behaviour/physiology and morality/justice. All three aspects are conceptualized by metaphor. The first aspect, the conceptualization of the intensity of disgust has four versions in my corpus: INTENSITY OF DISGUST IS DEPTH, INTENSITY OF DISGUST IS SIZE, INTENSITY OF DISGUST IS INFINITENESS and INTENSITY OF DISGUST IS TOTALITY. It is interesting to note that the metaphor intensity as depth has the container image as its underlying conceptualization. The second aspect, behaviour/physiology calls for the metaphor DISGUST IS A HUMAN BEING, which may be understood as a specific-level version of the more generic metaphor DISGUST IS AN ORGANISM. The third aspect of disgust, morality/justice conceptualized by the metaphor DISGUST IS A MATTER OF MORALITY/JUSTICE turns our attention to a characteristic that is less straightforward in relation to emotions than the other aspects denoted by the adjectives discussed above. The morality/justice aspect is associated with our cognition, reason, logic and socialization, that is, our mental faculty, which seems to be non-prototypical of emotions. It is a characteristic that distinguishes the expression of emotion in humans and animals (cf. Darwin 1999/1872).

All in all, I find that the emotion disgust is conceptualized by both metaphor and metonymy. Practically all the metaphorical expressions identified in my corpus contain the noun *disgust* and 23 metaphorical expressions are composed with one of 17 adjectives modifying *disgust*. Metonymies instantiated in my corpus do not contain adjectives. The metonymies conceptualizing behavioural and physiological reactions accompanying disgust and the CONTAINER, INTENSITY and HUMAN

BEING metaphors conceptualize prototypical details of disgust, whereas the MORALITY/JUSTICE metaphors conceptualize less prototypical or non-prototypical aspects of the emotion. However, they all contribute to a more complete understanding of the concept of disgust.

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Edit Gálla

The Inconspicuousness of Technology and Domestic Abuse in Leigh Whannel's *The Invisible Man*

In H. G. Wells' 1897 novel, *The Invisible Man*, the titular hero, Adrian Griffin, is a struggling, unsociable university demonstrator, who abandons medicine for physics, and embarks on research to produce a chemical that makes the human body invisible. Being an albino, with white hair and red eyes, he is an outcast, and his social predicament finds an appropriate metaphor in the invisibility he first desires and then deplores as an insufferable curse, which allows him to obtain possessions but not to enjoy them. As Griffin poignantly complains to a fellow scientist, Kemp, whom he wants to make his accomplice: "I made a mistake, Kemp, a huge mistake, in carrying this thing through alone. I have wasted strength, time, opportunities. Alone—it is wonderful how little a man can do alone! To rob a little, to hurt a little, and there is the end" (Wells 2007, 247). Indeed, what the plot foregrounds in the novel is Griffin's isolation from other human beings, first his reluctance and then his failure to secure assistance from others, and ultimately, it is his abject loneliness that causes his downfall.

There are several cinematic adaptations of Wells' novel and some of them feature a love interest subplot inserted into the original story. The most salient digression of the 2020 remake both from other movie versions and the novel is that the invisible man is removed from his position as a protagonist to be replaced by his girlfriend, Cecilia Kass, as the heroine of the story. Noticeably, the 2020 production directed by Leigh Whannell provides a social commentary on its age inasmuch as it highlights not only the sexual coercion and humiliation of women, carried on under the cover of professional or romantic relationships, unbeknownst to outsiders, but also contemporary concerns about the dangers of anonymity or invisibility that technology makes possible.

The film especially foregrounds the dangers lurking in the secrecy and anonymity of wrongdoing and the impunity that abusers enjoy within a society that compounds the harm done to the victims by refusing to believe them and denying the validity of their fear and pain:

> To the extent that traumatic experience shatters the bond that keeps the victims connected to others, they are cut adrift, alone in a sea of pain, anger, guilt, despair, hopelessness, and meaninglessness. Other people avoid them because they are tainted, defiled, bad, crooked, ugly, and impure. They are infected with evil and must be shunned. As bearers of troubling thoughts and feelings, victims are suppressed; listeners change the topic away from their tales of woe; they attempt to press their own interpretation of events upon the victims; they blame them for their pain, and finally shun them altogether. (Bloom and Reichert 2013, 145)

Bloom and Reichert's poignant description of the cultural attitudes to victims of any kind of trauma is given convincing and intelligent cinematic treatment under Whannell's direction: the potential pitfalls of salaciousness and vulgarity are deftly avoided, while the abused woman's state of mind—her isolation, apprehensiveness, and defiance—become the focal point and the primary source of suspense in the film.

This paper proposes that the two main themes of *The Invisible Man* are the trauma of domestic abuse and the consumption of, overreliance on, and vulnerability to digital technology—themes that are closely intertwined and also mirror each other since both domestic abuse and the effects of consuming technology—especially in the case of surveillance—are mostly unnoticeable: invisibility is a key aspect of both. Furthermore, the titular antagonist, Adrian Griffin, can be seen as the embodiment of corporate tech giants, inasmuch as he possesses both enormous wealth and technological know-how and his objective is to use these resources to gain power over people, while Cecilia represents the reluctant consumer, who is unwilling to buy into his world of digital technology and who, as a result, is severely persecuted, victimized and nearly destroyed.

As Freud contends in one of his early works, trauma usually results not from a single event, but from a series of events, which are connected in the patient's mind: "These have only been able to exercise a traumatic effect by summation and they belong together in so far as they are in part components of a single story of suffering" (Breuer and Freud 2003, 180). A series of insults, shocks, frights, or other potentially traumatic experiences evolve into trauma due to the patient's inability to psychologically process

these experiences. Certain situations or events are more likely to cause trauma, stipulates Freud, if they have not been "abreacted": if the patient cannot find an outlet for the emotions generated by the events, but instead, relegates them to the unconscious (Breuer and Freud 2003, 181). The idea of "abreaction" is a basic principle in psychoanalytic treatment, since only by reliving and articulating the story of the painful events can the patient find release from the tormenting symptoms of trauma.

In *The Invisible Man*, we do not witness specific instances of domestic abuse; the audience can only see the effects of mistreatment on Cecilia. She embarks on her road to recovery by escaping from Adrian's house. She finds herself a safe place to stay until she can start an independent life again. She tries to articulate what the traumatizing experiences consisted of, but her brief account of her experience of abuse, couched in very general terms, spoken in a soft voice, does not constitute an effective "abreaction." Ultimately, the film presents the viewers with the most extreme form of "abreaction" possible, after she has been abandoned and reviled by her loved ones when Cecilia takes murderous revenge on her tormentor.

The last image the viewer is left with, that of Cecilia taking leave of her only remaining friend, and embarking into the dark void of the night, gazing ahead with an exalted and determined expression on her face, has a distinctly asocial, and bitterly individualistic flavor. Ultimately, it seems to imply, the abused woman is left to her own devices, not only in her physical escape but also in the considerably more challenging and longer process of psychological escape from the framework of male dominance and female victimization. Overall, the movie paints a rather bleak picture of community, solidarity, and the possibilities for redemption in today's consumer society: there is very little support to be had, and even that is contingent on fulfilling so many requirements—such as conforming to standards of "normality"—that those who really need assistance are often disqualified.

Digital technology is ubiquitous in consumer capitalism: consumers use it and are exposed to it in so many walks of life and areas of social interaction that they often, to some extent, forget about their constant involvement with it. In other words, technology becomes unnoticeable due to its pervasiveness. Not only does technology seem to encroach on users' time through necessitating continual virtual presence in the digital world, but it also enables the surveillance of consumers in ways that are undetectable by them. The movie taps into this hovering sense of paranoia of the contemporary consumer, showing the heroine ruining the small camera on her laptop. However, the perfect tool for surveillance and the epitome and symbol for

all surveillance devices is the invisibility suit Griffin wears, with its million tiny cameras, which, by displaying the background against which its wearer is positioned, allows the wearer to seamlessly blend into the surroundings. The invisibility suit embodies the voyeurism and manipulativeness of surveillance technology and draws attention to all its sinister effects and implications in terms of the unequal power relations between those who deploy this technology and those subjected to its deployment.

If the invisibility suit is emblematic of surveillance technology, Griffin personifies the technological giants: powerful corporations that develop, manufacture, and disseminate digital technological devices and applications. Corporate capitalism sets itself the task of transforming its economic and technological power into effective cultural influence and political power, and today's tech giants draw on the vast and widely accessible resource of the world wide web to design and operate their services.

This ideological influence exerted over the global consumer population translates into manipulation and mind control on the level of the individual which is similar to the impact of domestic abuse in the sense that both the abuser and the tech giant aim to eradicate ideas, beliefs, and attitudes that are independent of their manipulative agenda and replace these individual thought processes with a prefabricated system of ideas and attitudes with a view to gain complete control over the victim's actions and behavior. The parallel between domestic abuse and the mind control of "big tech" is made obvious in the movie by unifying the agents of both kinds of abusive power in the character of Griffin, who is not only a violent man imprisoning his girlfriend but also an inventor of cutting-edge surveillance technology and the owner of a gigantic technological firm. If Griffin can be regarded as the personification of big tech, then Cecilia occupies the position of the reluctant consumer who, realizing the dehumanizing aspects of consumer subjecthood, wants to, and temporarily, manages to escape from Adrian's world of technology and puts up a fierce resistance against being siphoned back into the state of brainwashed and abject servitude.

While Cecilia's determination to sever ties with the oppressive Griffin can be accounted for by her desire to regain agency and human dignity, it is perhaps less clear-cut why he goes to such great lengths to make the reluctant Cecilia come back to him. With Elizabeth Moss in the leading role, Cecilia comes across as a complex, but believable and relatable character, both vulnerable and strong-minded, gentle and intractable. This ambiguity may be a force of attraction in itself but her looks are definitely not on par with the glamorous beauties the audience might expect to find in the company of

billionaire tech giants. In due course, Cecilia asks the invisible Adrian this question herself: "Why me? You could have any woman." She emphasizes her lack of special qualities, protesting that she is only a suburban girl.

Cecilia's self-characterization as an average suburban woman is reminiscent of the rise of consumerist ideology in America in the 1950s when the target population of the emerging advertising business was suburban housewives, therefore, this is another reference to Cecilia's status as the symbolic consumer. In the 1950s housewives constituted themselves as "good subjects" by obediently desiring and consuming household appliances, detergents, medications, and other products touted by advertising. As Nava argues, the 1950s kickstarted an ideology of "brainwashing," primarily targeted at housewives and implemented largely through advertising, insisting on the idea that all real and false needs can be satisfied through buying consumer items (Nava 1992, 163). This is similar to how today's consumers prove their normality through the consumption of technology. Those who have proven their "fitness" and normality as "good subjects" by consuming digital technology assume that boycotters lack the competences to fully participate in today's society.

From the perspective of the tech giants, however, the reluctant consumer poses a potential threat to the dissemination of their ideology and, by implication, to the pervasiveness of their power since any opposition to tyrannical power, however exceptional, might become the rule over time if left unchecked. This is exactly the dynamics playing out between Cecilia and Griffin: the reluctant consumer's successful flight from the clutches of big tech would undermine the latter's authority, prestige, and relevance as an indispensable agent in every individual's life. Therefore, the renegade must be punished and coerced into returning to the fold, thereby legitimizing and acknowledging the abuser's complete power over her life.

The persecution that Cecilia is subjected to aims to denigrate her character in the eyes of other people: the invisible slap on her friend's daughter's face is interpreted as a betrayal of friendship, the malicious email sets her up as a treacherous sister, the empty portmanteau and the fainting at the job interview makes her seem incompetent, unprofessional and an unstable woman without any tangible achievements of her own. Finally, she is framed as the deranged murderer of her sister and is incarcerated in a facility for the criminally insane. At this point, an emissary visits her with an offer from Adrian. Were she to accept his "forgiveness" and return to him, not only would she forfeit her individuality, but she would also acknowledge that all that has been taken away from her in the meantime—her credibility, the

trust, and affection of her loved ones, her right to lead a life of her own—was never really hers in the first place.

The final act of the movie subverts Cecilia and Adrian's position in more than one sense. Cecilia goes to the bathroom and leaves Adrian alone in the dining room. Sidney, providing backup and bearing witness to the events through a security camera feed, watches Adrian sitting alone when suddenly, his throat is slashed. When Cecilia walks out of the building, she asks Sidney to confirm that he saw Adrian commit suicide. As Cecilia departs, an icy determination hardens her gaze, and the audience can catch a glimpse of the invisibility suit tucked away in her handbag. So, Cecilia triumphs over his enemy and gains her desired freedom. However, she is enabled to achieve this victory by means of the obnoxious piece of technology—the invisibility suit—which was used to ruin her life, to torture and kill her loved ones. This sense of moral defeat is highlighted in the exchange with Sidney: his dismay and half-frightened consternation at Cecilia's calm and collected behavior reminds the audience of the long way she has come from a cringing, desperate, victimized woman to the cold femme fatale quietly tying up all loose ends. To some extent, Cecilia becomes a willing consumer, relying on technology to achieve her aims and manipulate people.

This paradoxical ending is evocative of a crucial contradiction at the heart of consumption studies: the consumer paradox. On the one hand, as Paterson explains, consumers can be seen as exploited and manipulated—consumers as "suckers"—on the other hand, they can be regarded as knowledgeable users of consumer items who are able to negotiate and shape their social position by means of their consumption consumers as "savvy" (Paterson 2006, 141–42). By displaying certain consumer items, consumers position themselves in society as belonging to a certain socio-economic group. Gaining social status through consumption has become increasingly more feasible today than ever before because other indicators of social status—such as profession, educational background, religion—have ceased to be highly relevant in the formation of identity and the concomitant group affiliations have eroded. Therefore, people increasingly rely on consumer items to confer a social status to them (Paterson 2006, 171). Whether consumers are seen as taken advantage of by products and services they consume or as individuals who actively and cleverly take advantage of consumer items to improve their prospects in life depends on the perspective; what is certain is that consumer items have become an essential factor in shaping social relations.

In some instances, *The Invisible Man* seems to convey an anti-consumerist stance, poking fun at representatives of consumerism such as the CEO of

the glitzy architect firm during whose little promotional speech about the company Cecilia becomes sick. Another example is the restaurant scene: the glamorous establishment, with flamboyant, postmodern décor, and handsome, young waiters, claims to provide a special experience to the customers. When the waiter pops up at their table, playing his part in creating the "experience," Cecilia's sister disdainfully rebukes him: she knows the experience is completely artificial, staged, and choreographed – the kind of simulated experience symbolized by Disneyland, according to Baudrillard. Strangely, the idea of incarceration, which later happens to the heroine in the movie, is one invoked by Baudrillard when he proposes his hypothesis of third-order simulations: "Disneyland exists in order to hide that it is the 'real' country, all of 'real' America that *is* Disneyland (a bit like prisons are there to hide that it is the social in its entirety, in its banal omnipresence, that is carceral)" (Baudrillard 2006, 12). Cecilia's sister is aware of the disingenuousness and manipulation of the Disneyfied experience: however, she still buys into it, to deny the fakery of the "real" world.

Despite its apparent gesturing towards a critique of consumerism, the movie is part of a franchise of Universal monster movies and as such, is a prime example of mass culture and consumption. Paterson points out that resistance to the "power-bloc," in the form of emerging subcultures, already originate in and dissolve into the dominant consumer culture: the ripping of jeans and then the subsequent selling of pre-ripped jeans is a case in point (Paterson 2006, 163). By the same token, the media often takes notice of counter-movements and enfeebles or completely invalidates them by seemingly embracing them and then selling them back to consumers. Thus, a critique of big tech and digital surveillance devices is deftly translated into the battered woman's empowerment by the same technology.

In addition to references to mass consumption, the film makes several allusions to conspicuous consumption, establishing a contrast between the humble comforts of middle-class life exemplified by Sidney, his daughter, and the beleaguered Cecilia and the ostentatiously glittering settings of the rich, the likes of Adrian Griffin and his brother Tom. The structure of contemporary consumer society may have come a long way since Veblen expounded his theory of the leisure class—and Adrian as an engineer does not strictly speaking belong in that class as defined by Veblen (1997, 200), but the way in which luxurious consumer items and the stylization of everyday activities—as manifested in living spaces or dining habits—are used to articulate a privileged social position has not changed significantly. Veblen claims that "high-bred manners and ways of living are items on conformity

to the norm of conspicuous leisure and conspicuous consumption" (Veblen 1997, 47). The final dinner scene in Adrian's spacious dining room, with a plethora of bite-size delicacies arranged on tiny plates and set on a large dinner table, exemplifies not only the notion of conspicuous consumption but is also evocative of Bourdieu's ideas of the distinctive features of the eating habits of the elite. According to Bourdieu, bourgeois eating habits are characterized by almost purely aesthetic considerations in the presentation of dishes, an emphasis on quality rather than quantity, and a sophisticated etiquette around the dinner table, all of which serve "to deny the crudely material reality of the act of eating" (Bourdieu 1984, 196). This emphasis on ostentation and prestige in connection with eating is emphasized in the film in the two dinner scenes by both the glitzy surroundings and the fact that no actual food consumption is shown to take place.

The most important parallel between domestic abuse and technology is the tension between the purported assurances of privacy and the vulnerability of individuals who become victimized exactly because of this common assumption that their privacy is safe. In the home, it is the relatively weaker partner—whether this weakness is physical, psychological, economic, or social—who often suffers exploitation and mistreatment, while on the world wide web, it is the average consumer whose data are collected, stored, and might be used against them by corporations or other private individuals.

As some critics have pointed out, domestic privacy is often the privacy of the male. At least, it used to be in legal terms in the United States until the 1960s when a series of court cases began to establish different precedents of the right to privacy, especially in terms of women's reproductive rights within the marriage. As a result, "the patriarch was no longer the only individual with privacy rights within the private space [. . .] What individualized the right to privacy, then, was the discovery of the wife's autonomy from her husband." Nelson's optimistic conclusion that "the notion of familial privacy was completely undone" by the 1970s (Nelson 2002, 70), however, is convincing only so far as legal aspects are concerned.

Similarly, those with more technological know-how or financial resources can hijack the data of other users, who, although they become victims of technological power abuses, are not considered to be wronged. Indeed, sometimes the victims themselves refuse to realize that they have been exploited due to an unwillingness to conceptualize the technological power that encroaches upon their lives on a daily basis. Hirsch and Silverstone point out the inherent paradox of people's relationship to technology: "We are, indeed, great consumers of technology. At the same time, we are often quite

anxious about technologies' capacity to consume us" (2003, 2). Surveillance technology is an especially compelling aspect of today's technological environment that bears a strong resemblance to domestic abuse in that it illuminates the paradox between privacy and intrusion. While surveillance technology purports to ensure the user's safety, it is more often and effectively deployed to spy on people; similarly, intimate partner violence within the home is commonly viewed as an integral part of cohabitation. Adrian's glass-cage mansion with its extensive system of security cameras exudes an oppressive atmosphere—much like that of the detention center in which Cecilia is later held. The similarities between the luxury residence and the prison are accentuated by the frequent shots of these interiors through the security camera lens, and this sense of being watched is even more intense in Sidney's house where Cecilia is being harassed by the invisible Adrian. An important difference between intimate partner violence and surveillance technology, though, is that the latter can be completely anonymous: the privacy of the watcher is ensured while that of the person being watched is violated. Despite this dissimilarity, the anonymity of surveillance is often taken advantage of by the abusive partner and used as one of the means by which he can control his partner. Thus, instead of providing safety for all, surveillance technology—and most digital devices can be used for this purpose—reinforces existing power relations by enabling the more powerful and technology-savvy individuals to extend their control over the life of the vulnerable, thereby rendering the former even more powerful, the latter even more defenseless.

What *The Invisible Man* makes particularly salient is exactly this way in which bullying can become faceless, anonymous, and undetectable to its source. Cecilia's suspicions that she is being watched are symptomatic of the interiorization of the sense of being monitored and are evocative of Foucault's explanation of the Panopticon model. Foucault demonstrates that actual surveillance is a powerful tool in controlling subjects but, more importantly, the awareness of the possibility of being watched at any moment is a significantly more effective means to supervise individuals since it does not require constant and actual monitoring. The point is, argues Foucault, that subjects must be made to feel they are being monitored and this will intimidate them into regulating their behavior according to norms and expectations set by the powerful without any active intervention on the part of the authorities. He draws the conclusion that "power should be visible and unverifiable" (Foucault 1997, 201). Indeed, surveillance is probably the

single most effective means of controlling individuals and it is a prominent feature of both intimate partner violence and digital technology.

By monitoring the subject, the abuser attempts to strengthen his hold on his victim by inculcating norms of speech and behavior, including lifestyle factors. Gradually, the abuse proceeds from influencing the outward aspects of a person's life to her inner cognitive processes. Marx famously stated: "Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behaviour" (Marx and Engels 2004, 47). This precept, according to which the mind can be manipulated by means of interventions on the body, is one that governs systematic abuse. One of the reasons why Marx was anxious to discredit religion was that it is premised on the existence of the soul that exists, to some extent, outside the realm of material conditions and the social. If that is so, then even long-term, meticulous abuse must fail since the human "soul" cannot be chained to any particular material state and thus can be the source of inner freedom, independence, and dignity. Therefore, all abusers—whether private or political—target and try to weaken the individual's elusive connection to his or her "soul."

This pursuit of divesting people of their spiritual aspect is implemented by offering content that seemingly caters to the needs of consumers – however, these needs are artificially created by the same media. Arguably, much of this content is the product of mass culture rather than popular culture. A distinction between popular culture and mass culture—"culture as the expression of the people and culture as imposition *on* the people" (Culler 2000, 44)—still seems a useful dichotomy even though it has since been contested by some critics in cultural studies (Mukerji and Schudson 1991, 3). By imposing a commercialized culture on the people while packaging this as the creative output of the people, digital media succeeds in using consumers as unwitting tools of disseminating ideologies they do not need or understand.

To be sure, digital mass culture aims to confuse consumers who, relying on their consumption habits to build their identity, are left to scramble for snippets of identity conferred to them by a product or a lifestyle choice which later turns out to be ruinous to the same kind of identity. These contradictory demands on consumers result in a generalized sense of disorientation as they realize that signing up for a particular look or lifestyle does not ensure either a stable identity or social position. As consumers grow desperate for more guidance from the main source of their insecurities, big tech is tightening its grip on them, fueling their desire for admiration and material wealth, while worsening their dependencies and addictions, deepening their isolation,

making them childlike and lost in a maze of images and messages devoid of any stable meaning. By the same token, the abuser aims to confuse their partner by contradictory reproaches, criticism, and falsehoods. However, since the victim believes that she is the one to blame for the abuse and also because she is, in many cases, virtually isolated from the outside world due to the abuser's manipulations, s/he has no one else to rely on and expect help from than the abuser, who created this situation in the first place.

A final parallel between digital technology and domestic abuse involves assumed normality or rationality. The abuser often appears to be a charming, reasonable, and upright man to the outside world, while he shows his true nature only to his victim. Hence the battered woman's accounts of mistreatment are met with disbelief and suspicion. An analogous feature of technology is that it is posited as an overwhelmingly beneficial phenomenon that not only enhances individuals' quality of life but also contributes to social justice and equality. While technology's wonders and blessings are extolled, its pernicious effects remain in the shadows: "as consumers we are seduced by the benefits of technology but are simultaneously blinded to the power technology represents" (Miles 2006, 82).

In the final analysis, *The Invisible Man* demonstrates how vulnerable and exposed a subject is to the pervasive and anonymous power of digital technology. It is also a reminder of the protean nature of abuse: whether it happens in the form of intimate partner violence or as cyberbullying, at home or the workplace, whether it is physical or psychological, outright calumny or subtle manipulation, the abuser melts into the background, while the victim is on full display with her apparently unreasonable, disconcerted behavior, her incomprehensible rage, and terror: she is the only one visible, the only one to blame.

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"The Show Must Go On"
Revisiting the West End Musicals in 2020

The Musical Theatre—A Synoptic View

The history of musical theatre can be traced back to ancient Greece as most records show. Thus, during the 5th century B.C., most plays in Greece were staged with up to three actors and a chorus that responded to the actions of the characters therefore, besides dialogue, plays contained songs and dance. Later on, in the Middle Ages, when most people could not understand Latin, the official language of the church, many intelligent monks began to incorporate music and art in their evangelical missions. One of their additions was the introduction of cycle plays, which were biblical stories disseminated to different groups in order to be performed in church so believers could better understand the biblical message. As audiences grew, these groups moved outside the church and started traveling in pageant wagons from place to place and performed the cycle plays to larger audiences. Music was now played on a regular basis in cycle plays. A few centuries later, King Louis XIV. of France, in his attempt to offer more entertainment to the masses, asked the famous playwright Molière to adapt his plays and add music and dance to his productions who complied without hesitation. The new musical theatre style developed and by the 1700s there were, according to Shay Thornton, two types of musicals called the *ballad opera* and *comic opera*: "The ballad opera used popular songs of the day with new lyrics, while the comic operas had original songs and a more romantic plot development. Both these styles flourished, and the idea of incorporating music into plays grew and grew" (Thornton 2019, 5). Therefore, musical theatre has its roots in these ballad and comic operas and, in the 19th century, it begins to stand out as a popular entertainment genre. Even though there is a widespread

belief that the musical theatre is an American genre, the pioneers of musical theatre are the European ballad and comic opera composers such as William S. Gilbert, Arthur Sullivan, Jacques Offenbach, Johann Strauss or Franz Lehár and the first hubs for it were the West End in London followed by the Paris and Vienna stages.

The earliest musicals, called revues or musical comedies, were different from plays in that they had a weak plot as the focus shifted towards the musical pieces and dances incorporated in them. However, the great age of musical theatre is the 1940s when Oscar Hammerstein and Richard Rogers began to cooperate and combined drama and music in what would be the first worldwide musical success—*Oklahoma*—and would establish Broadway in New York as the leading hub for musicals. Other composers such as Irving Berlin, Jerome Kern, George Gershwin, Cole Porter and Andrew Lloyd Webber would take the genre to higher levels of popularity while the two musical scenes—West End and Broadway would be the most famous hotspots for musical theatre in the world.

Nowadays the musical theatre may be subdivided into different categories: Opera, Operetta, Comic Opera, Musical Revue, and Musical Comedy. The lyrics of the musical pieces may be written by the composer or by another songwriter. In many songs incorporated in musicals, the lyrics serve as part of the narrative or outline a character's feelings. An important part of musicals is the *book*. The *book* or the *libretto* is the skeleton of the musical and it provides the structure of the play. A successful *book* manages to integrate and combine all the elements of the musical—the dialogue, props, musical numbers, lyrics, and dancing. Of these, the central element of a musical theatre is the *musical number*.

The musical number is the key structural unit of a musical and it is the element that increased the popularity of the genre turning them into mega-musical shows. Therefore, one must notice the importance of the musical numbers' list. The mega-musical is the output of a combination of great musical numbers, great actors, outstanding singers, and a huge budget. The budgets of these shows are usually larger than other forms of theatre therefore the companies invest much in their effects, costumes, and sets. They had very large casts, pop-influenced music, and more special effects. The purpose was to offer something to appeal to everyone and hence the big success of this art forms. Thus, the musical numbers must be appealing, uplifting, and easy to remember by the audience. This is the reason why composers of musical numbers chose the popular song format for their music. According to Juslin and Sloboda, the kind of music the musical number format follows

is "a structure which works through a system of chord progressions and modulations leading away from, and back to the initial note" (Juslin and Sloboda 2001, 16).

Andrew Lloyd Webber's Pop-influenced Musical Numbers

Of the contemporary composers, the one that stands out in terms of quality and popularity is Andrew Lloyd Webber and it is the list of the musical numbers that propelled his productions onto the top level. According to Snelson, his main biographer, Lloyd Webber has so consistently conquered popular culture that "from the New York arrival of Jesus Christ Superstar in 1971 to the present, the sun has yet to set on the Lloyd Webber era either on Broadway or in London's West End" (Snelson 2004, 2). Indeed, his mega-musicals (*Jesus Christ Superstar, Joseph and The Amazing Technicolour Dreamcoat, Evita, Starlight Express, Sunset Boulevard, Cats, The Phantom of the Opera, Love Never Dies*) enjoyed such considerable acclaim that no other composer has surpassed him. In spite of his popularity and success, the critical response to his productions has been divided, ranging from neglect to appreciation. Drama critics such as Frank Rich from *New York Times* mocked the success of his musical, *The Phantom of the Opera* as being "a victory of dynamic stagecraft over musical kitsch" (Rich 1988), while the *Newsweek* reviewer, David Ansen called the *Sunset Boulevard* performance a "dull show" (Ansen 1993). But besides some negative reviews, there is a fair number of scholars whose viewpoints on Lloyd Webber's shows are objective and are worth studying. In my investigation, I am informed mainly by Stephen Citron's (2001) comparative study entitled *Sondheim and Lloyd-Webber: The New Musical*, John Snelson's (2004) biography *Andrew Lloyd Webber*, David Chandler's (2009) study on Lloyd Webber's masterpieces, Juslin and Sloboda's (2001) study *Music and Emotion* and Vagelis Siroupulos's (2008) thesis on Lloyd Webber's musicals. These scholars agree that Lloyd Webber's works are much finer than his many detractors have claimed and those qualitative issues aside from the popularity and influence of the musicals make them worthy of study. Snelson, for instance, provides a combined musical and dramatic perspective which enables readers to discover Lloyd Webber's musicals as unique experiences which can only be felt while in the live audience. He sets Lloyd Webber apart from his successful predecessors, namely Rogers, Hammerstein, Kern, or Sondheim in terms of musical style, staging, props, and special effects (Snelson 2004, 5). Also, Steven Citron offers an interesting comparative and contrastive approach between Lloyd

Webber and Sondheim and outlines the main features Lloyd Webber uses that make him so special.

What distinguishes Lloyd Webber from other composers is, in my view, a preference for broad phrased, almost hymn-like ballads with large melodic leaps. These ballads have become Lloyd Webber's trademark; they are the great musical numbers everyone expects from his musicals. They are the great tunes that repeatedly crash into the orchestral texture and they are sometimes called pop arias since the aria was the opera's analogous unit for expressing emotions. In other words, Lloyd Webber's favorite techniques are the reworking of classical pieces into a pop context and this is the reason why his fiercest critics attacked him for his lack of originality. However, Snelson appreciates his technique and sees it as a postmodern, eclectic reworking of classical pieces which turns him into an original composer: "The opposition between prose and musical numbers exists in order to distinguish the prosaic, the ordinary, the mundane from the emotional, the extraordinary, the extravagant" (Snelson 2004, 46). And, in spite of his classical thematic borrowings or the references to classical composers, Lloyd Webber's "stylistic origins are more strongly in commercial pop" (55).

These adaptations are the essence of the stage-audience relationship during a live performance. Everything seems to be in its right place—emotions, music, lyrics, dance, and acting—so the audience is totally immersed in the show. It can even stop the show, stand up and applaud, cheer loudly and restart the show. Thus, the distance between stage and auditorium or, as Gadamer has put it, the space between "theatron and theoros" is almost closed (Gadamer 1975, 105). Vagelis Siropoulos, a recent scholar, considers that

> apart from music, the musical number exploits the effects of many other arts associated with immediate affective response, like dance, light design and set design, then we reach an interesting conclusion: the musical number aspires at being a total art in itself, a minimalist version of the Wagnerian ideal of Gesamtkunst, the merging of all arts in an all-inclusive art form. (Siropoulos 2008, 2)

The musical numbers composed by Lloyd Webber have been the key elements that increased the audiences of his musical throughout the world. But due to the outburst of the Covid 19 pandemic, the live performances stopped short and his followers started to miss these great musicals. The composer and his associates came with a response and launched a project called *The Show Must Go On* on the YouTube platform—an initiative meant to make shows from

Lloyd Webber's back catalog available to home audiences while London's West End theatres were closed. Thus, *Joseph and the Amazing Technicolour Dreamcoat* followed by *Jesus Christ Superstar, Evita, The Phantom of the Opera, Love Never Dies,* and *Cats,* etc. were made available every weekend for 48 hours. They managed to rack up over 25 million viewers after the first broadcast. All broadcasts were the best live versions of the shows featuring brilliant singers/actors such as Donny Osmond, Elaine Paige, Ramin Karimloo, Kiri te Kanawa, Sierra Boggess, Sarah Brightman, Antonio Banderas, Mel C, etc. While watching these shows, one remarks again the power of the musical numbers of these musical plays and the overwhelming emotion they convey.

The first musical streamed which I watched was the 1999 direct-to-video adaptation of *Joseph and the Amazing Technicolor Dreamcoat* with Danny Osmond playing the role of Joseph while the London stage veteran Maria Friedman performs in the central role of the narrator. The musical film follows the same story of Joseph' life as the West End musical and it begins in 1968 as a 15-minute cantata written for a junior high school in England. Lloyd Webber described this musical show as a *pop oratorio*. An oratorio is a 17th-century term, which denotes an extended musical drama on a religious theme (such as Bach's famous *Christmas Oratorio*). *Joseph and The Amazing Technicolor Dreamcoat* is a montage of popular music styles, bringing the Old Testament story up to date. The only change is the addition of a very brief framing device in which the actors begin the film as teachers in a school where the students become the children's chorus of the musical. It is the Old Testament's well-known, inspirational story of Jacob's son, who is sold into a life of slavery by his jealous brothers but finally triumphs in Egypt due to his faith in God. The adaptation is a palimpsest of popular musical styles: rock 'n' roll, vaudeville, calypso, country, and disco.

Of the list of the musical numbers, the songs that stand out are, in my view, *Any Dream Will Do* and *Close Every Door. Any Dream Will Do* (first sung by Jason Donovan in 1991 at London Palladium) is a direct reference to one of the themes of the story, the interpretations of dreams:

> I closed my eyes/Drew back the curtain
> To see for certain/What I thought I knew
> Far far away/Someone was weeping
> But the world was sleeping/Any dream will do. (Mallet 1999)

Donny Osmond is a tenor with a strong but soft voice at the same time. He is likable and with good intent and this can be seen in his movement and voice. There are two renditions of this tune (the second one being the Grand Finale). The accompaniment in the second one is very similar to the vocal line in the piano and the children's chorus match perfectly the attitude of the protagonist, adding emotion and positivity. The beautiful sound of their voices in union reminds of the nostalgic and family-driven nature of the Joseph story (a story about a father losing and being reunited with his son). *Close Every Door*, the other musical number that stands out is an emotional ballad which Joseph sings from a prison cell into which he has been unfairly thrown. In the background, members of the ensemble hold lit candles and their singing seemed to echo in the theatre, adding up to the haunting quality of the song. In addition to expressing Joseph's despair at being imprisoned for a crime he has not committed, the song appears to contain allusions to the Holocaust. Lyrics such as "Just give me a number / Instead of my name [. . .] Destroy me completely / Then throw me away" reflect the well-documented Nazi practices of tattooing numbers on imprisoned Jews (Mallet 1999).

The next musical I keenly watched is Lloyd Webber's central opus, *The Phantom of the Opera*. Of the many reviewers of this performance, there are two who synthesize the very essence of this musical. Thus, Jerrold Hoggle defines the Phantom as a "popular opera," a work that embodies "many of the contradictions behind the deeply troubled forms of entertainment in middle-class Western culture" (Hoggle 2002, 203). Indeed, we may assert that it is a work of popular musical theatre that attempts to be as operatic as possible without chasing away an audience who would consider opera as too difficult to grasp. At the same time, Cathleen Myers describes *The Phantom of the Opera* as "an opera lovers' dream musical" (Myers 2009, 23), while David Chandler observes the influence of Mozart's and Puccini's music on Lloyd Webber's musical numbers in this musical (Chandler 2009). The broadcast was the 25th Anniversary film adaptation version of Andrew Lloyd Webber's, filmed at the Royal Albert Hall in 2011, the one produced by Cameron Mackintosh and starring Ramin Karimloo, Sierra Boggess, and Hadley Fraser. The musical is based on the novel written in 1910 by Gaston Leroux and was adapted and composed in 1986 to become the longest-running musical on Broadway and West End ever. In this broadcast, after the bows, Andrew Lloyd Webber gives a speech to the audience before bringing out both the Royal Albert Hall and the original team, the original leads from the London and Broadway productions, and the original London cast, including Michael Crawford and Sarah Brightman. Brightman then

performs theme song in *The Phantom of the Opera* with Colm Wilkinson, Anthony Warlow, Peter Jöback, and John Owen-Jones. Ramin Karimloo joins the four Phantoms in singing *The Music of the Night*, along with both casts and production teams.

The musical numbers which stand out are the title song, *Think of Me* and *The Music of the Night*. The theme song has an instrumental version—the *Ouverture* (2 min)—and another version with lyrics. The one with lyrics, written by Charles Hart and Richard Stilgoe, was originally recorded by Sarah Brightman and Michael Crawford. The song is performed in Act I before *The Music of the Night* and is reprised in Act II. It takes place as the Phantom escorts Christine by boat to his lair beneath the Opera Garnier. While the instrumental version is a masterful rendition of a grand orchestra (led by the conductor Anthony English), the rendition of the theme song is a wonderful performance by the gorgeous tenor baritone Ramin Karimloo and the unique voice, Sierra Boggess.

Later on, when Boggess (as Christine) enters the stage with her sublime voice singing the song *Think of Me*, the audience remains breathless. It is the third song in the musical and is the first time the main character sings. The lyrics of the song denote the singers' desire that someone should think of them even when they are "far away and free" (Perry 1987, 166). Its structure is unique and detailed, creating a romantic and happy feeling. The piece begins homophonically meaning that the two parts (voice and piano accompaniment) are moving together in harmony: "Think of me, / think of me fondly, / when we've said goodbye" (168). It begins with a moderate forte and then it is repeated with different lyrics. The second part is played and sung with a less romantic and darker tone as the mood of the lyrics change. Then the gentle and romantic feel is restored. After repeating the second part with a different second half, some instrumental music leads into a new character singing, an aspect that reinforces the dramatic tone of the lyrics. Christine sings again and concludes the piece. She repeats the second part with a different ending as well, however, her last two words are sung as a cadenza, which gives a dramatic ending to the aria. Rhythm is another important feature of this musical number as it establishes much of the mood and feeling created throughout. There are fast and complex tempos that allow the character to show off her talent and express the level of difficulty this section has. David Chandler notes that this musical number is an "operaticized song which invents a tradition for the modern musical and connects it with the high culture of the past by appealing to the culturally aspirational instincts of the audience" (Chandler 2009).

The other outstanding musical number from *The Phantom of the Opera* is *The Music of the Night*. The tune is sung after the Phantom lures Christine Daaé to his lair beneath the Opera House. He seduces Christine with "his music" of the night, his voice putting her into a type of trance. The Phantom (played by Ramin Karimloo) sings of his unspoken love for her and urges her to forget the world and life she knew before:

> Softly, deftly, music shall caress you.
> Hear it, feel it, secretly possess you.
> Open up your mind, let your fantasies unwind,
> In this darkness which you know you cannot fight.
> The darkness of the music of the night. (Perry 1987, 169)

The voice is soft and vibrant at the same time, in tone with the lyrics while the cadenzas, rhythm, and tempo add up to the tense moment of the play and pave the new setting for Christine. The intensity of the rendition and the lyrics did deep into Christine's psyche that the song has a hypnotic effect on her, a feeling equally shared by the audience.

To conclude, there is undoubtedly an intrinsic power of the musical numbers composed by Lloyd Webber that invites audiences to be almost co-participants in his shows, even if they do it from the living room. The reworked classical pieces into pop-influenced tunes add value to Lloyd Webber's musicals and enhance the dramatic devices employed in the performance of the actors/singers, creating a bridge between them and the audience. All these musical numbers are more than outstanding both in terms of lyrics and performance. Besides the ones analyzed above, there are other musical numbers in *The Phantom* and in *Joseph* which are no less valuable in terms of tone, mood, and their role as show stoppers meant to close the gap between the stage and the audience, a chord Lloyd Webber so keenly tries to strike. A follow-up of this paper will focus on the musical numbers from the next shows broadcast on the YouTube platform, *Love Never Dies* and *Cats*.

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